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RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS AND THE LAW 
Paul G. Kauper* and Stephen C. Ellis** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A decisive event in the history of Christianity was the edict of Constantine, which recognized the validity of bequests to the 
Catholic Church, thereby enabling the Church in its corporate capac-
ity to receive, hold, and accumulate property1 and laying the founda-
tion for the erection of a legal structure that was to have profound 
implications for both the church and the state. It is not the purpose 
of this article to develop at length the history of the church's owner-
ship of land and the reaction against it during the Reformation that 
often resulted in confiscation of church lands and enactment of mort-
main laws limiting the amount of land that churches could hold. 
The point is simply that the granting of a legal right to churches to 
acquire, hold, and accumulate property is of prime significance with 
respect to the place of the church in a secular society.2 
Unincorporated associations such as churches face problems of 
title with respect to the acquisition, use, and disposition of property, 
particularly real estate.3 At the early common law, a deed of land to 
an unincorporated association was ineffective.4 If the deed were con-
• Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1929, Earlham 
College; J.D. 1932, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
•• Member of the Washington Bar. B.A. 1967, University of Washington; J.D. 1970, 
University of Michigan.-Ed. 
I. The edict reads as follows: 
The same Augustus to the people. 
Each and every one should have, when departing, the freedom to leave what 
property he has wished to the most holy and venerable council of the Catholic 
Church. 
Decisions should not be void. 
There is nothing which is more due to persons than that the writing of their 
last will, after which they no longer can will anything, should be unrestricted 
and that their decisions, because it does not return again, should be free. 
Posted on 3 July at Rome, Crispus and Constantine Caesars being consuls 
for the second time. 
P. COLEMAN·NORTON, ROMAN STATE AND CHRISI'IAN CHURCH 85-86 (1966). 
2. "Corporate organization represents one of the supreme achievements of highly 
civilized society. The substantial benefits to be derived from such a legal mechanism 
have been recognized by Church and State, which in turn have adapted the corporate 
scheme to their respective needs. The relation between Church and State may be 
gleaned by an analysis of the position which the State assumes toward the eccelesiasti-
cal juristic personality." B. BROWN, THE CANONICAL Jt1RIS11C PERSONALITY WITH SPECIAL 
REFERENCE TO !TS STA11IS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1 (1927). 
3. For general law and history of unincorporated associations and their legal 
capacity, see H. FORD, UNINCORPORATED NON-PROFIT AssoCIATIONS (1959); s. WRIGHTING-
TON, THE LAW OF UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS AND BUSINESS TRUSTS (2d ed. 1923); 
Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 HARv. L. REv. 404 (1916). 
4. See IR. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 510-17 (1969); Ford, Dispositions of Property to 
Unincorporated Non-Profit Associations, 55 MICH. L. REv. 67, 71-76 (1956). 
[ 1500] 
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sidered to be a deed to the individual members of the association as 
tenants in common, the transfer was effective, but the further dispo-
sition of the property and the devolution of individual members' in-
terests created difficulties. Was each member's share his own property 
interest and thus part of his disposable estate, or was it impressed 
with some kind of trust for the benefit of the church? 
The same questions could be raised if land intended for the bene-
fit of the church were transferred by deed to an officer of a hierarchi-
cal church (such as a bishop of the Roman Catholic Church). Did 
the land pass to the bishop in his personal capacity and become sub-
ject, therefore, to disposition by him during his lifetime or at death, 
or was there an implicit limitation that the property was to be held 
by him and his successors in office solely for the benefit of the 
church? 
Two legal devices, the trust and the corporation, could be used 
to deal with the problem of title. A deed to a church officer could be 
regarded as a transfer in trust, thereby ensuring that the property 
would be used in perpetuity for the benefit of the church, with the 
occupant of the office at any given time serving as the trustee. Or the 
bishop could be regarded as a corporation holding the property for 
the purposes of the church, and each successor bishop would exercise 
the corporation's authority over the property. In either case, per-
petual ownership of the property for the purpose of the church was 
assured. 
An unincorporated association, with its many members, would 
raise more difficulties in working out the trust idea, unless it could 
be said that the deed to the association was a transfer in trust for the 
benefit of the church generally, that the land would be held in trust 
for such a purpose, and that the officers of the church could serve as 
trustees for the further disposition of the property. Clearly, the trust 
approach became easier if the property were transferred to named 
persons as trustees to hold for the benefit of the church. Apart from 
the trust pattern, the association could assert control over the prop-
erty only if the church or one of its officers had been accorded a cor-
porate status by the state. It is conceivable, of course, that a statute 
could grant a limited corporate status to a church solely for the pur-
pose of holding and disposing of property without giving it all the 
aspects of a legally incorporated body. 
It is clear from any preliminary discussion of this problem that 
a close and interesting relation exists between the trust and the 
corporate concepts as they are used to allow nonprofit associations 
1502 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:1499 
to acquire and hold property. Indeed, the end results of the trust 
device and the incorporation device are virtually the same. This is 
particularly true when, under a statute that provides for incorpora-
tion of a church body, the trustees are both the incorporators and the 
corporate body, so that the control and disposition of the property 
is in the hands of the trustees in their corporate capacity and, in tum, 
any disposition must be made by them. At this point the difference 
between an explicit conveyance in trust for the benefit of a given 
group and the incorporation of trustees to achieve the same purpose 
is even less pronounced. 
The availability of the trust device in itself presents an important 
question. Although originally equity would not enforce a trust with-
out specifically identified beneficiaries, this doctrine was eventually 
modified by the development of the charitable trust concept, by 
means of which property could be given to a trustee for a particular 
use or for the benefit of a group that was not specifically determined, 
provided the purpose of the trust was educational, charitable, or re-
ligious. The extension of the charitable trust doctrine to include 
trusts set up for religious purposes was a development of prime im-
portance to the churches. Originating in England, the charitable 
trust doctrine was generally adopted by American courts.6 
Many of the observations concerning the status of religious socie-
ties are equally applicable to other nonprofit associations that are 
organized for purposes within the charitable trust idea or that come 
within the range of incorporation statutes. It is only because the 
granting of special legal privileges may be deemed to raise a peculiar 
type of constitutional question in terms of church-state relations that 
the problems of religious associations deserve special attention. This 
article will attempt to present a picture of the legal status of religious 
organizations, with particular reference to the enjoyment of the cor-
porate privilege. Necessarily, this will involve at the outset an his-
torical review tracing the development of that status, beginning with 
the practice of granting special charters to churches and culminating 
in the now familiar general incorporation statute. Special attention 
will be paid to distinctive problems that arose in Utah, Pennsylvania, 
and Virginia concerning corporate status. The historical review is 
followed by a summary survey of the current state laws relating to 
the incorporation of churches. The last section deals with questions 
that the granting and conditioning of corporate status for churches 
and the applicability of corporation laws to church bodies may raise 
under the religion clauses of the first amendment. 
5. See, e.g., Vidal v. Girard's Exrs., 43 U.S. (2 How.) 126 (1844). 
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II. A HISTORY OF CHURCH CORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
The history of ecclesiastical corporations in the United States is 
a relatively unknown and unexplored area of law. The text materials 
available for study are sparse and, for the most part, of considerable 
vintage. 6 Therefore, in any attempt to portray this history reliance 
must be placed primarily on case law, and, to a lesser degree, on the 
statutes and enactments of the era under review. 
A. Roman and English Antecedents 
The Roman law first conceived of the notion of a body of people 
with a collective interest acting together as a legally recognized unit 
to govern its own affairs. Such groups were called collegia or uni-
versitates and were given certain collective powers, such as the power 
to hold land.7 While the edict of Constantine8 did not speak directly 
to the incorporation of individual churches, it implied a corporate 
capacity for local congregations by allowing them to accept legacies 
as a unit. The early Roman Catholic Church recognized the useful-
ness of corporate status and soon adopted the idea into the canon 
Iaw.9 Organizations with the power to hold land could be created 
simply by the formation of a voluntary association by parties with 
6. C. BARTLE'IT, THE TENURE OF PAROCHIAL PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES OF 
.AMERICA (1926): B. BROWN, THE CANONICAL JURimc PERSONAIJTY WITH SPECIAL REFER-
ENCE TO ITS STATUS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1927): H. DESMOND, THE CHURCH 
AND THE LAW (1898); P. DIGNAN, A HISTORY OF THE LEGAL INCORPORATION OF CATIIOLIC 
CHURCH PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1784-1932) (1935); W. DOHENY, CHURCH 
PROPERTY: MODES OF ACQUISITION (1927): P. Gun.DAY, THE CATIIOLIC CHURCH IN VmGINIA 
(1815-1822) (1924); M. HOFFMAN, ECCI.ESIASTICAL LAW IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1868); 
C. HOWELL, THE CHURCH AND THE ClvIL LAW (1886); S. HUDSON, LAW FOR THE CLERGY 
(1877): C. LINCOLN, CIVIL I.Aw AND THE CHURCH (1916): D. Mcl.EAisH, THE LAws OF THE 
STATE OF TEXAS AFFECTING CHURCH PROPERTY (1960): w. STRONG, Two LECTURES UPON 
THE RELATIONS OF CIVIL LAW TO CHURCH POLITY, DISCIPLINE AND PROPERTY (1875); 
R. TYLER, AMERICAN EcCI.ESIASTICAL I.Aw: THE I.Aw OF RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES, CHURCH 
GoVERNMENT AND CREEDS, DISTURBING RELIGIOUS MEETINGS AND THE LAW OF BURIAL 
GROUNDS IN THE UNITED STATES (1866); C. ZOLLMANN, .AMERICAN CHURCH LAW (1933); 
Zollmann, Classes of American Religious Corporations, 13 MICH. L, REv. 566 (1915): 
Zollmann, Powers of American Religious Corporations, 13 MICH, L. REv. 646 (1915): 
Zollmann, Nature of American Religious Corporations, 14 MICH. L. REv. 37 (1915). 
7. 2 J. DAVIS, CoRPORATIONS 224-25 (1971). It should be noted, however, that the 
"Roman Law never reached the point in development at which the corporations were 
included in the category of 'persons.'" Id. at 226. For a history of church associations 
under the civil law, see C. BARTLE'IT, supra note 6, at 6-8, 13-16; B. BROWN, supra note 
6. 
8. For full text of edict, see note I supra. 
9. "The Catholic Church and the Apostolic See have moral personality by divine 
institution itself; the other inferior moral persons in the Church obtain it either by the 
very prescription of the law or by special grant of the competent ecclesiastical superior 
given by formal decree for a religious or charitable purpose.'' Canon 100, § 1. This 
English translation is taken from T.L. BOUSCAREN, A. ELLis, &: F. KOR'IH, CANON I.Aw: 
A TEXT AND COMMENTARY 89 (4th ed. rev. 1963). 
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common interests; no prior consent or approval by the state was re-
quired for the existence of a viable entity.10 
In England, under the common law, things changed somewhat. 
The rise of the strong independent sovereign led to the idea that 
organizations exercising collegiate or corporate powers could exist 
only with the prior approval of the sovereign. Since many of these 
bodies had long existed as recognized juristic entities without the 
express consent of the sovereign or at least without preservation of 
the record of such approval, a fiction arose that permission had in-
deed been given by an earlier sovereign and that the charter had 
subsequently been lost. These organizations are the so-called com-
mon law corporations.11 
The requirement of prior approval by the state stressed the su-
premacy of the state over the church, a notion that was at variance 
with the church's view of itself and with traditional medieval notions 
of church-state relations. The Catholic Church saw itself as a moral 
person, founded in divine law, with the power to administer its own 
property independently of any sovereign.12 However, the Reforma-
tion, at least in England, destroyed any notion that the church ex-
isted as a separate spiritual entity immune from rule by the civil 
authorities. The use of the corporate form was limited to organiza-
tions upon which the privilege had been expressly bestowed. The 
church could no longer reside in England as a recognized entity with 
the power to take and hold property. It was now reduced to the level 
of any other voluntary, unincorporated association, dependent upon 
the state's grant of power. 
By the eighteenth century, the device of a charter incorporating 
a local congregation had been developed. The Church of England 
itself was not considered to be a corporate unit: 
At common law the church of England, in its aggregate description, 
is not deemed a corporation. It is indeed one of the great estates of 
the realm; but is no more, on that account, a corporation, than the 
nobility in their collective capacity. The phrase, "the Church of 
England," so familiar in our laws and judicial treatises, is nothing 
more than a compendious expression for the religious establishment 
of the realm, considered in the aggregate under the superintendance 
of its spiritual head. In this sense the Church of England is said to 
have peculiar rights and privileges, not as a corporation, but as an 
ecclesiastical institution under the patronage of the state.13 
10. 2 J. DAVIS, supra note 7, at 224-25; R. TYLER, supra note 6, at 57-58. 
11. See J. ANGELL &: s. AME'S, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 55-56 (11th ed. 1882). 
12. See text accompanying note 96 infra. 
13. Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 292, 325 (1815). 
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As such, the Church was even more subject to the specific control of 
the state with respect to temporal affairs. Each unit was to be incor-
porated separately, since the Church as a whole was not accorded the 
corporate status. The requirement of separate incorporation for each 
congregation was substantially mitigated by special laws incorporat-
ing ministers as corporations sole and by the granting of other priv-
ileges to the Church of England in its role as the established church.14 
However, it is fair to say that English corporate history can be seen, 
in part, as an attempt by the state to reduce the temporal power of 
the church along with assertions of political and spiritual power over 
it on other fronts. 
B. Early Corporate Development in America 
It hath been held (says Mr. Justice Blackstone) that if an uninhabited 
country be discovered and planted by English subjects, all the English 
laws then in being, which are the birthright of every subject, are 
immediately there in force. But this must be understood with very 
many and very great restrictions. Such colonists carry with them only 
so much of the English law as is applicable to their own situation 
and the condition of an infant colony; such, for instance, as the gen-
eral rules of inheritance, and of protection from personal injuries. 
The artificial refinements and distinctions incident to the property 
of a great and commercial people, the laws of police and revenue 
(such especially as are enforced by penalties), the mode of mainte-
nance for the established clergy, jurisdiction of the spiritual courts, 
and a multitude of other provisions, are neither necessary nor con-
venient to them, and therefore are not in force.15 
Whether a matter of refinement or necessity, the English notion 
that a corporation could exist only with the express prior approval of 
the state was transmitted to the colonies, along with the idea that an 
unincorporated association could not hold property in its own right 
but could only prevail upon an individual to take the property in his 
own name as trustee for the association. The colonies did, however, 
differ in their treatment of the churches. While the prevailing En-
glish pattern of granting special charters to religious bodies meeting 
with the approval of the king was repeated in most of the colonies, a 
view of the ecclesiastical organization as a municipal corporation 
known as the territorial parish was developed in New England, par-
ticularly in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Maine. The territorial 
parish was charged with the public responsibility of maintaining the 
14. See Weston v. Hunt, 2 Mass. 500 (1807). 
15. 1 R. BURN, THE ECCLESIASTICAL I.Aw 415lll (9th ed. 1842). 
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spiritual aspects of humanity.16 Initially, the parish and the town 
were a single geographic entity, but as time passed the two clearly 
separated into distinct political entities.17 Since the parish was a 
public corporation, membership, acquired by residence within the 
boundaries of the parish, subjected the citizen to the duties one might 
expect in a municipality, including the duty to pay taxes. "Such mem-
bership carried with it all the consequences, agreeable and disagree-
able, which residence in a town or county implied. Residents of a 
county or town were thus individually liable for its debts. A person 
who recovered judgment against these public corporations could 
levy execution against the property of any of their citizens."18 In 
essence, the territorial parish was the spiritual arm of the state and, 
as such, was subject to legislative control.19 
Within the parish, the minister held title in fee simple to all land 
dedicated as "parsonage lands, or lands granted for the use of the 
ministry, or of the minister for the time being."20 He held this land 
as a corporation sole, but "[t]he corporation was thus constituted 
solely for the purpose of holding property for the parish, and [was] 
nothing more than a trustee."21 The minister could grant an estate 
for the duration of his term of office, but an alienation for any longer 
period of time required the consent of the parish.22 During the in-
terim period between ministers, the town or parish was entitled to 
the custody of the property and the rents and profits from it.23 
16. See Second Ecclesiastical Soc. v. First Ecclesiastical Soc., 23 Conn. 254, 277-79 
(1854). In this case the court also noted: 
Each of these societies, or communities, were considered to be, and were in 
fact, municipal, public, political corporations. They were governmental instru-
mentalities, composed of individuals, as component parts of the great community, 
for the promotion of the general welfare of that community, and in which no 
person had an interest, or was to derive a benefit, of a character particular or 
individual to himself merely, but only in connection with, and as he participated 
in, the welfare of the community generally; and not associations of individuals 
as such, created for their mere personal or private advantage, like ordinary private 
corporations; and they were established by the general assembly for the purpose 
of accomplishing, within their respective limits, the objects for which they were 
instituted, more conveniently than they could be accomplished, directly, by the 
general assembly itself. The promotion of these objects was a public duty, enjoined 
by law on the members of such corporations, which consisted of all the inhabitants 
residing within their limits, with the exception of certain individuals in ec-
clesiastical societies, who were, by particnlar provisions, excused from taxation 
for the religious objects of the society. 
23 Conn. at 273. See generally C. Zou.MANN, supra note 6, at 102-07. 
17. See Sedgwick v. Pierce, 2 Root 432 (Conn. 1796); Inhabitants of the First Parish 
v. Duuning, 7 Mass. 445 (1811). 
18. C. Zou.MANN, supra note 6, at 106. 
19. See Second Ecclesiastical Soc. v. First Ecclesiastical Soc., 23 Conn. 254, 274 (1854). 
20. Inhabitants of the First Parish v. Duuning, 7 Mass. 445, 447 (1811). 
21. C. Zou.MANN, supra note 6, at 108. 
22. See, e.g., Weston v. Hunt, 2 Mass. 500 (1807). 
23. See Inhabitants of the First Parish v. Duuning, 7 Mass. 445, 447 (1811); Weston 
v. Hunt, 2 Mass. 500, 502 (1807). 
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The territorial parish existed until the states disestablished the 
church. In Connecticut, for example, the power of the legislature to 
establish such a body was deemed to have been terminated by the 
adoption of a constitutional amendment that stated that "no person 
shall, by law, be compelled to join, or support, nor be classed with, 
or associated to, any congregation, church, or religious association."24 
Outside of New England, the other colonies persisted in the use 
of the special charter, which was granted only on petition to the 
sovereign and at his discretion.25 Many church bodies found it diffi-
cult to secure the corporate privilege because of the feeling of the 
sovereign that incorporation was to be reserved for the established 
church. For example, when Presbyterians in New York attempted to 
secure a charter in July 1767, their request was denied by the Lords 
of Trade in London, due to an uncertainty over whether such a grant 
would constitute an impermissible establishment of a dissenting 
church. The Lords stated, "That is a question of too great importance 
for us to decide, but we are of opinion, that independent of this ob-
jection, it is not expedient, upon principle of general policy, to com-
ply with the prayer of the petition, or to give the Presbyterian Church 
of New York any other privileges or immunities than it is entitled to 
by the laws of toleration."26 The practice of granting special charters 
continued unabated well into the nineteenth century27 and came to 
an end only after states adopted general incorporation laws that in-
cluded religious organizations within their scope. 
One other aspect of the European heritage bears mentioning. 
The idea has long persisted, at least in the United States, that there 
was no such thing as a common law corporation-that is, a corpora-
tion that existed without the benefit of a prior grant of the corporate 
privilege by the sovereign. It is not clear, however, that this was the 
case. There was a sense in which local churches and ministers of the 
24. Second Ecclesiastical Soc. v. First Ecclesiastical Soc., 23 Conn. 254, 274 (1854). 
25. As early as 1696, a charter was given to the Dutch Reformed Church in New 
York City. It incorporated the members of the Garden Street Church and is fairly 
representative of the early charters granted to religious societies in the colonies. "[The 
members] were authorized to have, take, acquire, possess, and purchase lands, tenements, 
and hereditamcnts, or goods and chattels, and the same to lease, grant, alien, sell and 
dispose of at their own will and pleasure, as other our liege people, or any corporation 
or body politic within our realm of England or this our province, may lawfully do." 
M. HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 103-04. On May 6, 1697, Trinity Church in New York 
was incorporated by Governor Fletcher-the power to incorporate still residing at this 
time with the executive and not the legislature. Id. at 295-310. 
26. Id. at 131. 
27. For example, an index to the statutes passed by the General Assembly of Rhode 
Island up to 1862 shows a total of 288 charters granted to various religious societies, 
the earliest dating from 1769. INDEX ro THE PRINTED Acrs .AND RESOLVES OF, AND OF 
THE PETITIONS .AND REPORTS TO THE GENERAL i\ssE:MBLY OF THE STATE OF RHODE JsLAND 
.AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS, FROM THE YEAR 1850 TO 1862 xx-xxviii (1863). 
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Church of England were deemed to be corporations without the 
benefit of a specific act granting the use of the corporate privilege. 
As shown by Mr. Justice Story in Town of Pawlet v. Clark28 and 
Terrett v. Taylor,29 local churches of the Episcopalian faith could 
hold property, and their ministers were seized with title to the vari-
ous grants in order that they might have a source of income: 
At a very early period the religious establishment of England 
seems to have been adopted in the colony of Virginia; and, of course, 
the common law upon that subject, so far as it was applicable to the 
circumstances of that colony. The local division into parishes for 
ecclesiastical purposes can be very early traced; and the subsequent 
laws enacted for religious purposes evidently pre-suppose the exis-
tence of the Episcopal church with its general rights and authorities 
growing out of the common law. What those rights and authorities 
are, need not be minutely stated. It is sufficient that, among other 
things, the church was capable of receiving endowments of land, and 
that the minister of the parish was, during his incumbency, seized of 
the freehold of its inheritable property, as emphatically persona ec-
clesiae, and capable, as a sole corporation, of transmitting that inheri-
tance to his successors. The church wardens, also, were a corporate 
body clothed with authority and guardianship over the repairs of the 
church and its personal property; and the other temporal concerns 
of the parish were submitted to a vestry composed of persons selected 
for that purpose.Bo 
While it is true that such status did not truly approximate actual in-
corporation, it is also true that considerably more power accrued to 
the local churches enjoying this status than was extended to other 
voluntary associations under the common law.B1 
28. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 292 (1815). 
29. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815). 
30. 13 U.S. at 46. The same conclusion is reached in Town of Pawlet with respect to 
the Episcopal church in Vermont. 
31. There is, however, evidence that would, at the least, qualify Justice Story's 
viewpoint. In Weston v. Hunt, 2 Mass. 500, 501 (1807), the court mentions an early 
Massachusetts statute (Act of Feb. 20, 1786, ch. 12, [1783-88] Mass. Acts &: Laws 396) 
that was supposedly modeled after an English provincial statute (28 Geo. II, c. 9 (circa 
1754)). The Massachusetts version read: 
That the deacons of all the several protestant churches, not being episcopal 
churches, and the church wardens of the several episcopal churches, are, and 
shall be deemed so far bodies corporate, as to take in succession all grants and 
donations, whether real or personal, made either to their several churches, the 
poor of their churches, or to them and their successors, and to sue and defend 
in all actions touching the same; and whenever the ministers, elders or vestry, 
shall in such original grants or donations have been joined with such deacons or 
church wardens as donees, or grantees in succession, in such cases, such officers 
and their successors, together with the deacons or church wardens, shall be deemed 
the corporation for such purposes as aforesaid; and the minister or ministers 
of the several protestant churches, of whatever denomination, are and shall be 
deemed capable of taking in succession any parsonage land or lands, granted to 
the minister and his successors, or to the use of the ministers, and of suing and 
defending all actions touching the same • • • • 
August 1973] Religious Corporations and the Law 1509 
The Catholic Church may well have been accorded a similar 
status, in limited geographical areas, as a result of the 181932 and 
189833 treaties between the United States and Spain. The 1819 treaty 
involving the cession of Florida has been interpreted as a confirma-
tion by the federal government of the juridical personality of the 
Catholic Church.34 The 1898 treaty, following the Spanish-American 
War, repeated this recognition. In subsequent litigation over prop-
erty allegedly owned by the Church, the Supreme Court held that 
Spain had vested the Church with a "legal personality" that allowed 
it to hold property without the necessity of prior incorporation.35 
It is not entirely clear that such recognition rested on either treaty; 
one case involving a property dispute indicated that "[t]he corporate 
existence of the Roman Catholic Church, as well as the position 
occupied by the papacy, has always been recognized by the Govern-
ment of the United States.''36 
The independent corporate capacity of the Catholic Church was 
also recognized by the supreme courts of California37 and Texas.38 
As recently as 1927, the Florida supreme court stated, "That the com-
mon law corporation sole is, under our statute adopting the common 
law, the law in Florida today ... there can be no doubt .... "39 
C. The Growth of General Incorporation Laws 
The difficulties inherent in any system that grants special favors 
to a few led to the downfall of incorporation by special charter.40 It 
32. Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits with Spain, Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 252, 
T.S. No. 327. 
33. Treaty of Peace with Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754, T.S. No. 343. 
34. "There can be no doubt of the power of the King of Spain to grant lands in 
Florida while the province was his; nor of the capacity of the Roman Catholic Church 
to take by grant. Our treaty with Spain recognises and ratifies all such grants made 
prior to a certain day." 1 OP. ATIY. GEN. 563-64 (1822). 
35. Santos v. Holy Roman Catholic & Apostolic Church, 212 U.S. 463 (1909); 
Municipality of Ponce v. Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, 210 U.S. 296 (1908). 
36, Municipality of Ponce v. Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, 210 U.S. 296, 318 
(1908). 
37. Santillan v. Moses, I Cal. 92 (1850). But see City of San Diego v. Cuyamaca 
Water Co., 209 Cal. 105, 287 P. 475 (1930). 
38. Blanc v. Alsbury, 63 Tex. 489 (1885); Blair v. Odin, 3 Tex. 288 (1848). 
39. Reid v. Barry, 93 Fla. 849, 887, 112 S. 846, 860 (1927). 
40. The method of obtaining corporate capacity by special charters is subject to 
grave abuse, not so much on the part of church societies, but in regard to other 
private corporations. Not only was gross favoritism shown to particular persons in 
granting charters to them, but the ever-increasing demand for such charters 
threatened to swamp the Legislatures and prevent them from performing their 
other duties. As a consequence, constitutional amendments were passed in many 
states prohibiting the Legislature from granting any such special charters and 
requiring them to pass general incorporation acts not only in regard to corpora-
tions for profit, but also in regard to all other corporations. 
C. ZoLLMANN, supra note 6, at 134-35. 
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seems probable that the spirit of separation and pluralism that swept 
the country at the time of the American Revolution lent aid to the 
enactment of general incorporation laws. The old system of special 
charters had proven to be a means of establishing favored religious 
bodies, and states began to enact statutes that granted the corporate 
form to all bodies that could comply with certain minimal prerequi-
sites. Such incorporated bodies were no longer seen as favorites of 
the state but as sectarian agencies that had been accorded the benefit 
of a secular legal form with which they might more effectively achieve 
their stated goals and purposes. The reasons for this movement away 
from the special legislative recognition of the established church to 
the more readily available status of the private corporation were per-
haps best expressed in the preamble to the New York Act of April 
6, 1784: 
Whereas by the thirty-eighth Article of the Constitution of the State 
of New York, it is ordained, determined and declared, that free cap-
ital Exercise and Enjoyment of religious Profession and Worship, 
without Discrimination or Preference should forever thereafter be 
allowed within this State to all Mankind, provided that the Liberty 
of Conscience thereby granted, should not be so construed, as to 
excuse Acts of Licentiousness, or justify Practices inconsistent with 
the Peace or Safety of this State. 
And whereas, many of the Churches, Congregations, and religious 
Societies in this State (while it was a Colony) have been put to great 
Difficulties to support the public Worship of God, by reason of the 
illiberal and partial Distribution of Charters of Incorporation to 
religious Societies, whereby many Charitable and well disposed Per-
sons have been prevented from Contributing to the Support of Re-
ligion, £or want of proper Persons authorized by law to take charge 
of their pious Donations, and many Estates purchased and given £or 
the Support of religious Societies, now rest in private hands, to the 
great Insecurity of the Societies for whose Benefit they were pur-
chased or given, and to the no less Disquiet of many of the good 
People of this State. 
And whereas, it is the duty of all Wise, Free and Virtuous Gov-
ernments to countenance and encourage virtue and religion, and to 
remove every Lett or Impediment to the Growth and Prosperity of 
the People, and to enable every religious Denomination to provide 
for the Decent and Honorable Support of Divine Worship, agreeable 
to the dictates of Conscience and Judgment .... 41 
41. Ch. 18, preamble, [1784] N.Y. Laws 21. So popular did such acts become, that in 
1866 a New York author stated: "Trinity Church, of the city of New York, and a few 
other Protestant Episcopal Churches of the State, exist under special charters, but most 
of the churches or societies of this denomination in the State of New York have been 
organized under the general incorporating acts passed from time to time by the 
State legislature." R. TYLER, supra note 6, at 59-60. The churches incorporated by 
special charter continued to enjoy the privilege of incorporation. See M. HOFFMAN, 
supra note 6, at 43. 
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Two principal classes of religious corporations emerged under 
the new general incorporation acts: the trustee corporation and the 
membership corporation. Still later, yet a third form, the corporation 
sole, appeared.42 
The trustee form was initially adopted in most eastern states.43 
It consisted of a body of trustees, usually elected by the congregation, 
which was incorporated as a unit. All church property was vested in 
the corporate body, which held it for the use and benefit of the 
church, congregation, or society involved.44 This form grew out of 
the common law practice of using trustees to hold property for a vol-
untary association incapable of taking or holding property in its own 
name.411 By simply incorporating the trustees who already held title 
to the property, the legislatures of the states that adopted this form 
granted perpetual succession without the necessity of a transfer of 
property to some different entity and without a change in existing 
relationships. 46 
In theory, the use of the trustee form appeared simple and ideal. 
The trustees would hold the property in trust for the benefit of the 
congregation, and any deviations from the scope of the trust could 
be enjoined by a court of equity.47 In practice, however, it was pre-
cisely the simplicity of the trustee form that created difficult prob-
lems of administration for the courts. During the nineteenth century, 
as disputes began to arise among church members, courts were re-
quired to engage in theological discussions and to delve into the 
mysteries of doctrine in order to determine whether trustees had 
departed from a principle held to be fundamental to the original 
faith of the congregation.48 As courts sought to determine the proper 
use of church land, the substantial body of law known as the doctrine 
of implied trust was developed.49 
42. See text accompanying notes 204-12 infra. This statutory form is quite different 
from the earlier common law corporation sole. See generally C. ZOLi.MANN, supra note 6, 
at 107-10. 
43. See C. ZoLLMANN, supra note 6, at 114-15. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. Cf. Hunt v. Adams, 111 Fla. 165, 149 S. 24 (1933); I.W. Phillips & Co. v. Hall, 
99 Fla. 1206, 128 S. 635 (1930); Wilkins v. St. Mark's Protestant Episcopal Church, 52 
Ga. 351 (1874). 
46. C. ZoLLMANN, supra note 6, at 114-15. 
47. See, e.g., Hanna v. Malick, 223 Mich. 100, 193 N.W. 798 (1923); First Church of 
the Ilrethren v. Snider, 367 Pa. 78, 79 A.2d 422 (1951); Dissolution of Susquehanna Ave. 
Presbyterian Church, 31 Pa. D. 8: C. (C.P. 1938); Franke v. Mann, 106 Wis. ll8, 81 
N.W. 1014 (1900). 
48. See, e.g., Kniskern v. Lutheran Churches, 1 Sandfd. 439 (N.Y. Ch. 1844). 
49. Where a divided congregation held property under a trust deed stipulating 
that the congregation be connected with or subordinate to a general church 
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To compound matters, the trustees were seen as an entity separate 
from the congregation. 50 The trustees were the corporation, and only 
they could legally bind the church to a contract. The members of the 
congregation might vote on internal bylaws or give advisory opinions 
to the trustees, but such decisions were not legally enforcible in the 
absence of approval by the trustees. 51 
As a result of the difficulties inherent in the trustee form, New 
York, by judicial fiat, in 1854 reinterpreted its Religious Incorpora-
tions Act and decided that the Act established the membership, 
rather than the trustee, corporation.52 The membership corporation, 
as the name implies, incorporated the membership, which could then 
exercise authority directly without using a trustee. Control of church 
property was now solely in the hands of the congregation, to be dis-
organization, the courts did not hesitate to enforce the trust in favor of the :earty 
adhering to that organization, and it may have seemed but a small additional 
step to imply, in the absence of an express trust, a dedication in support of the 
particular form of ecclesiastical organization to which the congregation had 
adhered prior to dispute. Many courts thus declared that church property no 
matter how obtained was impressed with a trust for the maintenance of the forms 
of ecclesiastical government to which the founders had adhered. Although this 
rule resembled the English implied-trust doctrine, American courts emphasized 
continuity of denominational affiliation rather than continuity of religious 
tenets, and so generally refused to review the decisions of hierarchical church 
judicatories on matters of doctrine. 
Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes over the Use of Church Property, 75 HARV. L. 
REv. 1142, 1149-50 (1962). See generally C. ZoLI.MANN, supra note 6, at 221-49; Casad, 
The Establishment Clause and the Ecumenical Movement, 62 MICH. L. REv. 419 (1964); 
Duesenberg, Jurisdiction of Civil Courts over Religious Issues, 20 Omo Sr. L.J. 508 
(1959); Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes over the Use of Church Property, 75 
HARV. L. R.Ev. 1142 (1962); Note, Judicial Intervention in Church Property Disputes-
Some Constitutional Considerations, 74 YALE L.J. 1113 (1965). 
50. The church is the spiritual body of believers over which courts could have 
no jurisdiction whatsoever; the society consists of all those who have associated 
themselves together and who elect the trustees, whether they are of the church 
or not; while the trustees, under whatever name they might be known, and 
whether they are members of the church or the society or both or neither, are 
the corporation, created for the express purpose of holding the property of the 
society. 
C. ZoLLMANN, supra note 6, at 117. 
51. Each of these may act separately. The efficacy of their respective acts, or how 
they are to be rendered responsible therefor, or how their respective duties or 
obligations are to be enforced may sometimes become an important inquiry. 
The employment of a pastor, may be submitted or allowed to the congregation at 
large. Or it may be done by the Church, strictly so called. But unless the trustees, 
as such, are parties to the contract, no action at law can be sustained against the 
society, whatever other remedy may exist. The trustees may refuse their assent 
to the employment of a pastor whom the Church or congregation may employ. 
And if they do-no action lies-and the only remedy I can conceive of against 
them, would be not against them as a corporation, but against them personally, 
by removal from office, or in some other mode, for a dereliction of personal 
duty. But it must be borne in mind, that although they as trustees are entitled to 
the custody of the temporalities of the society; they ought not to act capriciously, 
or arbitrarily. 
Miller v. Trustees of the Baptist Church, 16 N.J.L. 251, 253 (Sup. Ct. 1837) (emphasis 
original). See also C. ZOLLMANN, supra note 6, at 117. 
52. Robertson v. Bullions, 11 N.Y. 243 (1854). 
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posed of in the manner prescribed by the local church's rules, bylaws, 
charters, or custom. The New York court of appeals saw its decision 
as a means of avoiding the implied trust doctrine, which it had come 
to abhor.53 In fact, the court viewed its action as a step forward in 
the realm of religious freedom: 
The act has in truth accomplished what the public sentiment in this 
country would seem to demand, that is, the entire separation of the 
£unctions of the ecclesiastical and temporal judicatories, and has 
limited the former to their proper sphere of control over the spiritual 
concerns of the people. I£ this statute is properly construed, we shall 
have fewer examples of temporal courts engaged in the inappropriate 
duty of deciding upon confessions of faith, and shades of religious 
belief and points of doctrine too subtle for any but ecclesiastical 
comprehension. 54 
The theory suggested by the court of appeals reached its logical con-
clusion in Petty v. Tooker,55 when the trustees and a majority of the 
membership of a Congregational church were. allowed to quit that 
faith and, far from having to forfeit their interest in the congrega-
tional property, were permitted to dedicate the property to the 
Presbyterian faith. 
Not all states followed New York in trying to abolish the implied 
trust doctrine, although the membership form of corporation began 
to replace the trustee form in many jurisdictions. In most states, the 
familiar implied trust doctrine was simply applied to the member-
ship corporation; in fact, courts became increasingly willing to apply 
the doctrine as the nineteenth century wore on.56 In New York, the 
legislature soon reacted against the court of appeals' extreme con-
struction of the Religious Incorporations Act. In 1875, the Act was 
amended to require the trustees to administer the property of the 
congregation according to the "discipline, rules and usages of the de-
nomination to which the church members of the corporation be-
53. The Court stated: 
The church is the body of believers ••• it was the intention of the legislature 
to place the control of the temporal affairs of these societies in the hands of the 
majority of the corporators, independent of priest or bishop, presbytery, synod, or 
other ecclesiastical judicatory. This is the inevitable effect of the provision giving 
to the majority, without regard to their religious sentiments, the right to elect 
trustees, and to fix the salary of the minister. The courts clearly cannot dis• 
franchise any corporator who possesses the qualifications prescribed by the 
statute. 
Robertson v. Bullions, 11 N.Y. 243, 263-64 (1854). 
54. Robertson v. Bullions, 11 N.Y. 243, 264 (1854). 
55. 21 N.Y. 267 (1860). 
56. See Note, 75 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1142, supra note 49, at 1149-54. 
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long."57 This change in wording, duly noted and applied by the New 
York courts, resurrected the old implied trust notions.58 
As noted above, the theory of the membership corporation rested 
on a distinction benveen the corporation and the church-that is, 
between the temporal and the spiritual. This distinction was the 
cause of the spectacular decision of the New York court of appeals in 
Westminster Presbyterian Church v. Trustees of the Presbytery.59 
The plaintiff in this case was a legal religious corporation established 
in 1889. In 1908, friction benveen the local congregation and the 
Presbytery of New York caused the Presbytery to dissolve the local 
church, pursuant to its rights under the laws of the Presbyterian 
Church and the New York Religious Corporations Law. Representa-
tives of the Presbytery took possession of the church property, and 
the plaintiff began suit to recover it. The court of appeals held that 
the power of dissolution conferred on the Presbytery by the statute 
involved the power to dissolve the church, "in the spiritual sense," 
but not the power to dissolve the religious corporation. The corpora-
tion, an entity distinct from the spiritual body of the church, was 
created by the state, and only the state could dissolve it in the ab-
sence of an express statutory power in some other body to do so. 
The Presbytery could hold the trustees of the corporation to account 
and require them to administer the property subject to denomina-
tional uses, but it could not deprive them of physical possession. 
Thus, while the corporate shell remained in existence, it had no 
function, since the congregation of the church had been lawfully dis-
solved by the Presbytery. In the related case of Trustees of the Presby-
tery v. Westminster Presbyterian Church,60 the old trustees were left 
with the naked legal title to the property in question but were 
obliged to administer it in favor of a new congregation formed by 
the Presbytery. 
D. Powers Under Early Statutes 
A religious corporation may take, either by deed or will, real and 
personal property to an amount limited by law. The statutes of the 
States, inheriting the jealousy of large accumulation of property in 
the hands of ecclesiastical persons and religious houses which was so 
great an evil in England before, and even subsequent to the Refor-
mation, have in many cases enacted that no religious society shall be 
57. Ch. 79, § 4, [1875] N.Y. Laws 70. 
58. See, e.g., First Reformed Presbyterian Church v. Bowden, 14 Abb. N. Cas, 356 
(Sup. Ct. 1883). 
59. 211 N.Y. 214, 105 N.E. 199 (1914). 
60. 222 N.Y. 305, 118 N.E. 800 (1918). 
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incorporated, with power to hold property yielding a greater annual 
income than a specified sum. Of course, where this is the law of the 
State, property acquired by such a corporation beyond the sum lim-
ited is liable to escheat to the commonwealth. Within that limit there 
is the same freedom of acquisition which belongs to a natural person. 
And where property has been held for the use of an unincorporated 
religious society, it will, upon its subsequent incorporation become 
vested at once, by force of the law, in that corporate body. No con-
veyance is necessary. So an agreement with individual members of a 
society to convey land to them for the site of a church will be en-
forced after they are incorporated, and a conveyance will be decreed 
to the corporate body.61 
This statement by Mr. Justice Strong fairly reflects the situation 
in the nineteenth century in most states that had enacted general in-
corporation laws. Regulation was the theme in many of these acts. 
States varied in the scope and severity of the conditions imposed on 
the exercise of the power to take, hold, lease, mortgage, and sell or 
otherwise dispose of the corporation's property. Maine, for example, 
required a prior appraisal by "three discreet persons, under oath, to 
be elected by ballot at a legal meeting of [the] owners or proprietors" 
of any property that the corporation wished to sell.62 Georgia gave the 
corporation power to do any act not contrary to Georgia law, but 
it limited land holdings to an amount "absolutely necessary to carry 
into effect the objects of the incorporation."63 Michigan placed no 
limit on the amount of land that could be held, but it required a 
prior judicial approval of any sale of property.64 
Such limitations on land holdings remained as vestiges of the 
English mortmain laws, which were originally inspired by the fear 
that a corporation with perpetual succession could aquire vast 
amounts of property and thereby monopolize the soil.65 While the 
early restrictions have generally been abandoned, some states con-
tinue to impose various limitations on property holdings.66 
A further interesting aspect of the nineteenth century incorpora-
tion laws was the limitations placed upon the class of incorporators 
and voting members of the resultant corporation. Many of the stat-
utes required that this class could include only those who were of 
61. W. STRONG, supra note 6, at 69-70. 
62. Ch. 172, § 2, [1855] Me. Laws 197. 
63. Act of Dec. 28, 1843, §§ 1-2, [1842-43] Ga. Acts 108. 
64. Act of Feb. Ill, 1855, § 19, [1855] Mich. Laws 317. 
65. See 3 A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 437-38 (1950); C. ZOLL-
MANN, supra note 6, at 164-68; Joslin, "Mortmain" in Canada and the United States: 
A Comparative Study, 29 CAN. B. REv. 621 (1951). 
66. See text accompanying notes 161-64, 242-46 infra. 
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full age.67 At least one statute restricted the class even further, to 
males of full age and to Christians. 68 Some of these requirements exist 
to the present day.69 
E. Two Case Histories 
The abuses that may result from governmental manipulation of 
the corporate privilege are strikingly illustrated by the experiences 
of two churches: the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
(Mormons) and the Roman Catholic Church. 
I. The Mormons 
The early corporate history of the Mormon Church is a prime 
example of governmental regulation with a vengeance. The federal 
government effectively stripped the Mormon Church of the use of 
the corporate privilege primarily because of the Church's advocacy 
of polygamy, a form of marriage considered by many non-Mormons 
to be immoral.70 
67. E.g., ME. REv. STAT. ch. 12, § 1 (1857); Act of Feb. HI, 1855, § 2, [1855] Mich. 
Laws 313. See R. TYLER, supra note 6. 
68. E.g., 1 Mo. CODE OF GEN. LAws art. 26, § 88 (1860). See generally R. TYLER, supra 
note 6. 
69. For example, N.Y. R.EL1c. CoRP. LAw § 43(6) (McKinney Supp. 1972) reads as 
follows: 
Male persons of full age belonging to the parish, who have been baptized and 
are regular attendants at its worship and contributors to its support for at 
least twelve months prior to such election or special meeting or since the 
establishment of such parish, shall be qualified voters at any such election or 
special meeting, and also, whenever so permitted, by the canons of the diocese, 
women having the like qualifications may vote at the annual elections and special 
meetings of any parish of such diocese, whenever such parish shall so determine 
in the manner provided in section forty-six of this chapter. 
70. Congress denounced polygamy and enacted a statute making its practice illegal 
in all United States territories. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, § I, 12 Stat. 501. This 
statute was upheld in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). Even today, a 
person who has been convicted of bigamy is prohibited from voting in territorial 
elections. 
No polygamist, bigamist, or any person cohabitating with more than one 
woman, and no woman cohabitating with any of the persons described as afore-
said in this section, in any Territory or other place over which the United States 
has exclusive jurisdiction, shall be entitled to vote at any election held in any such 
Territory, or other place, or be eligible for election or appointment to or be 
entitled to hold any office or place of public trust, honor, or emolument in, 
under, or for any such Territory or place, or under the United States. 
48 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970). This restriction is a carry-over from the period when the United 
States was actively engaged in the persecution of the Mormon Church and its members. 
The section was passed in 1882, Act of March 22, 1882, ch. 47, § 8, 22 Stat. 31, twenty 
years after the Act of July I, 1862, ch. 126, § 1, 12 Stat. 501 ("An Act to punish and 
prevent the practice of Polygamy in the Territories of the United States and other 
Places, and disapproving and annulling certain Acts of the Legislative Assembly of the 
Territory of Utah"), and has remained in effect ever since. For a discussion of early 
decisions against polygamy, see L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM: 645-50 (rev. 
ed. 1967). 
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The Mormon Church was originally incorporated in 1851 by an 
act of the so-called State of Deseret71-a provisional government set 
up by the Mormons in what is now the State of Utah. After the 
territorial government of Utah was set up by Congress,72 the terri-
torial legislature reenacted and specifically approved the original 
act.78 In 1862, Congress passed an act that annulled this incorpora-
tion of the Mormon Church by the Utah territorial legislature.74 
The federal act did not disenfranchise the Church, but was intended 
to "annul all acts and laws which establish, maintain, protect, or 
countenance the practice of polygamy, evasively called spiritual mar-
riage however disguised by legal or ecclesiastical solemnities, sacra-
ments, ceremonies, consecrations, or other contrivances."75 The act 
provided for a mandatory fine and sentence of up to five hundred 
dollars and five years imprisonment for anyone convicted of bigamy.70 
The act further provided: 
[I]t shall not be lawful for any corporation or association for religious 
or charitable purposes to acquire or hold real estate in any Territory 
of the United States during the existence of the territorial govern-
ment of a greater value than fifty thousand dollars; and all real estate 
acquired or held by any such corporation or association contrary to 
the provisions of this act shall be forfeited and escheat to the United 
States: Provided, That existing vested rights in real estate shall not 
be impaired by the provisions of this section.77 
The fifty thousand dollar figure was well below the estimated wealth 
of the Mormon Church.78 
71. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 
136 U.S. 1, 3 (1890). 
72. Act of Sept. 9, 1850, ch. 51, §§ 1-17, 9 Stat. 453. 
73. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 
136 U.S. 1, 5 (1890). The text of the act may be found in 136 U.S. at 3-4. 
74. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, § 2, 12 Stat. 501. 
75. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, § 2, 12 Stat. 501. 
76. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, § 1, 12 Stat. 501. 
77. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, § 3, 12 Stat. 501. 
78. In Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United 
States, 136 U.S. 1, 9 (1890), the government contended that the estimated worth of 
the Church was approximately 3 million dollars. The irony of the entire affair is that, 
after the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the legislation in question and the 
appointment of the receiver thereunder, very little property was seized. The United 
States Attorney for Utah reported in 1890 that the following property had been 
seized: 
4,732 shares of Deseret Telegraph Stock •••••••.............•• (no present value) 
800 shares of city gas stock, par value ~100 • • • • • • • . • . • • . . . . . . . . . . • . • • $ 80,000.00 
Cash on hand in various banks .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 291,812.83 
Credits due on sheep • • . . • .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . . . .. .. .. . 10,000.00 
Total • . . • . • • • • . • • • . . . . • • • • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . $381,812.83 
1891 ATrY. GEN. ANN. REP. 247. 
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However, since the act had exempted from its scope all property 
acquired by the Church under the original incorporation statute,79 
it apparently did not have the desired effect of limiting the Church's 
power. Therefore, in 1887, Congress amended the act to provide for 
termination of the corporate status of the Mormon Church. The 
Church's property, except for houses of worship, parsonages, and 
cemeteries,80 was to escheat to the United States, and the proceeds 
thereof were to be applied to the common school fund of the terri-
tory. 81 The Attorney General of the United States was given the 
power to wind up the affairs of the Church and to secure the decrees 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the act. 82 The act also provided 
that religious organizations located in a territory of the United 
States could hold only "so much real property for the erection or 
use of houses of worship, and for such parsonages and burial grounds 
as shall be necessary for the convenience and use" of the organiza-
tion and required that such property was to be held in the names of 
court-appointed trustees. 83 
In a subsequent action brought by the Attorney General to en-
force the act, the supreme court of Utah appointed a receiver to wind 
up the affairs of the corporation and made findings substantially in 
favor of the United States.84 The church appealed this decision to 
the Supreme Court of the United States and alleged that the act con-
stituted an impairment of the contract between the Church and the 
Territory of Utah. The Supreme Court affirmed85 in an opinion con-
demning the Mormons and their practices. 86 The Court ruled that 
79. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, § 2, 12 Stat. 501. 
80. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 397, § 13, 24 Stat. 635. 
81. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 397, §§ 13, 17, 24 Stat. 635. 
82. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 397, § 17, 24 Stat, 635, 
83. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 397, § 26, 24 Stat. 635. 
84. United States v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 5 Utah 361, 15 
P. 473 (1887). 
85. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 
136 U.S. 1 (1890). 
86. For example, the Court viewed the issues as follows: 
It is distinctly stated in the pleadings and findings of fact, that the property 
of the said corporation was held for the purpose of religious and charitable 
uses. But it is also stated in the findings of fact, and is a matter of public notoriety, 
that the religious and charitable uses intended to be subserved and promoted 
are the inculcation and spread of the doctrines and usages of the Mormon Church, 
or Church of Latter-Day Saints, one of the distinguishing features of which is 
the practice of polygamy-a crime against the laws, and abhorrent to the senti-
ments and feelings of the civilized world. Notwithstanding the stringent laws 
which have been passed by Congress-notwithstanding all the efforts made to 
suppress this barbarous practice-the sect or community composing the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints perseveres, in defiance of law, in preaching, 
upholding, promoting and defending it. It is a matter of public notoriety that its 
emissaries are engaged in many countries in propagating this nefarious doctrine, 
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charters granted by a territory are subject to the approval of Congress 
and that, therefore, rights under the Utah charter are subject to con-
gressional divestiture. Congress, in its role as parens patriae, has the 
power to annul the acts of the territorial legislature, to confiscate 
funds held by the Church under the charter, and to dispense any 
money so obtained in accordance with the cy pres doctrine.87 
In 1890, the Church submitted to federal law and abolished 
the practice of polygamy by official decree.88 Congress eventually re-
solved, in 1893, to have the receiver, who had been appointed to hold 
the confiscated funds, deduct his expenses and return the property 
to the Church for use in charitable projects.89 
The entire affair amply documents the idea that the law regards 
the incorporation process as a state-endowed privilege flowing from 
the exercise of sovereignty. It also demonstrates that the state can 
and may utilize the grant or withdrawal of such a privilege to force 
ideological change or to punish those organizations of which it dis-
approves. 90 Although it is true that, except for section 17, which 
and urging its converts to join the community in Utah. The existence of such a 
propaganda is a blot on our civilization. The organization of a community for 
the spread and practice of polygamy is, in a measure, a return to barbarism. 
It is contrary to the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization which Christianity 
has produced in the Vvestern world. The question, therefore, is whether the 
promotion of such a nefarious system and practice, so repugnant to our laws and 
to the principles of our civilization, is to be allowed to continue by the sanction 
of the government itself; and whether the funds accumulated for that purpose 
shall be restored to the same unlawful uses as heretofore, to the detriment of the 
true interests of civil society. 
136 U.S. at 48-49. 
87. The Court brushed aside the religious freedom argument on the ground that, 
since the government had the right to prohibit polygamy in federal territorieit, a 
church organization could not claim a right to use its funds for the purpose of 
promoting and propagating the unlawful practice as an integral part of its religious 
usages, 136 U.S. at 49-50. 
88. The announcement read: 
This practice [plural marriage] was established as a result of direct revelation, and 
many of those who followed the same felt that they were divinely commanded so 
to do. For ten years after plural marriage had been introduced into Utah as a 
Church observance, no law was enacted in opposition to the practice. Beginning 
with 1862, however, Federal statutes were framed declaring the practice unlawfnl 
and providing penalties therefor. The Church claimed that these enactments were 
unconstitutional, and therefore void, inasmuch as they violated the provision 
in the national Constitution forbidding the government making laws respecting 
any establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Many 
appeals were taken to the national court of final resort, and at last a decision 
was rendered sustaining the laws as constitutional and therefore binding. The 
Church, through its President, thereupon discontinued the practice of plural 
marriage, and announced its action to the world, solemnly placing the responsi-
bility for the change upon the nation by whose laws the renunciation had been 
forced. This action has been approved and confirmed by the official vote of the 
Church in conference assembled. 
L. PFEFFER, supra note 70, at 649. 
89. Jt. Res. 11, 53d Cong., 1st Sess., 28 Stat. 980 (1893). 
90. While the United States may well have had the power to outlaw the practice of 
polygamy, this power should not, as the dissent points out, have included the authority 
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specifically dissolves the Mormon Church,91 the 1887 act92 is phrased 
in general terms, it is equally true that the act had only one apparent 
goal.93 Such use of the corporate privilege as a club to enforce ideo-
logical conformity demonstrates the wisdom and fairness underlying 
general incorporation laws.94 
2. The Roman Catholic Church 
The experience of the Roman Catholic Church in this country 
presents an even more fundamental example of potential abuse of 
the power to grant or deny the corporate privilege. In the case of 
the Catholic Church, the factor that motivated governmental policy 
was not that the church advocated what the government considered 
to be immoral acts, but that it had a hierarchical structure that many 
found offensive. The same desire for local, democratic control that 
had helped fan the fires of the American Revolution swept through 
the Catholic laity in many areas of the country in the early part of 
the nineteenth century. The fact that the Church had long been at-
tacked, both in England and in the colonies, for its foreign control 
led many non-Catholics to support such a desire among the Catholic 
laity. The result was that the Catholic laity and the non-Catholic 
to confiscate the property of the Mormon Church: "Congress has the power to extirpate 
polygamy in any of the Territories, by the enactment of a criminal code directed to that 
end; but it is not authorized under the cover of that power to seize and confiscate the 
property of persons, individuals, or corporations, without office found, because they may 
have been guilty of criminal practices." 136 U.S. at 67 (Fuller, C.J., Field, Lamar, JJ., 
dissenting). 
91. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 397, § 17, 24 Stat. 635. 
92. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 397, 24 Stat. 635. 
93. See France v. Connor, 161 U.S. 65 (1896), where the Court held that at least 
section 18 of the Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 397, 24 Stat. 635, applied only to the territory 
of Utah and not to any of the other territories. 
94. The government remained adamant in its antipolygamy stance. In the enabling 
act authorizing Utah to form a state government, Congress stated: 
And said convention shall provide, by ordinance irrevocable without the consent of 
the United States and the people of said State-First. That perfect toleration of 
religious sentiment shall be secured, and that no inhabitant of said State shall 
ever be molested in person or property on account of his or her mode of religious 
worship; Provided, That polygamous or plural marriages are forever prohibited. 
Act of July 16, 1894, ch. 138, § 3, 28 Stat. 107. Utah's Constitution now contains almost 
identical language. UTAH CoNsr. art. III, ,r first. When Grover Cleveland proclaimed 
Utah a state in 1896, he carefully noted that the requirement of prohibition of poly• 
gamous marriages had been fulfilled and iguored the other requirements. Proclamation 
of Jan. 4, 1896, No. 9, 29 Stat. 876. Subsequently, the enabling acts of Arizona (Act of 
June 20, 1910, ch. 310, § 2, 36 Stat. 557), New Mexico (Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 1110, § 2, 
36 Stat. 557), and Oklahoma (Act of June 16, 1906, ch. 3335, § 3, 34 Stat. 267) all con• 
tained similar provisions. Today, in addition to Utah, five other states prohibit 
polygamy by constitutional language. They are: Arizona (Aruz. CoNsr. art. XX, ,r 
second), Idaho (IDAHO CoNsr. art. 1, § 4), Montana (MONT. CoNsr. art. III, § 4), New 
Mexico (N.M. CoNsr. art. XXI, § 21), and Oklahoma (OKLA. CoNsr. art. 1, § 2). 
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majority combined in an attempt to reduce the power of the hier-
archy over its American parishioners.95 A stranger alliance would be 
hard to imagine. 
To put the problem in perspective, it is first necessary to grasp 
traditional Catholic views concerning the church as a moral, juridical 
personality: "The Catholic Church, and the Apostolic See are moral 
persons by divine law, and have an innate right, independent of any 
civil power, to acquire, to hold, and to administer temporal goods. 
Single churches, and any other moral persons possessing juridical 
personality by ecclesiastical authority have a similar right, governed 
by the regulations of the sacred canons."96 It became apparent that 
the civil authorities in the United States simply would not accept 
this viewpoint and that it had to be tempered to fit the prevailing 
political realities: 
It is a foregone conclusion that, if the property rights of the Church 
are established by divine positive law, it is the will of God that they 
be recognized in the United States. But, because it is impossible 
under the Federal and State Constitutions of this country legally to 
recognize any Church as being divinely established, some other basis 
of recognition should be sought. This other mode of recognition is 
to be found in what has already been said about the natural right of 
men to hold property dedicated to religious purposes. In other words, 
since the United States does not seem to assume in her legislation that 
there is any divinely established religion, she should apply the prin-
ciple which would have been applicable in case no special religion 
had actually been established by God.97 
This meant, in practice, that the Church fully intended to see that its 
property and membership in the United States were under the con-
trol of its hierarchy.08 To nineteenth-century Americans, this meant 
government by a foreign sovereign.99 
The concept of democratic local lay control of the Church began 
in North Carolina and soon spread to Philadelphia, New York, and 
Norfolk, Virginia.100 The advent of the trustee corporation gave lay-
men their opportunity to seize physical control of the local churches. 
As legal title to Church property became vested in local members 
as incorporated trustees, they begin to assert control over the prop-
95. See generally P. DIGNAN, supra note 6; P. GUILDAY, supra note 6. 
96. C. BARTLETr, supra note 6, at I. 
97. Id, at 9. 
98. See id. at 22-23. 
99. See, e.g., P. DIGNAN, supra note 6, at 192-95. 
100. For general histories of the period, see P. DIGNAN, supra note 6; P. GuILDAY, 
supra note 6. 
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erty and used this control as a means of asserting authority over the 
hierarchy.101 
Instead of proving to be a local aberration, the idea of lay control 
spread. It became a matter of significant concern at the several Coun-
cils of Bishops that met from time to time throughout the nineteenth 
century and the early part of the twentieth.102 The First Provincial 
Council, held in 1829, declared: "Since lay trustees have too often 
abused the power given them by the civil law to the great detriment 
of religion and not without scandal to the faithful, we very greatly de-
sire that in the future no church shall be built or consecrated, unless 
it shall have been assigned by written instrument to the bishop in 
whose diocese it is to be built, wherever this can be done .... "103 
The Fourth Provincial Council, held in 1840, again stressed this 
solution and passed a decree "insisting upon the necessity of properly 
securing all movable and immovable property and stating that if this 
security could be obtained in no other way, then the property was 
to be handed down by means of last wills and testaments, drawn up 
according to the provisions of civil law."104 In 1843, at the Fifth Pro-
vincial Council, the earlier decree was modified to require that 
"[e]ach bishop ... within three months after his consecration ..• 
make a will securing the ecclesiastical property in his charge by the 
laws of his State and . . . deposit a copy of the will with the arch-
bishop. "105 The First and Second Plenary Councils, held in 1852 and 
1866, again stressed the importance of holding the title of property 
in the name of the bishop in whose diocese the property was lo-
cated.106 However, by the time of the Third Plenary Council in 1884, 
worry over the legal complications that could result from adherence 
101. In some instances • • • Catholic laymen of that day carried over into the 
trustee system the policy and regulations of non-Catholic American congrega-
tions, and gradually the fatal tendency of regarding their priests as "servants to 
perform religious services" became apparent in their attitude. There was, moreover, 
the belief present among many laymen that the clergy should be relieved of all the 
worries and anxieties attendant upon the temporal management of church 
affairs, and having excluded the priests from this material attention, they gradually 
excluded them from all control of the property incorporated in the name of the 
congregation. Once this right was claimed, as legally it could be in the courts, the 
trustees arrogated the further power of dismissing any priest who attacked the 
system and of selecting the clergymen who were amenable to dictation from 
themselves. In this way, unworthy priests were intruded into congregations, and 
when episcopal authority for the good of religion attempted to exercise a re-
straining and pruning hand upon such restrictions, attack, rebellion, and schism 
were the inevitable result. 
P. GUJLDAY, supra note 6, at 6-7. 
102. See C. BARTLETI", supra note 6, at 56-59. 
103. C. BARTLETr, supra note 6, at 57. 
104. P. GUILDAY, A HISTORY OF THE COUNCILS OF BALTIMORE (1791-1884), at 126 (1982), 
105. Id. at 138. 
106. See P. GuILDAY, supra note 104, at 180, 208. 
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to this practice was ram pant.107 The Council declared that, depend-
ing on the state's statute, the bishop could hold title to church prop-
erty under several legal theories, either as a corporation sole, as trustee 
for the diocese, or as an individual with absolute title in fee simple.108 
Although in the eyes of the Church he would be merely the adminis-
trator of the property, under the law he would have all the rights 
and duties of any other owner of property.109 
Any fear that the Church might have had about legal complica-
tions proved to be well-founded. In 1888, the Roman Catholic arch-
bishop of the diocese of Cincinnati was sued on personal debts 
amounting to some 3.5 million dollars. The debts had actually been 
incurred by his brother, the vicar-general of the diocese, who had 
been accepting deposits of money from individual Catholics and 
lending it out again at interest. The archbishop had assumed all of 
the debts and made a general assignment of his personally owned 
property for the benefit of his creditors. The assignee sued the bishop 
to recover church property held by the bishop in fee simple, alleging 
that it was included within the scope of the assignment. Denying 
the requested relief, the trial court found that the church property 
was, in reality, held in trust for the benefit of the various congrega-
tions that had originally purchased or donated it. The supreme court 
of Ohio affirmed,11° citing canon and civil law to the effect that the 
bishop had no power to bind church property for his personal debts. 
Despite this victory, the Church wanted to be certain that there could 
be no pillage of its property. In 1911, it passed a decree forbidding 
bishops to hold church property in fee simple.111 
The entire problem arose because of the lack of incorporation 
statutes satisfactory to the Church. The Church favored the use of 
the corporation sole, but the notion of a one-man corporation, with 
all of its concomitant powers, was not generally acceptable to civil 
authorities,112 and the Church was generally unsuccessful in its efforts 
107. C. BARTLEIT, supra note 6, at 23. 
108 See id. 
109. Id. 
ll0. Mannix v. Purcell, 46 Ohio St. 102, 24 N.E. 595 (1888). 
lll. "If there is no provision for corporations sole, then the Bishop, may, as a last 
resort, hold the property as trustee. This trustee tenure is not expressly endorsed in 
the Document of 1911 but it is by implication, since the only other possibility, fee 
simple tenure, is abolished.'' B. BROWN, supra note 6, at 145. 
112. See C. BARTLETr, supra note 6, at 79. "A corporation sole, or one composed of 
one person, is not lawful in Michigan [not true anymore-see note 209 infra and 
accompanying text]. This law is aimed at the 'one man power.' Churches might other-
wise be tempted to lodge in some high dignitary unlimited power over property. The 
Catholic Church avoids the force of this by having the fee simple title of all her 
property vested in the bishop in his individual name and capacity." C. HOWELL, supra 
note 6, at 8. 
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to have the corporation sole adopted. The Church was placed on the 
defensive in some areas, such as Pennsylvania, where statutes were 
passed that required that the control of church property be vested 
in the lay members of the various congregations. No better example 
of the basic misunderstanding between church and state in this re-
gard can be found than in a series of Pennsylvania cases involving 
the Catholic Church. 
The controversy arose in the following manner: In 1896, an unin-
corporated congregation transferred title to the church property to 
the bishop of the diocese in trust for use of the congregation. Penn-
sylvania law required that 
[w]hensoever any property, real or personal, shall hereafter be be-
queathed, devised or conveyed to any ecclesiastical corporation, 
bishop, ecclesiastic or other person, for the use of any church, con-
gregation or religious society, for religious worship or sepulture, or 
the maintenance of either, the same shall not be otherwise taken and 
held, or inure, than subject to the control and disposition of the lay-
members of such church, congregation or religious society, or such 
constituted officers or representatives thereof .... 118 
In 1908, acting on a resolution passed by a majority of the congrega-
tion, ten lay members brought suit to compel the bishop to reconvey 
title to them as trustees for the congregation. The bishop defended 
on the theory that canon law required title to be held in his name, 
and the trial court agreed and denied the writ. The supreme court 
of Pennsylvania reversed,114 holding that, since canon law is subordi-
nate to civil law, civil law must be followed when the two conflict.m 
Since the bishop was only holding title under a dry, naked trust, the 
beneficiary could terminate it in the fashion desired. 
Following this decision, the congregation split into two opposing 
factions, each of which held its own congregational meeting. The 
faction favorable to the bishop purported to convey the church prop-
erty to him; the faction opposed to the bishop declared that no such 
reconveyance had been made. The probishop faction began suit to 
compel the reconveyance of title, and, after holding an in-court elec-
tion to determine the wishes of a majority of the original congrega-
113. 2 Pa. Digest of Laws 1860 (12th ed. 1895), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, 
§ 81 (1965). 
114. Krauczunas v. Hoban, 221 Pa. 213, 70 A. 740 (1908). 
115. "[E]cclesiastical rules and regulations, ••• except as they are aided by legal 
conveyance, are ineffectual to divest any owner of his property .••• [I']he position taken 
by defendant and sustained by the court, is in direct opposition to the law, whose 
supremacy, over all ecclesiastical rules and regulations, when rights of property arc 
concerned, is not to be questioned." Krauczunas v. Hoban, 221 Pa. 213, 225, 70 A. 740, 
745 (1908). 
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tion, the trial court found in favor of the probishop faction. The su-
preme court of Pennsylvania again reversed.116 It held that (I) by 
conducting its own election, the trial court had abdicated its responsi-
bility to determine which side had the authority to convey the prop-
erty, 117 and (2) the plaintiffs had not given their representatives 
power to bind their group by such an election.118 The court then re-
vealed that it had no concept of the scope of the disagreement be-
tween the parties: 
Without any disposition to prejudge this case in any of its legal 
aspects, and certainly not intending so to do, this much may be said 
which, if it prejudice at all, prejudices equally. If this litigation in-
volves any possible result worth a moment's controversy, it is con-
cealed from our view. This may be a matter which concerns only the 
parties themselves; but we remark upon it for the reason that the 
case discloses sufficient to warrant an inference that neither side ap-
preciates the insignificance of the stake for which they are contend-
ing. It is difficult to conceive of anyone bearing any relation whatever 
to a religious body, quite so incapable of intermeddling with the af-
fairs of the congregation, as a trustee who simply holds the legal title 
to the church property. Such an one [sic] is trustee for no other pur-
pose, and has nothing whatever, by reason of the fact that he holds 
the legal title, to do with any of the affairs of the congregation, or 
with the property itself, no matter whether he be prelate or layman. 
Whoever he be, he holds the title not under or because of any rules 
or regulation of any ecclesiastical body to which the congregation is 
affiliated or connected, but under the law of the land which allows 
the membership to indicate him as trustee.119 
The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the matter by 
proper procedure. 
On the third try, the trial court found that the congregation had 
voted at a lawfully called meeting to reconvey title to the bishop to 
hold as trustee subject to the laws, rules, and usages of the Catholic 
Church. Prior to the retrial, the bishop had excommunicated the 
faction opposed to him and had placed the church under interdict 
until such time as the property was conveyed to him. The supreme 
court of Pennsylvania reversed again, finding that title could not be 
conveyed in this fashion, since the majority had placed canon law 
above civil law.120 The state simply did not recognize the temporal 
authority of the bishop. 
116. Mazaika v. Krauczunas, 229 Pa. 47, 77 A. 1102 (1910). 
117. Mazaika v. Krauczunas, 229 Pa. 47, 50, 77 A. 1102, 1104 (1910). 
118. Mazaika v. Krauczunas, 229 Pa. 47, 51, 77 A. 1102, 1104 (1910). 
119. Mazaika v. Krauczunas, 229 Pa. 47, 52-53, 77 A. 1102, ll04-05 (1910). 
120. l\Iazaika v. Krauczunas, 233 Pa. 138, 81 A. 938 (19ll). 
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At this point, the opposition began to call non-Catholic ministers 
to hold services in the still interdicted church. The faction that was 
loyal to the bishop began suit to enjoin this activity; the trial court 
granted relief, only to be reversed yet a fourth time.121 The supreme 
court of Pennsylvania found that, since the bishop had refused to 
recognize civil law and had simply been trying to have his own way 
by means of the interdict, the decree should not have been granted. 
The court closed by saying: 
[B]ecause the evidence in the case makes it apparent that the purpose 
of the bill is to accomplish indirectly that which we have repeatedly 
declared may not be done, the plaintiffs in the bill have no standing 
to ask equitable relief. If they desire to proceed further, their appeal 
must be first to the ecclesiastical authority which has forbidden 
Catholic worship in the church for rescission of the episcopal interdict 
that inhibits it.122 
By this time, six years had passed since the first suit had been insti-
tuted. The bishop, feeling further resistance was useless, rescinded 
the excommunication order, lifted the interdict, and dropped his de-
mand that title be reconveyed to him. He then appointed a new 
priest, who was subsequently locked out by the opposition faction. 
The opposition now claimed that the interdict had severed all of 
the congregation's ties with the Catholic Church and that they were 
free to use the property as they saw fit. The loyal faction sued to en-
join the use of the property by non-Catholics, and the trial court 
again awarded it a decree. This time the supreme court of Pennsyl-
vania affirmed.123 The court held that the property had been dedi-
cated to the Catholic Church and that the plaintiffs had a perfect 
right to prevent diversion from such use. The bishop, said the court, 
could not sever the ties by decree, as the defendants seemed to argue, 
since this would give him the power to subvert civil law that the court 
had consistently denied him.124 
Thus, the final result was that, while the laity controlled temporal 
affairs, it could do so only as a Catholic laity. The familar implied 
trust doctrine was resorted to despite the language of the statute. 
In subsequent litigation, the Pennsylvania supreme court recog-
nized the power of the Catholic Church to extinguish125 and to di-
121. Novickas v. Krauczunas, 240 Pa. 248, 87 A. 686 (1913). 
122. Novickas v. Krauczunas, 240 Pa. 248, 255, 87 A. 686, 688 (1913). 
123. Novicky v. Krauczunas, 245 Pa. 86, 91 A. 657 (1914). 
124. Novicky v. Krauczunas, 245 Pa. 86, 92-93, 91 A. 657, 659 (1914). 
125. Canovaro v. Brothers of the Order of Hermits of St. Augustine, 326 Pa. 76, 
191 A. 140 (1937). 
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vide126 its parishes. Thus, the Church was at least marginally recog-
nized as a political entity with the power to create its own geographic 
subdivisions. Other state courts gave like recognition under various 
factual circumstances,127 while still others denied any temporal au-
thority whatsoever to the Catholic hierarchy.128 
III. RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES TODAY 
In the foregoing section, an effort was made to portray, in at least 
a summary way, the general history of the extension of the corporate 
privilege to religious bodies in the United States. It has been a tangled 
history, and, as experience, particularly in states like Utah and Penn-
sylvania, has demonstrated, legislative control over granting, ·with-
holding, or terminating the corporate privilege could be manipu-
lated as a means of attempting to exert control over a particular 
church body and its practices. 
The long history of religious corporations has culminated in the 
United States with almost universal granting to church bodies of the 
privilege of incorporation, in accordance with procedures and limita-
tions defined in the applicable legislation.129 The state statutes dis-
play great variety in the forms and methods of incorporation allowed 
and in the powers that may be exercised by religious corporations. 
Some states have statutes particularly designed for the incorporation 
of ecclesiastical bodies, 130 while others allow churches to incorporate 
under either a general nonprofit corporation act131 or a general corpo-
ration act.132 In the survey of the state laws that follows, an attempt 
is made to give a bird's-eye view of the contemporary statutory pat-
tern and also to give some indication of modem attitudes vis-a-vis 
ecclesiastical organizations and their powers. 
126. In re Trustees of St. Casimir's Polish Roman Catholic Church, 273 Pa. 494, 
117 A. 219 (1922). 
127. See Chatard v. O'Donovan, 80 Ind. 20 (1881); Klix v. Polish Roman Catholic 
St. Stanislaus Parish, 137 Mo. App. 347, 118 S.W. 1171 (Ct. App. 1909). Cf. Heiss v. 
Vosburg, 59 Wis. 532, 18 N.W. 463 (1884). 
128, See Levasseur v. Martin, 11 La. Ann. 684 (1856); Congregation of the Roman 
Catholic Church of St. Francis v. Martin, 4 La. (4 Rob.) 62 (1843). 
129. Only Virginia and West Virginia do not provide some form of corporate 
status to ecclesiastical organizations. See text accompanying notes 139-72 infra. 
1!10. See text accompanying notes 173-93 infra. 
131. See text accompanying notes 306-27 infra. 
132. Hawaii, for example, covers all corporations, profit and nonprofit, in one code. 
HAWAII R.Ev. STAT. ch. 416 (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1971). See also HAWAII R.Ev. STAT. 
ch. 419 (1968). 
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Provisions in state constitutions relating specifically to religious 
corporations are rare, beyond those that exempt churches from taxa-
tion or guarantee no discrimination bet1veen sects or denomina-
tions.133 Those states that do refer specifically to religious corporations 
in their constitutions usually do so for minor reasons.134 Often, con-
stitutional guarantees are explicitly included in order to assure 
continued enjoyment of rights and privileges recognized pursuant to 
the federal constitution or by decisional law.135 In a few rare cases, 
constitutional provisions serve to define procedures and rules of reli-
gious organizations.136 
The constitutions of l:1V'o states contain provisions that relate to 
landholding by ecclesiastical bodies. Kansas provides that title to all 
property required for church use must be held by trustees elected 
by the membership; this provision thus gives a preferred position to 
the trustee form of corporation, at least where property ownership 
is involved.131 Maryland's constitution restricts all sales of realty prior 
to November 3, 1948, to, or in trust for, any ecclesiastical body to 
133. For a discussion of state constitutional provisions relating to religion, see 
C. ANTIEAu, P. CARROLL,&: T. Burum, R.ELlGION UNDER THE STATE CoNSrITUTIONS (1965). 
134. For example, Alabama's constitution exempts "benevolent, educational, or 
religious corporations" from the corporate franchise tax. ALA. CONST. art. 12, § 229. 
135. For example, Vermont's constitution states: 
All religious societies, or bodies of men that may be united or incorporated for 
the advancement of religion and learning, or for other pious and charitable 
purposes, shall be encouraged and protected in the enjoyment of the privileges, 
immunities, and estates, which they in justice ought to enjoy, under such regula• 
tions as the general assembly of this State shall direct. 
VT. CONST. ch. II, § 64. 
136. Massachusetts' constitution, for example, states: 
As the public worship of God and instructions in piety, religion and morality, 
promote the happiness and prosperity of a people and the security of a republican 
government;-therefore, the several religious societies of this commonwealth, 
whether corporate or unincorporate, at any meeting legally warned and holden for 
that purpose, shall ever have the right to elect their pastors or religious teachers, to 
contract with them for their support, to raise money for erecting and repairing 
houses for public worship, for the maintenance of religious instruction, and for 
the payment of necessary expenses; and all persons belonging to any religious 
society shall be taken and held to be members, until they shall file with the 
clerk of such society, a written notice, declaring the dissolution of their membership, 
and thenceforth shall not be liable for any such grant or contract which may 
be thereafter made, or entered into by such society;-and all religious sects and 
denominations, demeaning themselves peaceably, and as good citizens of the 
commonwealth, shall be equally under the protection of the Jaw; and no sub-
ordination of any one sect or denomination to another shall ever be established 
by law. 
MAss. CONST. pt. 1, art. ill. 
137. KAN. CONST. art. 12, § 3. 
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those sales made with the prior or subsequent approval of the legis-
Iature.138 
2. Virginia and West Virginia 
The constitutions of Virginia139 and West Virginia140 are unique 
in that they expressly prohibit the granting of a charter of incorpo-
ration to any church or religious denomination.141 The West Virginia 
constitutional provision was carried over from the Virginia constitu-
tion. Both provisions reflect the influence of Jefferson and Madison, 
who were skeptical of all forms of ecclesiastical power and saw the 
use of the corporate charter as a means of acquiring property to im-
plement such power.142 Indeed, James Madison, when President, 
vetoed an act for the incorporation of the Episcopal Church for the 
District of Columbia on the ground that it would constitute a for-
bidden establishment of religion.143 Since at an earlier time the 
Anglican Church, as the established church of Virginia and Mary-
land, enjoyed the status of a public corporation, whereas only local 
lllS. Mn. CoNsr. Declaration of Rights art. 38. No consent is necessary after Novem-
ber 3, 1948, unless the legislature provides otherwise; so far it has not. 
139. VA. CoNsr. art. IV, § 14: 
The General Assembly shall not grant a charter of incorporation to any church 
or religious denomination, but may secure the title to church property to an extent 
to be limited by law. 
140. W. VA. CoNsr. art. 6, § 47: 
No charter of incorporation shall be granted to any church or religious denomina-
tion. Provisions may be made by general laws for securing the title to church 
property, and for the sale and transfer thereof, so that it shall be held, used, or 
transferred for the purposes of such church, or religious denomination. 
141. Missouri originally had a similar provision in its constitution of 1820, which 
stated that "no religious corporation can ever be established in this state." Mo. CoNsr. 
art. 13, § 5 (1820). The Missouri constitution of 1865 stated: 
[N]o religious corporation can be established in this State; except that by a 
general law, uniform throughout the State, any church, or religious society, or 
congregation, may become a body corporate, for the sole purpose of acquiring, 
holding, using, and disposing of so much land as may be required for a house of 
public worship, a chapel, a parsonage, and a burial ground, and managing the 
same, and contracting in relation to such land, and the buildings thereon, through 
a board of trustees selected by themselves; but the quantity of land to be held by 
any such body corporate, in connection with a house of worship or a parsonage, 
shall not exceed five acres in the country, or one acre in a town or city. 
Mo. CoNsr. art. 1, § 12 (1865). 
The constitution of 1875 stated: 
[N]o religious corporation can be established in this State, except such as may be 
created under a general law for the purpose only of holding the title to such 
real estate as may be prescribed by law for church edifices, parsonages and 
cemeteries. 
Mo. CoNsr. art. 2, § 8 (1875). The Missouri constitution no longer contains such a 
provision in any form. 
142. See CHURCH AND STATE IN .AMERICAN HlsTORY 68-87 CT• Wilson ed. 1965). 
143. For the full text of the veto message, see note 333 infra. For further discussion, 
see text accompanying note 333 infra. 
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congregations enjoyed a recognized corporate status in regard to the 
holding of property, it was understandable that Jefferson and Madi-
son would. view the extension of the corporate privilege to churches 
of a particular denomination as a means of restoring special privi-
leges associated with establishment.144 
It is strange, however, that this prohibition on the incorporation 
of religious bodies has been retained in the Virginia and West Vir-
ginia constitutions to this day in view of the over-all movement in 
this country for permitting the incorporation of church bodies un-
der general laws that are not designed to give a preferred position 
to any particular church. 
Nevertheless, religious bodies in Virginia and West Virginia have 
not in fact been placed at a disadvantage as a result of the constitu-
tional prohibitions. An explanation of the development in Virginia, 
however, cannot be commenced without an understanding of the 
law of charitable trusts in that state. In Trustees of the Philadelphia 
Baptist Association v. Hart's Executors,145 the United States Supreme 
Court held that a bequest in trust for an unincorporated religious as-
sociation was void for vagueness, since the validity of charitable de-
vises was, for indefinite beneficiaries, dependent on the Statute of 
Elizabeth,146 which had not been adopted by the Virginia legislature 
and was therefore not part of Virginia law. The Virginia supreme 
court subsequently adopted this interpretation in Gallego's Executors 
v. Attorney General,147 thereby causing the whole development of 
the charitable trust doctrine in Virginia to be delayed and made de-
pendent on statutory provisions.148 This is not the occasion to de-
velop at length the further history of the decisional law in Virginia 
respecting charitable trusts; however, it should be noted that, despite 
varying and sometimes contradictory statements on the subject,140 
the Virginia court seems to continue to adhere to the Gallego doc-
trine, except to the extent that it has been overruled or modified by 
144. On the Anglican establishment in Virginia and Maryland, see E. GAUSTAD, A 
RELl:GIOUS HlsrORY OF AMERICA 36-46, 74-79 (1966). 
145. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1 (1819). 
146. 43 Eliz. I, c. 4 (1601). 
147. 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 450 (1832). 
148. See G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES§ 322, at 647-49 (2d ed. 1964). 
149. The Virginia court, in Protestant Episcopal Educ. Soc. v. Churchman's 
Representatives, 80 Va. 718, 765-66 (1885), held that Gallego had been wrongly decided. 
In Trustees v. Guthrie, 86 Va. 125, 151, 10 S.E. 318, 325 (1889), the court declared that 
the Churchman case had shown that Gallego was never the "law in this state." In 
Fifield v. Van Wyck.'s Exr., 94 Va. 557, 27 S.E. 446 (1897), the court distinguished 
Churchman and Guthrie as referring to gifts to corporations only and reverted to the 
Gallego doctrine. 
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statute.150 In West Virginia, a statute was deemed to have overruled 
the Gallego doctrine completely, and the use of the charitable trust as 
a means of acquiring title for religious purposes seems to be fully 
recognized in that state.151 
Quite apart from the charitable trust question, the constitutions 
of both Virginia and West Virginia recognize the authority of the 
legislature to adopt legislation to permit the acquisition of title to 
church property. Both constitutions provide that the state legislatures 
may, by law, establish standards by which title to church property 
may be secured.152 Pursuant to these provisions, legislation in both 
states in effect authorizes the transfer of property in trust to trustees 
to be used for religious purposes.1158 It is hard to perceive a distinc-
tion between this use of the trust device and the trustee corporation. 
Moreover, the constitutional prohibitions against incorporation of 
churches apply to ecclesiastical societies but not necessarily to other 
church-related groups.154 Also, the constitutional prohibition does 
not bar the recognition of charitable bequests to a church incorpo-
rated under the laws of another state.155 
In both Virginia and West Virginia, statutes overcome, at least 
for certain specified purposes, the common law disability of volun-
tary associations to receive real property in their own names.156 The 
statutes also allow the elected trustees of such organizations to sue 
and be sued in their own names on behalf of their memberships for 
damages to property or recovery of a debt.157 The trustees also have 
the power to take, hold, and encumber real property.158 In West 
Virginia, the death of any or all of the trustees will not abate a suit 
instituted against a religious body for or on account of real or per-
sonal property held or claimed by the trustees or for or on account 
150. As recently as Maguire v. Lloyd, 193 Va. 138, 142, 67 S.E.2d 885, 888 (1951), the 
Virginia supreme court stated that Gallego is good law unless modified by statute. 
151. Sands v. Security Trust Co., 143 W. Va. 522, 534-35, 102 S.E.2d 733, 741 (1958), 
citing W. VA. CODE§ 35-1-7 (1966), as amended, W. VA. CODE § 35-1-7 (Supp. 1970). 
152. VA. CoNST. art. IV, § 14; w. VA. CONST. art. 6, § 47. 
153. VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 57-7 to ·8 (1969); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-1, -7 (1966), as 
amended, W. VA. CODE ANN.§ 35-1-7 (Supp. 1970). 
154. Compare Jordan's Admrx. v. Richmond Home for Ladies, 106 Va. 710, 56 S.E. 
7110 (1907), with Wilson v. Perry, 29 W. Va. 169, I S.E. 302 (1886). 
155. See Trustees v. Guthrie, 86 Va. 125, 10 S.E. 318 (1889); Osenton v. Elliott, 73 
W. Va. 519, 81 S.E. 837 (1914). 
156. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-7 (1969); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1 (1966). 
157. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-11 (1969); W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 35-1-7 (1966), as amended, 
W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 35-1-7 (Supp. 1970). 
158. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 57-7, -11 (1969); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-7, -9 (1966), as 
amended, W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-7, -9 (Supp. 1970). 
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of matters relating to the property, 159 and the trustees are held ac-
countable to the organization.160 
Land holdings by trustees are limited to a total of four acres per 
congregation in an incorporated West Virginia city, town, or vil-
lage161 and to :fifty acres per congregation in a Virginia city or town.162 
Virginia limits congregations outside of towns to two hundred fifty 
acres of land at any one time,163 while West Virginia limits such con-
gregational land holdings to sixty acres.164 Sales and mortgages of 
land in Virginia by trustees of a diocese, congregation, church, or re-
ligious denomination may be accomplished only according to court 
order.165 In West Virginia, sales and mortgages need not be court-
approved but there must be prior publication of intent in a county 
newspaper.166 Virginia allows a member of the church, in his own 
name and on behalf of the other members and subject to the approval 
of the church's governing body, to bring a legal action against the 
trustees to compel them to sell or mortgage the society's property in 
accordance with the wishes of the society.167 West Virginia, on the 
other hand, allows suit by the congregation whenever the trustees 
propose to sell or encumber improperly the property of the society.168 
A provision in the Virginia code that allows one individual to 
hold title to church property in general169 creates, in effect, a corpo-
ration sole for hierarchical churches. The individual may deal with 
the property as he wishes, so long as he acts within the rules of his 
own denomination and the laws of Virginia.170 It is indeed hard to 
159. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-7 (1966), as amended, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-7 
(Supp. 1970). 
160. W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 35-1-7 (1966), as amended, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-7 
(Supp. 1970). 
161. w. VA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-8 (1966). 
162. VA. CODE ANN.§ 57-12 (Supp. 1973). The city or town council may by ordinance 
authorize up to fifty acres if the land is to be, and actually is, used for certain specified 
purposes. 
163. VA. CODE ANN.§ 57-12 (Supp. 1973). 
164. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-8 (1966). 
165. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-15 (1969). 
166. W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 35-1-10 (1966), as amended, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-10 
(Supp. 1970). In lieu of such publication, the notice may be read at the principal 
services of the church, parish, congregation, or branch on at least two separate oc-
casions during a period of two weeks. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-10 (1966), as amended, 
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-10 (Supp. 1970). 
167. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-14 (1969). See also VA. CODE ANN. § 57-13 (1969) (provides 
for suits in equity against a trustee to compel him to apply any real or personal estate 
for the use or benefit of the church). 
168. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-11 (1966). 
169. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-16 (1969). 
170. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-16 (1969). 
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distinguish this statutory arrangement from the corporation sole as it 
exists in many American jurisdictions. 
West Virginia allows the property of an extinct church to be dis-
posed of according to the terms of the original grant, the congrega-
tion's bylaws, or the bylaws of the denomination to which it was 
attached, upon the suit in a circuit court of any trustee, member of 
the congregation, or official of the denomination to which it was at-
tached prior to extinction.171 Virginia has no similar provision.172 
In summary, both Virginia and West Virginia give to their reli-
gious bodies powers very similar to those given through the use of 
the corporate form in other states, even though under the constitu-
tional provisions the former states may not authorize the incorpora-
tion of ecclesiastical societies. 
B. State Statutory Patterns 
I. General 
State legislation granting the privilege of incorporation for reli-
gious purposes reveals a great diversity in types of corporations that 
may be organized by churches, applicability to specific church bodies, 
and limitations imposed on ecclesiastical corporations. Undoubtedly, 
a large part of this variety is attributable to the long history of reli-
gious corporations and the carry-over of some ideas from the past. 
For instance, the enactment of a special statute for the incorporation 
of churches of a particular denomination may be seen as a carry-over 
of both the practice of granting special corporate charters and the 
established status of some early churches. In many cases, the present 
legislation, which reflects, in some instances, a combination of stat-
utes tailored to specific church bodies and general ecclesiastical cor-
porations statutes, shows nothing more, perhaps, than a legislative 
adaptation to the problem in successive eras and an unwillingness to 
disturb organizations organized under earlier statutes. The legislation 
probably also reflects a legislative concern that any attempt to impair 
corporate privilege and powers under earlier statutes might be held 
invalid as an impairment of the obligation of contracts. In any event, 
as pointed out earlier, one cannot understand the kaleidoscopic pat-
tern of religious corporations law in this country without an aware-
ness of history. 
171. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-12 (1966). 
172. Since there are no cases and no statutory provisions relating to disposition of 
the property of an extinct church, one can only speculate on what a court might do 
when various people claim such property. Most likely it would award the property in 
accordance with the cy pres doctrine. 
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It should be noted here that some of the statutes discussed in this 
paper do not deal only with religious organizations, but also include 
within their scope charitable, fraternal benefit, or educational or-
ganizations. However, the religious element is clearly a major con-
cern in all the statutes. The authors have attempted to distinguish 
such statutes from those that are genuinely unrestricted ( except for 
the requirement that the corporations formed thereunder be non-
profit in scope) in their application. A good example of this latter 
form is the Model Non-Profit Corporation Act. 
2. Statutes Tailored to Specific Churches 
Sixteen states173 provide specific corporate forms for certain 
named religious denominations. Most of these states provide specific 
statutory forms for only one to four denominations.174 At least three 
states provide for fourteen or more separate denominations.175 New 
York leads the field, with specific provisions for more than thirty-five 
different denominations of varying degrees of size and reputation.176 
Most of the states that have such specific laws are located east of the 
Mississippi. Provisions for specified denominations are largely con-
173. They are Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Vermont, and Wisconsin. 
174. E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-265 to -276, -279 to -28la (1960), as amended, 
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-268 to -276, -28la (Supp. 1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, 
§§ 271-313 (1973). 
175. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. ch. 458 (1967); N.J. STAT, ANN. tit. 16 (1939), as 
amended, N.J. STAT. ANN. tit 16 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. RELIC. CORP, LAW (McKinney 1952), 
as amended, N.Y. RELIC. CoRP. LAW (McKinney Supp. 1972). 
176. New York has statutory provisions for the following demoninations (all citations 
are to N.Y. RELic. CoRP. LAw (McKinney 1952), as amended, N.Y. RELIC, CORP, LAW 
(McKinney Supp. 1972)): American Patriarchal Orthodox Church (§§ 51-a to 54-a); 
Apostolic Episcopal (§§ 50 to 59-b); Baptist (§§ 130-40); Byelorussian Autocephalic 
Orthodox Church in America (§§ 336-52); Christian Orthodox Catholic Churches of 
the Eastern Confession (§§ 95-96); Christian Scientist (§§ 184 to 189-b); Church of 
Christ (Disciples) (§ 206); Church of the Nazarene (§§ 273-79); Congregational Christian 
(§§ 160-72); Evangelical United Brethren Church (§ 204-b); Free Baptist (§ 17); Free 
Churches (§§ 180-83); Free Methodist (§§ 225 to 225-o); General Assembly of Spiritualists 
(§§ 262-72); Holy Orthodox Church in America (§§ 50-aa to 50-mm); Holy Ukranian 
Autocephalic Orthodox Church in Exile (§§ 175-79); Independent Associated Spiritu-
alists (§ 210); Jewish (§§ 207-09); National Spiritualist Association (§§ 300-06); Orthodox 
Church in America (§§ 105-08); Orthodox Greek Catholic (§§ 290-96); Presbyterian 
(§§ 60-70); Protestant Episcopal (§§ 40-49); Reformed Church in America (§§ 110-16); 
Reformed Dutch (§§ 110-16); Reformed Lutheran (§§ 110-16); Reformed Presbyterian 
(§§ 110-16); Religious Society of Friends (§§ 201-a to 203); Roman Catholic (§§ 90-92); 
Ruthenian Greek Catholic (§§ 100-02); Seventh Day Baptist (§ 17-a); Spiritual Science 
Mother Church, Inc. (§ 211); Unitarian and Universalist Societies (§§ 400-14); United 
Church of Christ (§§ 160-72); United Methodist (§§ 320-35); and United Society of 
Shakers (§ 202), 
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fined to older juridictions,177 which have a fairly lengthy history with 
respect to ecclesiastical corporation laws,178 while newer jurisdictions 
have concentrated on developing statutes that cover either ecclesiasti• 
cal corporations in general179 or nonprofit corporations as a whole.180 
The denominations most commonly provided for by specific state 
laws are the Protestant Episcopal Church,181 Methodist churches of 
various kinds, 182 the Roman Catholic Church,183 and the Eastern 
Orthodox Church.184 
Most of the present laws providing for the Eastern Orthodox 
177. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 16:6-1 to :6-3, :12-1 to :12-31, :15A-1 to :15A-6 (1939), 
as amended, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 16:6-1 to :6-3, :12-1 to :12-31, :15A-l to :15A-6 (Supp. 
1973); N.Y. REL1c. CORP. LAw (McKinney 1952), as amended, N.Y. R.ELIG. CoRP. LAW 
(McKinney Supp. 1972). 
178. See text accompanying notes 40-46 supra. See generally M. HOFFMAN, supra 
note 6. 
179. E.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-123 to -137.1, -138 to -154 (1965), as amended, 
WYO. STAT. ANN.§§ 17-123 to -137.1 (Supp. 1973). 
180, E.g., WASH, REv, CoDE ANN. §§ 24.03.005-.03.905 (Supp. 1972). 
181. CONN. GEN. STAT, ANN, §§ 33-265 to -267 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit, 27, § 114 
(1953); Mo. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 274A-312Q (1973); MAs.s. ANN. LAws ch. 67, § 39 (1971); 
MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 458.251-.273 (1967): MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 315.17-.20 (1969); 
NEV. R.Ev. STAT. §§ 82.300-.390 (1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 16:12-1 to :12-31 (1939), as 
amended, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 16:12-1 to :12-31 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. R.Euc. CoRP. LAw 
§§ 40-49 (McKinney 1952), as amended, N.Y. REL1c. CORP. LAW §§ 40-49 (McKinney 
Supp. 1972); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 901-05 (1967), as amended, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, 
§§ 901-05 (Supp. 1973); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 187.04 (1957). 
182. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-268 to -276 (1960), as amended, CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 33-268 to -276 (Supp. 1973) (Methodist Church); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3!1-
28la (Supp. 1973) (United Methodist Churches); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 313 (1973) 
(Methodist Church); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 67, §§ 40-43 (1971), as amended, MAss. ANN. 
LAws ch. 67, §§ 40-43 (Supp. 1973) (United Methodist Church); MrcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN, 
§§ 458.21-.33 (Methodist Episcopal Church), 458.41-.55 (Wesleyan Methodist Church), 
458.61-.74 (Methodist Protestant Church), 458.81-.93 (Free Methodist Church) (1967); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 16:6-1 to :6-3 (1939) (Free Methodist Church); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 16:IOA-l to :lOA-15 (Supp. 1973) (United Methodist Churches); N.Y. R.Er.Ic. CoRP. 
LAW §§ 225 to 225-o (Free Methodist Church), 320-35 (United Methodist Church) 
(McKinney 1952), as amended, N.Y. R.ELIG. CORP. LAw §§ 225 to 225-o, 320-35 (McKinney 
Supp. 1972); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 861-66 (1967), as amended, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, 
§§ 861-66 (1967), as amended, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 861-66 (Supp. 1973) (United 
Methodist Church); Wis. STA'I'. ANN. § 187.15 (1957) (Methodist Church). 
183. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-279 to -281 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 27, §§ 115-
18 (1953); Mo. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 271-74 (1973); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 67, §§ 44-46 
(1971); MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 458.1-.2 (1967), as amended, MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. 
§§ 458.1-.2 (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 16:15-1 to :15-17 (1939), as amended, N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 16:15-1 to :15-17 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. R.Er.tc. CORP. LAw §§ 90-92 (McKin-
ney 1952), as amended, N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW §§ 90-92 (McKinney Supp. 1972); [1869] 
R.I. Acts and Resolves 221, kept in force by R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-6-1 (1970); WIS. STAT. 
ANN, § 187.12 (1957). 
184. !LI.. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 187 (1971); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:481-:483 (1969); 
MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 67, § 55 (1971): N.H. R.Ev. STAT • .ANN. §§ 292:15-:17 (1966); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 16:15A-1 to :15A-6 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. RELIG. CoRP. LAw §§ 105-08 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1972); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 187.17 (1957). 
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Church came about as the result of a wave of legislation in the early 
1950's. The purpose of the states that enacted such laws seems to have 
been the protection of Eastern Orthodox property located in the 
United States from domination and control by Communist govern-
ments in the USSR and Eastern Europe.186 
It is understandable that the Roman Catholic Church has often 
been singled out for specific statutory treatment. In the early history 
of the country, legislation tended to discriminate against the Catholic 
Church, since it was feared that, with its hierarchical control, it 
would accumulate wealth and power incompatible with the American 
idea of democracy.186 Earlier reference has been made to the extra-
ordinary history of the Catholic Church under the incorporation 
laws of Pennsylvania, which, at least as originally designed, were in-
tended to assure the control of a congregation's property by laymen 
rather than by the church hierarchy.187 Great changes have occur-
red since that time. In the first place, a number of states specifically 
allow the incorporation of bishops of the church as corporations 
sole.188 Most of the laws regarding the Roman Catholic Church pro-
vide for a mixed lay-clerical government for each parish, but the acts 
are so drawn as to leave control of the church personal and real 
property in the hands of the hierarchy.189 
While there does not appear to be any recognizable pattern in 
the state laws governing the incorporation of Protestant Episcopal 
185. Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 363 U.S. 
190 (1960); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344 
U.S. 94 (1952). 
186. See text accompanying notes 95-128 supra. 
187. See text accompanying notes 113-28 supra. 
188. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 10, § 115 (1959); CAL. CORP. CODE § 10002 (West 1955). Cf. 
MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 458.1-.2 (1967), as amended, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. 
§§ 458.1-.2 (Supp. 1973), which makes the bishop a quasi-corporation sole for the pur-
poses of holding, alienating, and encumbering property. 
189. See, e.g., N.Y. R.ELIG. CoRP. LAW § 91 (McKinney 1952), which states that the 
government of the incorporated church shall be composed of the bishop and vicar-
general of the diocese, the rector, and two lay members of the congregation chosen 
by the clerical trustees. In St. Nicholas Ruthenian Greek Catholic Church v. l3ilanski, 
19 Del. Ch. 49, 162 A. 60 (Ch. 1932), a similar statutory pattern was challenged as 
"unreasonable and inequitable," The court replied: 
I know of no authority by which this court would be justified in rebuilding the 
corporate structure in the manner prayed. Whether as a matter of policy it is un-
just and inequitable for a religious organization's temporal affairs to be controlled 
by ecclesiastics rather than by the people of the congregation is a matter which 
would admit of a conflict of views. What any individual's views about it may be 
is of no importance. The law under which the corporation was created clearly 
admits of ecclesiastical control, and it would be going a great length indeed for 
this court to say that such a scheme of control is so unjust and inequitable as to 
not be permissible, especially when the very congregation in whose behalf the 
protest is now made assented to such control when the title was conveyed. 
19 Del. Ch. at 53-54, 162 A. at 62. 
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or Methodist Churches, it should be noted that these churches, like 
the Orthodox and the Catholic Churches, do have a particular hier-
archical structure and that whenever the attempt is made to fit corpo-
rate law to churches of this type, special and specific types of legisla-
tion are required. The congregational types of churches, on the other 
hand, more readily fit under the general incorporation laws. 
Incorporation laws tailored to reflect the internal rules of specific 
churches present problems that general incorporation laws do not. 
Once the law of a church becomes codified by a state, the church 
loses its ability to modify its own rules, for a change in church struc-
ture has no legal effect without a corresponding amendment of the 
statute. Further attention will be paid to this problem later, and 
some consideration will be given to possible limitations that laws of 
this type may place on the constitutional freedom of churches to 
alter their own internal procedures.190 
In some instances, specifically tailored provisions may conflict 
with state constitutional provisions that prohibit the grant of special 
charters by the state legislature. The likelihood of a constitutional 
conflict increases as acts become more and more specific. For example, 
Nevada recently enacted a statute that incorporated the Episcopal 
Diocese of Nevada.191 The statute identifies the recipient of the grant 
quite explicitly. The Nevada constitution contains a provision that 
requires the use of general incorporation laws, as opposed to grants 
of special charters: 
The Legislature shall pass no Special Act in any manner relating to 
corporate powers except for Municipal purposes; but corporations 
may be formed under general laws; and all such laws may from time 
to time, be altered or repealed.192 
There appears to be at least one other state-Maryland-that has an 
arguably similar situation.193 The potential problem in Maryland 
190. At least one author has previously questioned the validity of incorporation 
laws tailored to reflect the internal rules of specific churches. See Casad, supra note 
49, at 459. 
191. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 82.295-.2957 (1971). 
192. NEV. CONST. art. 8, § 1. 
193. Instead of one law covering the entire Episcopal Church, Maryland has three 
separate statutory schemes covering: the Diocese of Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, 
§ 274A-297 (1973); the Diocese of Eaton, MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 298-312 (1973); and 
the Diocese of Washington, MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 312A-312Q (1973). Art. m, § 48 
of the Maryland constitution provides: 
Corporations may be formed under general laws, but shall not be created by spe-
cial Act, except for municipal purposes and except in cases where no general laws 
exist, providing for the creation of corporations of the same general character, as 
the corporation proposed to be created; and any act of incorporation passed in 
violation of this section shall be void. 
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seems more severe due to the great detail in which the statutes of 
that state appear to regulate the day-to-day affairs of the corporations 
involved. 
3. Types of Corporations 
Three basic types of ecclesiastical corporations are recognized in 
the United States: (1) the trustee corporation, (2) the membership 
corporation, and (3) the corporation sole. 
A trustee corporation is a form of corporate body made up of 
elected trustees or other officials with similar powers and duties. The 
trustees themselves are the corporate body and wield all of the power 
given thereto except to the extent that a statute limits the scope of 
exercise of the power or imposes specified duties upon the trustees 
themselves.194 
The trustee corporation represents the earliest form of ecclesiasti-
cal corporation explicitly recognized by statute in the United 
States.195 However, its use has been rather severely curtailed in recent 
years, and today its use is restricted in both scope and geographical 
area. Some eighteen jurisdictions, fifteen of them east of the Missis-
sippi, recognize a form of the trustee corporation.196 Of the eighteen, 
twelve197 recognize at least one of the other two corporate forms for 
ecclesiastical bodies, and many of the twelve use the trustee form only 
sparingly.198 
194. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 172 (1971) (makes trustees of religious corpora-
tions expressly subject to the members of the congregation); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. 
§§ 458.29, .51, .68, .87, .104, .207, .257, .306, .406, .426, .457, .530 (1967) (several trustee 
corporations provided for may not sell or mortgage real property without the approval 
of the membership or a specific portion thereof, or of the hierarchy); NEV. REv. STAT. 
§ 86.130 (1969) (trustees may not sell or mortgage real property without prior court 
approval). 
195. See text accompanying notes 43-60 supra. See also C. ZOU.MANN, supra note 6, 
at 113-16. 
196. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-279 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 27, § 101 (Supp. 
1968); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 27, § 102 (1953); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-502, -507 (1967); 
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 172, 182 (1971); MD. ANN. CoDE art. 23, §§ 256, 271, 282, 309, 
312M (1973); :MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 67, §§ 40-41 (1971); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 450.159, 
458.101, .257, .401, .421 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 315.01, .15, .16 (1969); Mo. ANN. 
STAT. 352.060 (1966); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 82.320, 86.120 (1967); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 292:4, 306:4 (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 16:1-2, :1-32, :1-34, :1-37, :1-40, :3-3, 
:11-2, :11-18, :12-2, :13-1, :15-1, :15-9, :16-1, :16-9, :17-1, :17-5 (1939), as amended, N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 16:11-18 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW §§ 41, 181 (McKinney 1952). 
as amended, N.Y. R.ELIG. CORP. LAW § 41 (McKinney Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 61-2 
(1965); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1715.18 (Page 1964); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 701, 861, 
901 (1967), as amended, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 861 (Supp. 1973); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 187.05, .12, .15 (1957); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-138 to -139, -142 (1965). 
197. Connecticut, District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New 
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Vermont, Wisconsin and Wyoming. 
198. For example, Connecticut limits its use to the Roman Catholic Church. CONN. 
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The membership corporation, on the other hand, is recognized 
in the vast majority of American jurisdictions. Some forty-three sepa-
rate jurisdictions recognize it, 199 thirty-one of them to the exclusion 
of any other form of ecclesiastical corporation.200 The membership 
corporation is essentially a corporate body made up of the members 
of the congregation. The members, collectively, are the corporate 
body and are akin to the shareholders of a business corporation, save 
that there are usually no stock certificates issued,201 and one need 
not buy into the corporation in the usual sense to become a voting 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-279 (1960). Massachusetts religious corporations are generally 
membership corporations, M:Ass. ANN. LAws ch. 67, §§ 47-49 (1971), but the Methodist 
Episcopal Church, MAss ANN. LAws ch. 67, §§ 40-41 (1971), and the Roman Catholic 
Church, 'MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 67, §§ 44-46 (Supp. 1972), are both trustee corporations. 
Michigan limits its use to Baptist, MlcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 458.101 (1967), Evangelical, 
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 458.451 (1967), Episcopal, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 458.257 
(1967), and Reformed Protestant churches, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 458.401 (1967). 
New York restricts its use to Episcopal, N.Y. RELIG. CoRP. LAW § 41 (McKinney Supp. 
1972), and Free churches, N.Y. R.ELIG. LAw CORP § 181 (McKinney 1952). 
199. ALA. CoDE tit. 10, §§ 124-25 (1959); AI.As. STAT. § 10.20.051 (1968); ARI2:. 
R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 10-451 (Supp. 1972); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-1914 (1966); CAL. CORP. 
CODE § 9200 (West 1955); CoLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-19-1, -20-1, -21-1 (1963); CoNN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-264(a) (Supp. 1973); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-1012, -1029 (1967); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 617.013 (Supp. 1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-2501 (1970); HAWAII REv. STAT. 
§ 416-20 (1968); !DAHO CODE § 30-1101 (1967); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 163a7 (1971); 
IND. ANN. STAT. § 23-7-1.1-7 (Burns 1972); IOWA CoDE ANN. § 504A.ll (Supp. 1972); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1701 (1964); KY. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 273.187 (1972); LA. R.Ev. STAT. 
ANN. § 12:210 (1969); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 2861, 3021, 3103 (1965); MAss. ANN. 
Vi.WS ch. 67, §§ 47-49 (1971): MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 450.1'78, 458.21, .41, .61, .81, 
.201, .301, .451, .524 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 315.17, .21, .23, 317.07 (1969); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 5310.1 (Supp. 1972); MONT. R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 15-2311 (1967); NEB. R.Ev. 
STAT. §§ 21-1910, -1927 to -1929 (1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 16:2-2, :2-17, :5-20, :lOA-3, 
:lOA-4, :12-18, :15A-2 (1939), as amended, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 16:2-2 to :15A-2 (Supp. 
1973): N.Y. RELIG. CoRP. LAw §§ 50-ee, 53-a, 63, 90, 95, 100, 106, 112, 132, 162, 1'77, 
187, 201-a, 210, 211, 225-c, 265, 274, 294, 304, 323, 341, 403 (McKinney 1952), as amended, 
N.Y. RELIG. CoRP. LAw §§ 63, 106, 117, 201-a, 225-c, 323,341,403 (McKinney Supp. 1972); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-29 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 10-24-11 (1960); Omo REv. 
CODE ANN. § 1'702.04 (Page 1964), as amended, Omo R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 1'702.o4· (Page 
Supp. 1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 541, 562 (1953); ORE. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 61.091 
(1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § '7'751 (Special Supp. 1972); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § '7-6-2 
(1969); s.c. CODE ANN. § 12-751 (Supp. 1971): S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 4'7-23-1 (196'7); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-601 (Supp. 1972); TEx. R.Ev. Cxv. STAT. ANN. § 1396-2.08 (1962); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-6-26 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 2358, 2401 (1973); WASH. R.Ev. 
CODE ANN. § 24.03.065 (Supp. 1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 187.01, .IO (195'7), as amended, 
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 18'7.0I, .IO (Supp. 1973); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1'7-123 (1965). 
200. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, 
Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Washington. See note 197 
supra for a list of those jurisdictions that use both forms. 
201. Colorado does allow a form of joint stock religious corporation, CoLO. REv. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 31-21-1 to -21-13 (1963); congregations may so incorporate, CoLO. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 31-21-12 (1963), and may issue stock of a value between ten and one 
hundred dollars, CoLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-6 (1963). Some states do allow stock 
issuance under general nonprofit corporation acts. E.g., AI.As. STAT. § I0.30.05l(a) (1968); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 504A.ll (Supp. 1972). 
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participant in corporate matters. Questions of membership qualifi-
cations are generally left to the congregational bylaws or constitution. 
It is probable that widespread use of the membership form has 
been influenced by legislative familiarity with the form of the modem 
business corporation, which is invariably a membership corporation. 
Since the membership has a voice in corporate affairs, this form is 
also more democratic than the trustee corporation and, accordingly, 
has a greater appeal to the American psyche and sense of history. In 
those states that provide specific corporate forms for certain church 
bodies, the trustee form is generally reserved for hierarchical church 
bodies202 and is only occasionally used for churches capable of being 
designated as congregational.203 The use of the trustee form neces-
sarily concentrates power in the hands of the few--often the repre-
sentatives of the church hierarchy. 
The third form, the corporation sole, is exactly what its name 
implies-a one-man corporation. The corporation sole envisages the 
incorporation of an office, with corporate privileges granted to the 
individual lawfully holding the office.204 As a result, the corporate 
name of the entity is generally the same as that of the office itself. 
It is generally required that an officeholder be elected or appointed 
according to the constitution or bylaws of the denomination to which 
he belongs.205 Most likely, this requirement is inserted to ensure that 
the corporate entity, with its concomitant powers and privileges, is 
limited to parties officially recognized by the denomination in ques-
tion. In practice, it would seem that the corporation sole should be 
limited to hierarchical churches; this follows from the very nature of 
the institution.206 However, most of the acts allowing its use contain 
nothing that would so restrict its operation.207 
202. Those hierarchical churches provided with the trustee form include: Christian 
Reformed, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 458.451 (1967): Episcopal, e.g., MICH. COMP. 
LAws ANN. § 458.257 (1967): Methodist, e.g., l\fu. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 313 (1973): 
Reformed Protestant, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 458.401 (1967); Roman Catholic, 
e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT, ANN. § 33-279 (1960); and Ruthenian Catholic, e.g., N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 16:16-1 (1939). 
203. Those congregations that can be labeled congregational and are provided 
with the trustee form include: Baptist, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 458.101 (1967): 
Christian Scientist, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 16:3-3 (1939); and Spiritualist, N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 16:17-1 (1939). 
204. E.g., WASH, REV. CODE ANN. § 24.12.010 (1958). 
205. E.g., AI.As. STAT.§ 10.40.020 (1962); WASH. REV. CODE ANN§ 24.12.010 (1958). 
206. The corporation sole is particularly suited to hierarchical denominations due 
to the ability of the latter to identify officials in power. Denominations with a con-
gregational polity do not, by their very nature, have the ability to identify one person 
with the requisite authority to fulfill the office. 
207. Some of the acts, however, do so restrict their operation. The Alabama statute, 
ALA. CoDE tit. 10, § 116 (1958), implies the existence of a hierarchy. The Hawaii statute, 
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Although the corporation sole was once looked upon with hos-
tility in many parts of the country,208 in recent years it has begun to 
win wider acceptance, especially in states west of the Mississippi. To-
day, it exists in some form in at least seventeen states.209 At least one 
other state allows for trust succession in the name of one office,210 
and one state specifically prohibits such trust succession.211 The cor-
poration sole is allowed as an additional corporate form by some of 
the jurisdictions that have adopted the Model Non-Profit Corporation 
Act.212 
4. Provisions for Voluntary Associations 
Besides providing for incorporated religious entities, some twenty-
five jurisdictions have statutes that recognize unincorporated volun-
tary religious associations.213 The provisions in question vary in scope 
HAWAII REv. STAT. § 419-1 (1968), speaks of incorporating a bishop or presiding elder 
to administer the temporal affairs of his district. Michigan limits its use to the Roman 
Catholic Church, MICH. CoMP. I..Aws ANN. §§ 458.1-.2 (1967), as amended, M:rcH. CoMP. 
I..Aws ANN. §§ 458.1-.2 (Supp. 1973), and the Episcopal Church, MICH. CoMP. I..Aws ANN. 
§ 458.271 (1967). Montana, MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 15-2404 (1967), requires evidence 
of hierarchical authority before incorporation. North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 61-5 
(1965), limits the privilege to bishops and other officers. 
208. See text accompanying note II2 supra. 
209. A.LA. CoDE tit. 10, §§ 115-23 (1959); AI.As. STAT. §§ 10.40.010-.120 (1968); Aruz. 
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 421-27 (1956); CAL. CoRP. CODE §§ 10000-15 (West 1955); D.C. CoDE 
ANN. § 29-501 (1967); HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 419-1 to -9 (1968); IDAHO CoDE §§ 30-1201 
to -1209 (1967); M:rcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 458.1-.536 (Supp. 1973); MoNT. REv. CODES 
ANN. §§ 15-2401 to -2413 (1947); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 84.010-.080 (1967); N.H. REv. STAT. 
ANN. § 306:4 (1966) (not clear that such a corporation could be formed in New Hamp-
shire, but nothing says otherwise); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 61-5 (1965); ORE. REv. STAT. 
§ 61.055 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-762 (1962); UTAH CoDE ANN. §§ 16-7-1 to -11 (1953); 
WASH. REv. CoDE §§ 24.12.010-.040 (1958); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-146 to -154 (1965). 
210. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 563 (1953). 
211. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 703 (1967). 
212. AI.As. STAT. §§ 10.40.010-.120 (1968); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-501 (1967); MONT. 
REv. CODES ANN. §§ 15-2401 to -2403 (1967); ORE. REV. STAT. § 61.055 (1971); UTAH 
CoDE ANN. §§ 16-7-1 to -11 (1973); WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. §§ 24.12.010-.040 (1958). For 
a complete list of states that have enacted the Model Non-Profit Corporation Act, see 
note 306 infra. 
213. AI.As. STAT. § 10.40.120 (1968); .ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-201 to -202 (1971); CoNN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-264a to -281 (Supp. 1973); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-501 to -516 
(1967), as amended, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-501 to -516 (Supp. 1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 617.12-.13 (Supp. 1973); GA. CoDE ANN. §§ 22-5504 to -5512 (1970); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 17-1711 to -1726 (1964), as amended, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1711 to -1726 (Supp. 
1972); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 273.010-.150 (1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2986 
(1964); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 67, §§ 1-55 (1971), as amended, MASS. ANN. I..Aws ch. 67, 
§§ 1-55 (Supp. 1972); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 5350-51 (1957); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 21-1993 
to -1995 (1970); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 306:1 to :12 (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 16:1-39 
(1939); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 61-1 to -6 (1965); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1715.02-.22 (Page 
1965)," as amen'ded, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1715.02-.22 (Page Supp. 1972); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 18, §§ 561-564.5 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 21 (1965), repealed as to 
religious nonprofit corporations, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 21 (Supp. 1973); TENN. CoDE 
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and purpose, but many of them deal with the common law disability 
of a voluntary association to hold real property in its own name.214 
Statutes that give voluntary associations the right to take and hold 
real property have two general forms: (1) recognition of the common 
law device of granting the land to trustees to hold for the benefit of 
a religious entity,215 and (2) outright abolition of the disability by 
conferring the power to hold land on the association itself. 
Among the states that recognize the power of the trustees, some 
simply provide for the vesting of title to property in the trustees and 
their successors in office.216 Others go further and provide that the 
association shall organize formally and appoint trustees to hold its 
property and perform other proprietary functions on its behalf.217 
Still other states recognize the duly appointed or elected trustees of 
such associations as bodies corporate in and of themselves, even 
though they have not gone through formal incorporation proce-
dures.218 Other states simply recognize the right of the successors of 
the original trustees to take and hold the property held in trust and 
deny any right of the heirs of the original grantors to the property.219 
States that allow the association to take and hold real property in 
its own name are far fewer in number.220 These states generally re-
ANN. §§ 64-203 to -205 (1955), as amended, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 64-203 to -205 (Supp. 
1972); TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2293a (1971); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-7-10 (1973); 
VT. STAT. ANN, tit, 27, §§ 781-944 (1967), as amended, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 781-944 
(Supp. 1973); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 57-1 to -17 (1969), as amended, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 57-1 
to -17 (Supp. 1973); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-1 to -13 (1966), as amended, W. VA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-1 to -13 (Supp. 1970); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 187.07 (1957); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 1-955 to -956 (1959), 
214. For examples of the common law disability of a voluntary association to hold 
real property in its own name, see Britton v. Jackson, 31 Ariz. 97, 250 P. 763 (1926); 
Lael v. Crook, 192 Ark. 1115, 97 S.W.2d 436 (1936); Miller Lumber Co. v. Oliver, 65 
Mo. App. 435 (1896). 
215. For an example of this device, see Bartlet v. King, 12 Mass. 537, 7 Am. Dec. 
99 (1815). 
216. E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-7-10 (1973); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 187.07 (1957). 
217. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-264a to -28la (Supp. 1973); D.C. CODE ANN. 
§§ 29-501 to -516 (1967), as amended, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-501 to -516 (Supp. 1972); 
KY. REv. STAT, ANN. §§ 273.100, .110 (1972). 
218. E.g., MASS ANN. LAws ch. 68, § 1 (Supp. 1972); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 306:1 
to :7 (1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 61-1 to -4 (1965). These provisions allow church officials 
to act as a body corporate. Their power is subject to approval by the congregation in 
major matters affecting the property itself. The New Hampshire provisions specifically 
allow the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) to act as bodies corporate. 
219. E.g., ALAS. STAT. § 10.40.120 (1968); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1715.16 (Page 
1964); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-7-10 (1973); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-154 (1965). 
220. At the present time, only Mississippi and Pennsylvania so provide. MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 21:5350 (1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 21 (1965), repealed as to religious non-
profit corporations, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 21 (Supp. 1973). See also text accompanying 
note 216 supra. 
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quire the congregation to organize, and the resultant legal entity is 
granted rather limited corporate powers.221 
Nine states provide for the passing of the property of unincorpo-
rated religious bodies in the event of dissolution of the local congre-
gation or abandonment of its property.222 Generally, the property is 
to go to the denomination to which the unit was attached at the time 
of its demise.223 Some states, however, give power to the trustees of 
the local unit to apply to the local circuit or superior court £or a 
determination of the proper disposition of the property.224 
The last significant provision relating to unincorporated religious 
associations deals with the use of the property following schism within 
the congregation. One provision allows each faction to use the prop-
erty in proportion to its membership.225 Others give the majority of 
the congregation at the time of schism the right to take the property 
and exclude the minority.226 
C. Analysis of Statutes 
I. Formation of Ecclesiastical Corporations 
There are few, if any, special requirements for the incorporation 
of ecclesiastical organizations; normally, ecclesiastical corporations 
221. Mississippi, for example, has a provision that allows religious societies to 
"organize." Miss. CODE ANN. § 5350 (1942). This provision is in addition to provisions 
that specifically allow incorporation, MtSs. CoDE ANN. § 21:5310.1 (Supp. 1972), and 
establishes an entirely different procedure. A separate institution is created with the 
power to sue and hold real property in its own name. MISS. CODE ANN. § 5350 (1942). 
Pennsylvania applies mortmain provisions to such bodies, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 31-33 
(1965), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN, tit. 10, §§ 31-33 (Supp. 1973), and requires the 
property to be held according to the discipline of the faith to which the body is 
attached. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 21 (1965), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 21 
(Supp. 1973). 
222. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 617.12-.13 (Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-17II, -1713a, 
-1714, -1716a, -1716e, -1732, -1735 (1964), as amended, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1714, -1732, 
-1735 (Supp. 1972); KY. REv. STAT. §§ 273.120-.130 (1972); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 21-1993 to 
-1994 (1970); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1715.05 (Page 1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, 
§§ 103-04 (1965); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2293a (1971); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
27, §§ 782-83, 821-25, 864-65, 904-05, 941-43 (1967). 
223. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 617.12 (Supp. 1972). 
224. E.g., Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1715.05 (Page 1964). 
225. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23.120 (1972). 
226. ALA. CoDE tit. 10, §§ 104-13 (Supp. 1971); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-5504 (1970); 
MISs. CODE ANN. § 1273-01 (Supp. 1972). Alabama's statute, popularly known as the 
Dumas Act, was held constitutionally invalid in Goodsen v. Northside Bible Church, 
261 F. Supp. 99 (S.D. Ala. 1966), afjd., 387 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1967). It was also declared 
unconstitutional in First Methodist Church v. Scott, 284 Ala. 571, 226 S.2d 632 (1969). 
Mississippi's statute was held to violate the first amendment in Sustar v. Williams, 263 
S.2d 537 (Miss. 1972). 
1544 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:1499 
and regular business corporations are formed in a similar fashion. 
The Model Non-Profit Corporation Act provides a typical procedure 
for incorporation. Under this Act, one or more parties may serve as 
incorporators227 and must sign articles of incorporation containing 
the name of the corporation, its period of duration, its purpose, the 
address of its initial registered office, the name of the original regis-
tered agent, and the number, names, and addresses of the initial 
board of directors and the incorporators.228 Duplicate originals of 
these articles are filed with the secretary of state, who endorses them, 
files one, and returns the other with a certificate of incorporation.229 
An organizational meeting for the corporation must be called on 
three days' notice following the issuance of the certificate of incorper 
ration.230 
A popular variant of the above method is for the members of the 
organization to pass a resolution signifying an intention to incorpo-
rate and then to elect trustees who will go through the process of 
incorporation.231 This method is generally used for trustee corpora-
tions,232 but it may also be used for membership corporations.238 
Some states require that the articles be submitted to the local dis-
trict or superior court rather than to the secretary of state for final 
approval.234 In such cases, the articles must generally be filed with 
the county in which the property is- located, as well as with a state-
wide agency, usually the secretary ofstate.235 
Many states require that certain meeting and notice requirements 
be fulfilled prior to any actual incorporation of an ecclesiastical or-
ganization. Maine, for example, requires a meeting, for which notice 
has been given,236 to determine whether the congregation or organiza-
tion shall incorporate, and incorporation is allowed only upon the 
227. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Ac:r § 28 (rev. ed. 1964). 
228. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Ac:r § 29 (rev. ed. 1964). 
229. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Ac:r § 30 (rev. ed. 1964). 
230. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Ac:r § 32 (rev. ed. 1964). 
231. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 10, §§ 124-25 (1958). See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 27, § 101 
(Supp. 1968). 
232. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 27, § 101 (Supp. 1968); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-505 
(1967); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 256 (1973). 
233. See Williams v. Jones, 258 Ala. 59, 61 S.2d 101 (1952). 
234. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 10, § 125 (1958); Arur. STAT. ANN. § 64-1905 (1966). 
235. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 352.062 (1966); N.Y. REuG. CORP. LAW § 180 (McKinney 
1952). 
236. Seven days' written notice of the meeting to elect incorporators and the 
initial board of directors must be given by posting the notice at the church. ME. R.Ev. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2982 (1964), as amended, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2982 (Supp. 
1972). 
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favorable vote of the members.237 A further requirement found in 
states that allow separate corporate forms for specific denominations 
is the prior approval of an official of the church hierarchy (if the con-
gregation is affiliated with a hierarchical denomination) before the 
articles can be filed with the state.238 
Many states add a procedural requirement for the formation of 
the corporation sole-namely, a listing of the estimated value of the 
property of the corporation upon application for use of the corporate 
form.239 Succession to the corporate powers is accomplished for the 
most part by the filing of a certificate of appointment or election with 
an appropriate state or county official.240 The problem of interim 
management of the corporation between the death of one official and 
the certification of the next is not dealt with by any statute. 
2. Powers of Ecclesiastical Corporations 
The powers granted by statute to ecclesiastical corporations are 
fairly standardized throughout the United States and are not radi-
cally different from powers given to regular business corporations. 
The most basic power-the right to hold, manage, and dispose of real 
property-is universally granted to religious organizations, even in 
those jurisdictions where churches are not allowed to incorporate.241 
Even so, this power is by no means unqualified in every jurisdiction. 
Many states limit the amount of property that a religious organiza-
tion may hold at any one time.242 The forms of limitation vary from 
237. ME. R.Ev. STAT, ANN. tit. 13, §§ 2861-62 (1964), as amended, ME. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 13, § 2861 (Supp. 1972). 
238. E.g., MICH. CoMP. L\ws ANN. § 458.21 (1967) (Methodist Episcopal Church); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 16:15A-2 (Supp. 1973) (Russian Orthodox Church); N.Y. R.ELIG. 
CORP. LA.w §§ 50-aa, 50-ee (McKinney 1952) (Holy Orthodox Church). 
239. E.g., ALAS. STAT. § 10.40.040 (1968); WYO, STAT. ANN. § 17-148 (1965). 
240. E.g., ALAS. STAT, § 10.40.110 (1968); WYO, STAT. ANN. § 17-153 (1965). 
241. See VA. CODE ANN. § 57-7 (1969); w. VA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1 (1966). See text 
accompanying notes 139-41 supra. 
242. See ARIZ. R.Ev. STAT, ANN. § 10-454 (1956); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-272 
(Supp. 1973) (Methodist Church only); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-501 (1967); IDAHO CoDE 
§ 30-1106 (1967); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 2863, 2983 (1964); l\fAss ANN. LA.ws ch. 67, 
§§ 21 (religious societies), 25 (meeting house), 41 (Methodist Episcopal), 46 (Roman 
Catholic) (1971); MICH, CoMP. LAws ANN, §§ 548.27 (Methodist Episcopal), 458.49 
(Wesleyan Methodist), 458.67 (Methodist Protestant), 458.87 (Free Methodist), 458.205 
(Presbyterian), 458.257 (Episcopal), 458.307 (Congregational), 458.425 (Christian Re• 
formed), 458.457 (Evangelical), 458.529 (United Missionary) (1967); MISS. CoDE ANN, 
§ 5351 (1942); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 352.130 (1966); NEV. REv. STAT. § 86.160 (1969) (religious 
associations); NEV. REV. STAT. § 82.360 (1971) (Episcopal); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 295:7 
(voluntary corporations), 306:10 (religious societies), 306.11 (Quakers) (1966); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 543 (1953); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 7-6-8 (Supp. 1972); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 12-758 (Supp. 1971); WYO, STAT. ANN. § 17-125 (1965). New York does not seem to 
have any limitations at present, although it does have a provision that allows the state 
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restrictions on the total dollar value of the property that the organiza-
tion may hold,243 to restrictions on the total acreage it may hold,244 
to a general restriction that such organizations may not hold more 
property than is "reasonably necessary" for their purposes.245 A few 
states also spell out specifically the kinds of property that may be 
held by a religious body.246 
The methods by which a church may alienate or encumber its 
property are also restricted in many states.247 The purpose of such 
to investigate whether the amount of property held by one religious corporation 
"exceeds the amount authorized by law." N.Y. R.ELIG. CORP. LAw § 14 (McKinney 1952). 
243. Such provisions take two forms. Some restrict the total value that can be held: 
Massachusetts limits the Roman Catholic Church to 100,000 dollars worth of property 
per congregational corporation, MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 67, § 46 (1971), and the Methodist 
Episcopal Church to 50,000 dollars total assets, MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 67, § 41 (1971): 
Rhode Island limits all churches to 150,000 dollars total assets, R.I. GEN. LA.ws ANN. 
§ 7-6-8 (Supp. 1972). Others restrict yearly income from real and personal property: 
Connecticut limits the annual income of the Methodist church to 15,000 dollars, CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-272 (Supp. 1973); Maine limits the yearly income of incorporated 
parishes to 3,000 dollars, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2863 (1964); New Hampshire 
limits the annual income of religious associations to 7,500 dollars, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 306:10 (1966), and the annual income of Quaker monthly meetings to 10,000 dollars, 
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 306:11 (1966). The constitutional validity of limiting certain 
churches and not others-as is the case in Connecticut, Maine, and Nevada, among 
other states-appears highly questionable. 
244. For example, Nevada restricts religious associations to one block of real property 
if located in a city or to ten acres if located in the country. NEV. REv. STAT. § 86.160 
(1967). The District of Columbia limits religious societies to one acre. D.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 29-501 (1967). 
245. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-454 (1956); IDAHO CODE § 30-1106 (1967); MASS. ANN. 
LAws ch. 67, §§ 21, 23, 41, 46 (1971); MICH. COMP. IAws ANN. §§ 458.27, .49, .67, .87, .205, 
.257, .307, .425, .457, .529 (1967); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 352.130 (1966); N.H. REv. SrAT. ANN. 
§§ 295:7, 306:10, :11 (1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 543 (1953); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-758 
(Supp. 1971). 
246. Mississippi limits church holdings to the following: the church and a reasonable 
quantity of ground thereunder; schools and parish houses, and a reasonable quantity 
of ground thereunder; the minister's house and the ground thereunder; hospitals and 
grounds; colleges and grounds; orphan asylums and grounds; camp facilities and 
grounds; cemetery lands; and denominational headquarters and grounds. MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 5351 (1942). Missouri limits churches to a reasonable quantity of land for 
assembly, libraries, laboratories, and other rooms. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 352.130 (1966). 
247. ALA. CODE tit. 10, §§ 128-29 (1958); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-509 to -510 (1967); 
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 172, 180 (1970); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:207D (1969); ME. 
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 2982, 2984 (1964), as amended, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, 
§§ 2982, 2984 (Supp. 1973); MD. CODE ANN. art. 23, §§ 290, 309e, 312n (1973): MICH. 
COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 450.162 (church trustee corporations), 458.29 (Methodist Episcopal), 
458.51 (Wesleyan Methodist), 458.68 (Methodist Protestant), 458.89 (Free Methodist), 
458.104 (Baptist), 458.207 (Presbyterian), 458.257 (Episcopal), 458.306 (Congregational), 
458.406 (Reformed Protestant), 458.426 (Christian Reformed), 458.457 (Evangelical), 
458.530-.531 (United Missionary) (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 315.12 (religious associa-
tions-trustee corporations), 315.17 (Episcopal), 315.20 (Episcopal cathedrals), 315.24 
(religious associations-synods), 317.26 (nonprofit corporations) (1969); NEV. REv. STAT. 
§ 86.130 (1969); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 306:7 to :8 (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 16:1-6 
(general), 16:2-8 (Baptist), 16:3-4 (Christian Scientist), 16:5-22 (Evangelical Lutheran), 
16:10A-ll (United Methodist), 16:11-3 (Presbyterian), 16:12-4 (Episcopal), 16:13-2 
(Reformed), 16:15-5 (Roman Catholic Congregation), 16:15-4 (Roman Catholic Diocese), 
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restrictions is to protect the membership from hasty or unwise deci-
sions by boards of directors or from diversion of property from its 
intended use. Accordingly, the limitations take the form of require-
ments of specific percentages of voter approval that must be met be-
fore property may be sold or encumbered,248 or at least prior ap-
proval by an unspecified percentage before any action can be taken.249 
Some jurisdictions even require the prior approval of a local court 
before a sale becomes valid.250 In some states, congregations affiliated 
with a hierarchical church must have the prior approval of the hier-
archy before a sale or mortgage can be consummated.251 
A second group of powers, the powers to contract and to incur 
debts, are widely recognized by the states.252 Again, it should be men-
tioned that these powers are not given without some restrictions. As 
noted above,253 debt-contracting schemes are often subject to prior 
congregational approval before they become valid. 
Other powers given to ecclesiastical corporations generally in-
clude the right to maintain and alter a seal, 2;;4 the right to dissolve 
16:16-7 (Ruthenian Greek Catholic), 16:17-6 (Spiritualist) (1939), as amended, N.J. STAT • 
.ANN. §§ 16:1-6 to :17-6 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. RELIG. CoRP. LAw §§ 12(1) (general), 12(2) 
(Episcopal), 12(3) (Roman Catholic), 12(4) (Ruthenian Greek Catholic), 12(5-a) (Presby-
terian), 225-l (Free Methodist), 333 (Methodist), 351 (Byelorussian Orthodox), 411 
(Unitarian and Universalist) (McKinney 1952), as amended, N.Y. RELIG. CORP: LAw 
§§ 12(1)-411 (McKinney Supp. 1972); Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 1702.39 (Page 1964); PA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 7547 (Special Supp. 1972); 'WIS. STAT. ANN. § 187.12(5) (1957). See also 
text accompanying note 311 infra. 
248. See, e.g., MICH. Co.MP. LAws ANN. § 458.51 (1967), which requires approval by 
two thirds of the members present and voting at a meeting of a Wesleyan Methodist 
Church called for the purpose of considering the proposed sale or encumbrance. The 
Model Non-Profit Corporation Act requires approval by a two-thirds majority for a 
sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the corporation. MODEL NON-PROFIT CoR-
PORATION Acr § 44 (rev. ed. 1964). 
249. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT • .ANN. § 12:207D (1969). 
250. E.g., NEV. REv. STAT.§ 86.130 (1969); N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW§ 12(1) (McKinney 
Supp. 1972) (if a lease or mortgage is to be for more than five years' duration). 
251. E.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS .ANN. § 458.257 (1967) (Episcopal); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 16:IOA-ll (Supp. 1973) (United Methodist); N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAw § 12(2) (McKinney 
1952). 
252. All jurisdictions, with the possible exception of Mississippi, grant these powers 
specifically or impliedly. See, e.g., Cow. REv. STAT • .ANN. § 31-19-2 (1963); FLA. STAT. 
ANN, § 617.021 (Supp. 1972). Mississippi gives religious corporations only such powers 
as are specified in the articles of incorporation and are "reasonably necessary to accom-
plish the stated purpose." MISS. CoDE ANN. § 5310.1 (Supp. 1972). 
253. See note 247 supra and accompanying text. 
254. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-19-2, -20-1 (1963); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 617.021 
(Supp. 1972); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 416-26 (1968); !LL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 180 (1971); 
!ND. ANN. STAT. § 23-7-l.l-4(b) (1972); IOWA CODE ANN. § 504A.4 (Supp. 1973); LA. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 12:207 (1969); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 931 (Supp. 1972); MICH. 
CoMP. I.Aws ANN. § 450.183 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 315.04 (1969); MoNT. REv. CODES 
ANN. § 15-2305 (1947); NEV. REv. STAT. § 86.120 (1967); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 295:3 
(1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 16:1-4 (1939); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-14-30 (1953); Omo REv. 
CoDE ANN. § 1702.12 (Page Supp. 1972); PA. STAT, ANN. tit. 15, § 7502 (Special Supp. 
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and distribute the corporation's assets,255 the right to merge with 
foreign or domestic ecclesiastical corporations,256 the right to per-
petual duration, 257 the right to a limited duration should the organiza-
tion so desire,258 the right to sue,259 the right to borrow money,260 
the right to give security for the corporation's own borrowing,261 and 
the right to improve any real property the corporation may mrn.262 
Ecclesiastical corporations generally have the power to regulate 
their own internal affairs without outside restrictions. However, while 
the power to administer internal affairs has been thought to be a 
constitutionally protected right of religious organizations,263 many 
states do endeavor to establish standards or requirements to promote 
procedural safeguards in order to protect minority rights. Such pro-
cedural regulation often takes the form of notice requirements for 
meetings264 and elections,265 annual meeting requirements,266 meth-
ods for the removal of boards of directors or trustees,267 requirements 
1972); R.I. GEN. LAws .ANN. § 7-6-7 (1969); s.c. CODE .ANN. § 12-758 (Supp. 1971); 
S.D. COMP. LAws .ANN. § 47-22-54 (1967); WIS. STAT • .ANN. § 187.12 (1957); WYO. STAT • 
.ANN. § 17-150 (1965). See also MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 5(c) (reV'. ed. 
1964). 
255. See notes 270-96 infra and accompanying text. 
256. See notes 297-205 infra and accompanying text. 
257. E.g., AI.As. STAT. § 10.20.011 (1968); WASH. REv. CODE .ANN. § 24.03.035 (Supp. 
1972). Cf. ALA CODE tit. 10, § 118 (1958). This is a fairly standard power, although some 
states are silent on the point. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-453 (1956). 
258. The typical provision states that the corporation shall have perpetual duration 
unless otherwise specified in the articles of incorporation. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-1005 
(1967); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 931 (Supp. 1972); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. 
§ 24.03.035 (Supp. 1972). New Mexico limits the over-all duration of nonprofit corpora-
tions to 100 years. N.M. STAT • .ANN. § 51-14-ll0 (195ll). 
259. E.g., NEV. REv. STAT. § 84.050 (1967); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1702.12 (Page 
Supp. 1972). In a few states the power must be considered to be granted by implication 
only. See, e.g., ARiz. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 10-454 (1956). 
260. E.g., ALA. CoDE tit. 10, § 118 (1958); AI.As. STAT. § 10.40.070 (1968); ARiz. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 10-423 (1956); FLA. STAT • .ANN. § 617.021 (Supp. 1972). A few states appear 
not to grant this power. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31-20-7 (1963); Mo. STAT. ANN. 
§ 352.130 (1966). 
261. E.g., DEL. CODE .ANN. tit. 27, § 102 (1953); MoNT. CODES ANN. § 15-2406 (1967); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-15 (Supp. 1971). 
262. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 5(d) (1964 rev. ed.). For a list of states 
that have adopted this Act, see note 306 infra. 
263. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian 
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872). 
264. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:230 (1969) (requires ten to sixty days' written 
notice of all meetings). 
265. E.g., DEL. CODE .ANN. tit. 27, § 105 (195ll) (requires ten days' notice prior to 
election of trustees). 
266. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-30 (1965) (requires an annual meeting of members); 
MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 13 (rev. ed. 1964). 
267. E.g., D.C. CoDE ANN. § 29-504 (1967); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 169 (1971); ORE. 
REV. STAT. § 61.127 (1971). 
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concerning the eligibility of an individual to be an incorporator, 268 
or requirements for voter eligibility.269 
3. Dissolution Provisions 
Nearly all states have statutory provisions for dissolution proce-
dures, either voluntary or involuntary, for ecclesiastical corpora-
tions.270 The provisions display great variety, running the gamut 
from those that seem to be almost an afterthought to those that are 
highly sophisticated and patterned after similar sections in many 
business corporation acts. There are four principal procedures for 
dissolving an ecclesiastical corporation: (1) involuntary dissolution 
initiated by officers or members of the corporation, (2) involuntary 
dissolution initiated by the state attorney general or other public 
official, (3) voluntary dissolution upon vote of the membership of 
the corporation itself, and (4) dissolution by church officials upon 
extinction of the local corporate unit. Five states also allow dissolu-
tion when a creditor of a congregation has reduced a claim to judg-
ment and the claim remains unsatisfied.271 
Involuntary dissolution initiated by members or officers of the 
corporation is generally allowed if a deadlock among the members or 
directors of the corporation has prevented the corporation from func-
tioning, or if the corporation has committed an ultra vires act or 
has otherwise failed in accomplishing its stated purposes.272 This 
type of dissolution procedure is a refinement borrowed from regular 
business corporation acts and has been adopted in slightly less than 
half the jurisdictions.273 
268. For example, Maryland requires that the trustees who incorporate be elected 
by members over 21 years of age. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 256, 262-63 (1973). New 
Hampshire requires five or more persons of "lawful age" to be incorporators. N.H. 
R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 292:1 (Supp. 1972). 
269. For example, New York limits voters to those of "full age" unless otherwise fixed 
by statute or in the articles of incorporation. In no event, however, may the voting 
age be fixed at less than 16 years. N.Y. REuG. CORP. I.Aw § 4a (McKinney Supp. 1972). 
Note that New York requires Episcopal Church voters to be male, of full age, and 
regular contributors to the parish. N.Y. REuG. CORP. I.Aw § 43(6) (McKinney Supp. 
1972), quoted in note 69 supra. 
270. The states that have no such provisions are Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, 
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, and New Mexico. 
271. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:251 (1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-53 (1965); Omo 
REV. CODE ANN. § 1702.50 (Page 1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 7982 (Special Supp. 1972); 
S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 47-26-23 (1967). See also MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr 
§ 54 (rev. ed. 1964). 
272. E.g., HAWAII R.Ev. STAT. § 416-128 (1968); LA. REV. STAT. § 12:251 (1969). 
273. HAWAll REV. STAT. § 416-128 (1968); LA. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 12:251 (1969); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 315.38 (1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-53 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 
7981 (Special Supp. 1972); S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 47-26·22 (1967). In addition, those 
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Involuntary dissolution initiated by the state attorney general or 
other public official is a widely used method.274 Generally, the grounds 
for allowing dissolution on this basis are fraud in the procuring of 
the corporate franchise, abuse of the use of the corporate privilege, 
failure to file an annual report with the secretary of state or other 
designated public official, termination of the period of duration spe-
cified in the articles of incorporation, and general abuse of state law 
or violation of the public interest.275 As an outgrowth of his powers 
to oversee charities-a carry-over from the common law276-the at-
torney general of the state is usually given the power to institute dis-
solution proceedings.277 Some states give this power to the prosecut-
ing attorneys of the county in which the property of the corporation 
is located278 or to the state official charged with overseeing corpora-
tions within the state.279 
Voluntary dissolution upon a vote of the members of the corpora-
tion is generally allowed for any reason deemed proper by the mem-
bers. In some states such dissolution may go forward without a court 
order of any kind,280 while other states require court intervention 
to ensure the payment of all creditors and to oversee the proper dis,. 
tribution of the corporate assets.281 The majority of members re-
jurisdictions that have adopted all or parts of MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION A<::r § 
54(a) (rev. ed. 1964) (all states, except Arkansas, listed in note 306 infra) have such a 
provision. 
274. ARK, STAT. ANN, § 64-1918 (1966); CONN. GEN, STAT. ANN. § 33-264f (Supp. 1973); 
HAWAII R.Ev. STAT. § 416-122 (1968); !LL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 32, § 190 (1971); IND. ANN, STAT. 
§ 23-7-1.1-66 (1972); Mica. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 450.180 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 317.62 
(1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 352.240 (1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-50 (1965); S.D. COMP. 
LAws § 47-26-16 (1967). 
275. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 23-7-1.1-66 (1972). 
276. For a discussion of the attorney general's role with respect to charitable trusts, 
see 4 A. Scorr, THE LAw OF TRUSTS § 391 (3d ed. 1967). 
277. All states, except Hawaii, listed in note 274 supra allow the attorney general 
to act in this manner. 
278. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-1918 (1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 352.240 (1966). In both cases, 
the attorney general also has the power of dissolution. 
279. HAWAII REv. STAT. § 416-122 (1968) (director of regulatory agencies). 
280. COLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 31-19-7 (1963); CONN. GEN, STAT. ANN. § 33-264e (Supp. 
1973); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 416-121 (1968); IND. ANN. STAT, § 23-7-1.1-33 (1972); N.H. REv. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 308:1-:6 (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 16:2-16 (1939); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55A-44 
to -49 (1965); Omo R.Ev. CODE ANN.§ 1702.47 (Page Supp. 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, 
§ 7961 (Special Supp. 1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-763 (1962); S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 47-
26-1 to -11 (1967). In addition, all the states that have adopted all or parts of MODEL 
NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Ac:r § 49 (rev. ed. 1964) (all states, except Arkansas, listed in 
note 306 infra) have a provision of this sort. See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 317.45 (1969). 
281. FLA, STAT. ANN. § 617.05 (Supp. 1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:250 (1969); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 317.47 (1969); Mo. ANN. STAT, § 352.190 (1966); N.Y. RELIG, CORP, 
LAw § 18 (McKinney 1952); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN, § 2293(a) (1971). See also OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 564.3 (1953). 
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quired for a dissolution vote varies from simple282 to two-thirds283 
to three-fourths.284 It would seem likely that the relatively high per-
centages required are intended to ensure that the threat of dissolu-
tion will not arise upon every disagreement or controversy within 
the corporate unit. 
Dissolution by hierarchical officials upon extinction of the church 
or abandonment of the church premises is allowed in several states.285 
Most likely, the purposes of such laws are twofold: (1) to protect 
abandoned property from deterioration through exposure and ne-
glect, and (2) to ensure the hierarchy that the property will be pre-
served for the use of other members of the same denomination. 
Generally, all dissolutions of ecclesiastical corporations are ac-
complished by petition to a court of specified jurisdiction-usually 
the court of the county wherein the bulk of the corporate property 
is located.286 Most states require notice to creditors of the soon-to-
be-defunct corporation and satisfaction of all outstanding debts be-
fore the remaining corporate assets may be distributed.287 Only after 
payment of debts and formal court approval of the plan of distribu-
tion will the court order the dissolution or the secretary of state grant 
a certificate of dissolution.288 
Perhaps the plan of distribution is the most crucial question. 
Many states allow the trial court to make all determinations concern-
ing the distribution of property.280 In such cases, it would seem logi-
cal for courts, having no statutory guidelines, to rely upon plans pre-
sented to them by the parties and upon traditional notions of cy 
282. E.g., Omo R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 1702.47(D) (Page Supp. 1972). 
283. E.g., ILL. R.Ev. STAT, ch. 32, § 163a43 (1971). 
284. HAWAII R.Ev. STAT,§ 416-121 (1968). 
285. IOWA CODE ANN. § 504.11 (1949); KAN. STAT, ANN. §§ 17-1713, -1713(c), -1716, 
-1716(c), -1716(e) (1964), as amended, KAN. STAT, ANN. § 17-1716 (Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT • 
.ANN. §§ 17-l716(h), -1734, -1737 (Supp. 1972); MICH. COMP, LAWS ANN. §§ 458.29, .47, 
.69, .89, .107, ,209, .308, .532 (1967); N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 16:2-21, :5-26, :6-3, :lOA-14, :12-16, 
:13-16 (1939), as amended, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 16:2-21 to :13-16 (Supp. 1973); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN, tit, 18, § 564.2 (1953); VT. STAT, ANN. tit. 27, §§ 782, 822, 865, 905, 942 (1967), as 
amended, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 865, 905 (Supp. 1972); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 187.08, ,10, 
.15(4) (1957). 
286. E.g., FLA. STAT, ANN. § 617.05 (Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT, ANN. §§ 17-1712, -1713(b), 
-1716(b) (1964); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1715 (Supp. 1972); VT. STAT • .ANN. tit. 27, § 782 
(1967); WASH, R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 24.03.260 (Supp. 1972). 
287. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-1051 (1967); IND. ANN. STAT. § 23-7-1.1-33 (1972); 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 7961 (Special Supp. 1972). 
288. See, e.g., S.D. Cm,IP. LAws ANN. § 47-26-10 (1967); WASH. R.Ev. CODE .ANN. § 
24,03.245 (Supp. 1972). 
289. E.g., ARK. STAT • .ANN, § 64-1918 (1966); FLA, STAT. ANN, § 617,05 (Supp. 1972); 
HAWAII R.Ev. STAT. §§ 416-121 to -125 (1968). 
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pres.290 One state provides that the property will escheat to the 
state,291 while at least one other jurisdiction gives the property to the 
heirs of the original donors.292 Neither of the latter two solutions 
seems perfectly satisfactory. 
At the other extreme are the jurisdictions that specify that, upon 
the demise of a local congregation, the property will go to specified 
denominational organizations.293 Denominations with a congrega-
tional polity are specified more often than those with an hierarchical 
polity.294 These provisions have the advantage of providing security 
for the denominations affected, although problems could arise in the 
event of a name change or a merger unless such contingencies were 
290. For a discussion of the evolution of the cy pres rule in the United States, see 
E. FISCH, THE CY PRES DocrRINE IN THE UNITED STATES (1950). In Maryland, the court 
is instructed by statute to employ the cy pres doctrine. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 127 
(1973). 
291. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.180 (1967). 
292. D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-511 (1967). 
293. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1711 (Baptist, to Kansas Baptist Convention), 17-1713a 
(Colored Baptist, to Missionary Baptist State Convention), 17-1714 (Church of Christ, 
to Kansas Christian Missionary Society), 17-1716a (Congregational, to Kansas Congrega• 
tional and Christian Conference), 17-1716d (United Brethren in Christ, to Kansas Annual 
Conference of United Brethren in Christ) (1964), as amended, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
1714 (Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1732 (German Baptist Brethren, to Church 
of the Brethren, District of Kansas), 17-1735 (Church of Nazarene, to District Advisory 
Board of the Church of the Nazarene) (Supp. 1972); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 458.29 
(Methodist Episcopal, to Annual Conference), 458.47 (Wesleyan Methodist, to Annual 
Conference), 458.69 (Methodist Protestant, to Annual Conference), 458.89 (Free Method-
ist, to Annual Conference), 458.107 (Baptist, to Baptist Convention), 458.209 (Presby-
terian, to Presbytery), 458.308 (Congregational, to Michigan Congregational Conference), 
458.532 (United Missionary, to Annual Conference) (1967); N.J. STAT. ANN, §§ 16:2-19 
(Baptist, to New Jersey Baptist Missionary Corporation), 16:2-21 (Seventh-Day Baptist, 
to Seventh-Day Baptist Missionary Society), 16:5-26 (Lutheran, to Synod), 16:6-1 to 
:16-3 (Free Methodist, to New York Conference of the Free Methodist Church), 16:lOA-
14 (United Methodist, to Annual Conference), 16:12-16 (Episcopal, to Annual Conven-
tion), 16:13-14 to :13-17 (Reformed, to Classis) (1939), as amended, N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 16:2-21, :5-26, :lOA-14 to :13-17 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. RELIG. CORP. I.Aw§§ 16 (Episcopal, 
to Bishop), 17 (Free Will Baptist, to Central Association of Free Will Baptists), 17-a 
(Seventh Day Baptist, to Seventh Day Baptist Missionary Society), 59-b (Apostolic 
Episcopal, to Metropolitan Synod of the Apostolic Episcopal Church), 50-MM (Holy 
Orthodox, to Metropolitan Synod of the Holy Orthodox Church in America), 206 
(Church of Christ, to New York Christian Missionary Society), 225-M (Free Methodist, 
to Annual Conference), 352 (Byelorussian Orthodox, to Diocesan Council) (McKinney 
1952), as amended, N.Y. R.ELIG. CORP. LAw §§ 16, 352 (McKinney Supp. 1972); VT. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 781-85 (Baptist, to Vermont Baptist State Convention), 821-29 (Congrega-
tional, to Vermont Domestic Missionary Society), 864-66 (Methodist, to Troy Annual 
Conference of Methodist Church), 941-44 (Universalist, to Vermont &: Quebec Univer-
salist-Unitarian Convention) (1967), as amended, VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 864-65 (Supp. 
1972); VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 904-05 (Episcopal, to Protestant Episcopal Diocese of Vermont) 
(Supp. 1972); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 187.10 (Congregational, to Wisconsin Congregational 
Association), 187.12(10)-(11) (Catholic, to Bishop), 187.15(4) (Methodist, to Annual Con-
ference) (1957). 
294. A probable explanation for this situation is that no statutes are really necessary 
to determine where the property of a local congregation that belonged to a hierarchical 
polity should go upon the demise of the congregation. 
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foreseen when the legislation was drafted. Some states have avoided 
this problem by simply stating that the property is to be administered 
by the denomination to which the congregation was attached, 295 or 
by a similar religious group.296 
4. Ability To Merge or Consolidate 
In many jurisdictions, ecclesiastical corporations are allowed to 
merge or consolidate with other ecclesiastical corporations.297 Pro-
cedure varies from state to state, but the over-all pattern is very simi-
lar. Generally, the plan of merger must be approved by the board of 
directors or trustees of the corporation and then submitted to a vote 
of the membership. A favorable vote by the percentage of the mem-
bership specified by the statute is necessary to effectuate the merger.298 
There are variants to this pattern, which tend to rob the member-
ship of its power to reject a proposed merger or consolidation.299 For 
example, Maine requires only that the board of directors of each non-
profit corporation approve the plan of merger and submit it to the 
state attorney general for approval.800 This procedure is basically un-
democratic, despite the fact that the attorney general is supposed to 
represent the public interest. It is doubtful that a proposal for merger 
would be closely scrutinized by a public official busy with what he 
undoubtedly considers to be more important matters of state. At 
least one state allows religious hierarchies to order the consolidation 
of parishes or congregations.301 Other jurisdictions require the ap-
295. IOWA CODE ANN. § 504.11 (1949); NEB. R.Ev. STAT. § 21-1993 (1970); N.H. R.Ev. 
STAT. ANN. § 308.9 (1966). 
296. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:249B (1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 564.3 (1953). 
297. Merger is not specifically allowed in the following states: Alabama, Arkansas, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island. 
298. E.g., Omo REv. CooE ANN. §§ 1702.41-.42 (Page 1964) (requires endorsement by 
trustees of a plan of merger, notice to members of a meeting to approve the plan, and 
majority approval by membership of the plan). Most states require a two-thirds mem-
bership approval. See, e.g., MODEL NON·PROFIT CoRPORATION Ac:r § 40 (rev. ed. 1964). 
299. Several states use procedures that do not require membership approval prior 
to an effective merger. New York requires supreme court approval. N.Y. RELIG. CoRP. 
LAw § 13 (McKinney Supp. 1972). New Jersey and New Mexico require only the 
approval of the board of directors. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 16:1-20 (1939); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 51-14-35 (1953). Missouri has a unique system, which requires a plan of merger, 
approval by the membership, and submission to a local circuit court for approval. The 
circuit court may call upon an independent, competent person to give an opinion on 
the desirability of the merger. Once the circuit court gives approval, articles of merger 
must be filed in the county wherein the property is located and with the secretary of 
state. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 352.150 (1966). 
300. ME. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 961 (1964). 
301. Mn. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 293, 312p (1973). Some states have granted the power 
impliedly by case law. See, e.g., Chatard v. O'Donovan, 80 Ind. 20, 41 Am. R. 782 
(1881); Klix v. Roman Catholic Parish, 137 Mo. App. 347, 118 S.W. 1171 (1909). 
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proval of hierarchical officials before the merger or consolidation 
becomes effective.802 
Most jurisdictions require that notice of a merger or consolida-
tion be filed in the county where the property of the merged corpora-
tion is principally located303 or with a designated state oflicial.804 The 
filing requirement is essentially a method of giving notice to prior 
and prospective creditors and others interested in the affairs of the 
corporation. Prior creditors are also protected in almost every juris-
diction by the statutory requirement that the successor corporation 
succeed to all liabilities and assets of the merging or consolidating 
corporations. 805 
5. The Model Non-Profit Corporation Act 
The Model Non-Profit Corporation Act (MNPCA), propounded 
by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Associ-
ation, has been adopted in whole or in part in eighteen separate 
jurisdictions in the United States,306 and one can probably safely pre-
dict that other states will adopt it in due course. Many of the states 
that have adopted it are clustered in the Midwest and West, although 
there is no clear-cut pattern as to its adoption. A few jurisdictions 
that have adopted the MNPCA have also retained older acts cover-
ing ecclesiastical corporations.807 
302. E.g., N.Y. R.ELIG. CORP. LAw § 13 (McKinney Supp. 1972) (Episcopal). 
303. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 315.365 (1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 352.150 (1966). 
304. E.g., HAWAII R.Ev. STAT. § 417-57 (1968). 
305. E.g., MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 42 (rev. ed. 1964). 
306 • .ALAs. STAT. ANN. §§ 10.20.005-.725 (1968); .ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 64-1901 to -1921 
(1966) (highly modified version); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-1001 to -1099(1) (1967), as 
amended, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-1002, -1055, -1094 (Supp. 1972); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-
1030(a) (Supp. V 1972); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-2101 to -3601 (1970) (modified version); 
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 23-7-1.1-1 to .1-66 (1972); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 504A.l-.101 (Supp. 
1972); KY. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. §§ 273.161-.390 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 355.010-.520 
(1966), as amended, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 355.025 (Supp. 1973); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. 
§§ 15-2301 to -2397 (1967), as amended, MONT. R.Ev. CODES ANN. §§ 15-2354, -2359, 
-2383 to 84 (Supp. 1971); NEB. R.Ev. STAT. §§ 21-1901 to -19, 106 (1970); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§§ 10-24-01 to -24-28 (1960), as amended, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-24-05, -24-23 (Supp. 
1973); ORE. R.Ev. STAT. §§ 61.005-.950 (1971); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-101 to -2007 (Supp. 
1972) (sections of MNPCA scattered throughout these sections); TEX. R.Ev. CIV. STAT. 
ANN. arts. 1396-1.01 to -11.01 (1962), as amended, TEX. R.Ev. Cxv. STAT. arts. 1396-2.06, 
-2.14, -2.17, -2.18, -2.27, -3.02, -7.01, -7.02, -7.12, -8.08, -9.02 (Supp. 1972); UTAH CoDE 
ANN. §§ 16-6-18 to -6-53 (1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2301-806 (1973); WASH. R.Ev. 
CODE ANN. §§ 24.03.005-.925 (Supp. 1972); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 181.01-.76 (1957), as 
amended, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 181.04, .15, .175, .37, .56, .68, .76 (Supp. 1973). Illinois' 
General Not for Profit Corporation Act, ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 163a-163al00 (1972), 
although older, is quite similar to the MNPCA. 
307. Ar.As. STAT. §§ 10.40.010-.120 (1968); D.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 29-501 to -516, -601 to 
-606 (1967), as amended, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-501 to -516 (Supp. 1972); GA. CoDE .ANN. 
§§ 22-5501 to -5512 (1970); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 504.1-.29 (1949), as amended, IOWA 
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The MNPCA provides basically for a membership form of cor-
poration.308 It allows for the incorporation of any level of ecclesiasti-
cal organization, be it a congregation, a national denomination, or 
some level of the hierarchy of a given denomination.309 It should be 
remembered that the MNPCA applies also to all other forms of non-
profit corporations, as well as to the religious or ecclesiastical corpora-
tion. 
The formation of a corporation under the MNPCA is similar to 
the formation of a corporation under the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act, which has been described previously.310 
A corporation is given more powers under the MNPCA than un-
der most state ecclesiastical corporation laws. Under section five of 
the Act the following powers are granted to the corporation: to have 
perpetual succession; to sue; to have a corporate seal; to purchase, 
hold, lease, take by gift, or improve real and personal property or 
any interest therein, wherever situated; to sell, convey, mortgage, 
pledge, lease, or otherwise encumber its property; to lend to employ-
ees other than directors or officers; to deal in securities or obligations 
of any company or governmental unit in the United States; to make 
contracts, borrow, issue notes or bonds, or give security; to lend for 
corporate purposes, take security, and invest funds; to conduct its 
affairs in any state or foreign country; to elect or appoint officers or 
agents and fix their salaries; to make or alter bylaws; to make dona-
tions for public welfare or charities; to indemnify any officer for the 
expenses of any suit resulting from his acting as a director of another 
corporation at his own corporation's request; to cease activities and 
dissolve; and to exercise all necessary and convenient powers to effect 
its purposes. The power of the board of directors in exercising the 
above powers is limited only by the fact that they are elected and by 
a specific requirement that in order to sell or encumber all or sub-
stantially all of the corporate assets, two thirds of the membership 
must give its prior approval.311 
The MNPCA provides for voluntary and involuntary dissolution 
procedures. Voluntary dissolution takes place after approval by the 
CODE ANN. §§ 504.1-.29 (Supp. 1972); MONT. REv. CoDFS ANN. §§ 15-2401 to -2413 
(1967); ORE. REv. STAT. § 61.055 (1971); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 16-7-1 to -11 (1973); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 701-06 (1967); WASH, R.Ev. CODE ANN. §§ 24.12.010-.40 (1972); 
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 187.01-.17 (1957), as amended, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 187.01-.17 (Supp. 
1972). 
308. It is possible, however, to form a corporation under the MNPCA without 
members. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 11 (rev. ed. 1964). 
309. See MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr §§ 28-31 (rev. ed. 1964). 
310. See text accompanying notes 227-30 supra. 
311. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION ACT § 44 (rev. ed. 1964). 
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board of directors and two thirds of those members present and vot-
ing at a meeting properly called to consider the issue.312 Upon ap-
proval as outlined above, the corporation ceases operation and sends 
notice to all creditors.313 Assets go first to creditors, then to those 
contributors who specified the return of assets contributed in such an 
event, then to another corporation with similar purposes if the assets 
are in fact held in trust for a particular purpose, and finally to the 
members or other persons entitled to their possession according to 
the articles or bylaws.314 When all of the assets are distributed, the 
president and secretary execute and verify articles of dissolution315 
and file duplicates with the secretary of state, who files one, returns 
one, and issues a certificate of dissolution.316 
Involuntary dissolution may be initiated by a member or director 
when the directors are in deadlock, the members cannot break the 
deadlock and irreparable injury to the corporation is suffered or 
threatened; when acts of the directors are illegal, oppressive, or 
fraudulent; or when assets are being misapplied or wasted.317 A 
creditor may initiate a suit for dissolution if (1) he has a claim re-
duced to judgment, a return nulla bona has been made, and the 
corporation is insolvent, or (2) the corporation admits to his claim 
in writing and is shmvn to be insolvent.318 Such dissolution is ac-
complished by filing a suit in a court of equity. The court then ap-
points a liquidating receiver319 with the power to distribute assets 
in the order described previously.320 When all the assets are distrib-
uted, the court issues a decree of dissolution,821 which must be filed 
with the secretary of state.322 
A corporation organized under the MNPCA may merge or con-
solidate with one or more other domestic corporations.323 An alterna-
tive section of the MNPCA allows merger or consolidation with for-
eign nonprofit corporations.324 The MNPCA follows the pattern 
312. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 45 (rev. ed. 1964). 
313. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 45 (rev. ed. 1964). 
314. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 46 (rev. ed. 1964). 
315. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 49 (rev. ed. 1964). 
316. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 50 (rev. ed. 1964). 
317. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 54(a) (rev. ed. 1964). 
318. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 54(b) (rev. ed. 1964). 
319. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 55 (rev. ed. 1964). 
320. MODEL NON-PROFIT CoRPORATION Acr § 55 (rev. ed. 1964). 
321. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 59 (rev. ed. 1964). 
322. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 60 (rev. ed. 1964). 
323. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr §§ 38-39 (rev. ed. 1964). 
324. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 43 (rev. ed. 1964). 
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prevalent in the United States in requiring a plan of merger or con-
solidation to be adopted first by the board of directors and then by 
two thirds of those present and voting at a meeting properly called 
to consider the issue.325 Articles of merger must be adopted and dupli-
cates filed with the secretary of state, who then files one, returns one, 
and issues a certificate of merger.326 The new corporation so formed 
succeeds to all rights and liabilities of the predecessor corporations.327 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AsPECTS OF RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS 
The problems relating to incorporation of religious societies have 
had a long history in this country. The major developments in this 
history occurred prior to the United States Supreme Court's exten-
sive and highly significant interpretations of the religion clauses of 
the first amendment, which have been extended to the states via the 
fourteenth amendment.328 Although matters concerning the powers 
and limitations of ecclesiastical corporations, as well as questions 
about the intervention of civil courts in the internal affairs of 
churches, have traditionally been handled by state courts on the basis 
of statutes and state case law,329 the imposing body of recent decisions 
on the meaning and application of the first amendment330 warrant a 
closer look at some constitutional aspects of the church corporation 
problem. 
The initial and basic question is whether a state grant of the 
corporate privilege to societies organized for a religious purpose is 
consistent with the proscriptions of the establishment clause of the 
first amendment.831 While it may appear highly academic or perhaps 
325. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 40(a) (rev. ed. 1964). 
326. MODEL NON-PROFIT CoRPORATION Acr § 41 (rev. ed. 1964). 
327. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 42 (rev. ed. 1964). 
328. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. l (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 
296 (1940). 
329. E.g., Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian 
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872). See note 
49 supra and accompanying text. 
330. See, inter alia, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 1318 (1971); Walz v. Tax Commn., 
397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); School Dist. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
331. In Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 48-49 (1815), Justice Story delivered 
perhaps the only direct Supreme Court remark on the subject: 
It is conceded on all sides that, at the revolution, the Episcopal church no 
longer retained its character as an exclusive religious establishment. And there 
can be no doubt that it was competent to the people and to the legislature to 
deprive it of its superiority over other religious sects, and to withhold from it any 
support by public taxation. But, although it may be true that "religion can be 
directed only by reason and conviction, not by force and violence," and that "all 
men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion according to the dictates 
of conscience," as the bill of rights of Virginia declares, yet it is difficult to per-
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even frivolous to raise this issue today, there is some precedent that 
may suggest the importance of the question. In the famous case of 
Everson v. Board of Education332 the Supreme Court stated that the 
establishment clause was designed to prohibit any form of aid to any 
and all religions and to ordain the separation of church and state. 
If the no-aid language is literally construed, a formidable case can 
be made against the validity of any statute that grants to religious 
bodies a legal device that is immensely useful, not only in carrying 
on routine business, but also in acquiring and accumulating prop-
erty. The same can be said of the application of the charitable trust 
doctrine, whereby courts recognize and enforce trusts for the benefit 
of religious societies and in aid of religious purposes. The great value 
to churches of these benefits secured by law is readily apparent. Per-
haps it is safe to say that the recognition of the power of religious 
groups to acquire and own property and enter into contracts, to be 
the beneficiaries of charitable trusts, and to enjoy the protection af-
forded by the laws of the state in carrying out their religious func-
tions are among the chief forms of aid given by the state to religious 
societies. 
The argument that the no-aid interpretation requires the invali-
dation of laws permitting the incorporation of religious societies de-
rives some force from President Madison's veto of a bill to incorporate 
the Episcopal Church for the District of Columbia.333 He said that 
ceive how it follows as a consequence that the legislature may not enact laws 
more effectually to enable all sects to accomplish the great objects of religion by giv-
ing them corporate rights for the management of their property, and the regula-
tion of their temporal as well as spiritual concerns. Consistent with the Constitution 
of Virginia the legislature could not create or continue a religious establishment 
which should have exclusive rights and prerogatives, or compel the citizens to 
worship under a stipulated form or discipline, or to pay taxes to those whose 
creed they could not conscientiously believe. But the free exercise of religion 
cannot be justly deemed to be restrained by aiding with equal attention the 
votaries of every sect to perform their own religious duties, or by establishing 
funds for the support of ministers, for public charities, for the endowment of 
churches, or for the sepulture of the dead. And that these purposes could be better 
secured and cherished by corporate powers, cannot be doubted by any person 
who has attended to the difficulties which surround all voluntary associations, 
While, therefore, the legislature might exempt the citizens from a compulsive 
attendance and payment of taxes in support of any particular sect, it is not per-
ceived that either public or constitutional principles required the abolition of all 
religious corporations. 
332. 330 U.S. I (1947). 
333. The following is the complete text of his veto message: 
To the House of Representatives of the United States: 
Having examined and considered the bill, entitled "An Act incorporating the 
Protestant Episcopal Church in the town of Alexandria, in the District of Colum-
bia," I now return the bill to the House of Representatives, in which it originated, 
with the following objections: 
Because the bill exceeds the rightful authority to which Governments arc 
limited, by the essential distinction between civil and religious functions, and 
violates, in particular, the article of the Constitution of the United States, which 
declares, that "Congress shall make no law respecting a religious establishment." 
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the bill would amount to an establishment of religion forbidden by 
the first amendment. In assessing the significance of Madison's veto, 
it must be remembered that this corporation was chartered by special 
law and that the incorporation of only one church was subject to the 
charge that it was unduly preferred over others.834 Also, the grant of 
corporate status could well be viewed as an attempt to restore some 
special privileges lost when the Episcopal Church was disestablished 
in Virginia and Maryland.335 Moreover, as stressed by Madison in 
his veto message, the bill, by adopting the rules for the governance 
of the Episcopal Church, intruded into religious matters, since it 
gave a legal sanction to matters reserved for the determination of the 
church and would prevent the church from making changes in its 
internal law. Madison regarded this as an establishment of religion. 
In confining his criticism to features of this special charter, Madison 
did not necessarily take the view that a general law that permitted the 
incorporation of churches and did not attempt to prescribe the or-
ganizations' internal law would be unconstitutional. But the fact that 
Virginia, strongly influenced by Madison in these matters, adopted 
a constitutional provision prohibiting the incorporation of societies 
for religious purposes336 strongly suggests that Madison feared that 
the incorporation of churches would be a means for the enlargement 
The bill enacts into, and establishes by law, sundry rules and proceedings relative 
purely to the organization and polity of the church incorporated, and compre-
hending even the election and removal of the Minister of the same; so that no 
change could be made therein by the particular society, or by the general church 
of which it is a member, and whose authority it recognises. This particular church, 
therefore, would so far be a religious establishment by law; a legal force and 
sanction being given to certain articles in its constitution and administration. Nor 
can it be considered, that the articles thus established are to be taken as the 
descriptive criteria only of the corporate identity of the society, inasmuch as this 
identity must depend on other characteristics; as the regulations established are 
generally unessential, and alterable according to the principles and canons, by 
which churches of that denomination govern themselves; and as the injunctions 
and prohibitions contained in the regulations, would be enforced by the penal 
consequences applicable to a violation of them according to the local law: 
Because the bill vests in the said incorporated church an authority to provide 
for the support of the poor, and the education of poor children of the same; an 
authority which being altogether superfluous, if the provision is to be the result 
of pious charity, would be a precedent for giving to religious societies, as such, 
a legal agency in carrying into effect a public and civil duty. 
24 ANNALS OF CONG. 982-83 (1853) [11th Cong., 3d Sess. (1810-11)]. The text is also 
reproduced in M. HOWE, CASES ON CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 85 (1952). 
334. See the Presbyterian Protest Against Incorporation of Churches, which was 
directed against the bill in the Virginia legislature that would have authorized the 
incorporation of Protestant Episcopal churches in each parish. The protest is repro-
duced in M. HowE, supra note 333, at 13-14. 
335. For a history of the early Virginia statutes relating to establishment, disestab-
lhhmcnt, and incorporation of churches, sec Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 
(1815). 
336. VA. CoNST. art. IV, § 14. See text accompanying notes 139-72 supra. 
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of ecclesiastical power and would lead to abuse, including ecclesiasti-
cal intervention in matters of state.337 
Despite Madison's view, the whole history of religious corpora-
tions, culminating in contemporary statutes that permit the easy 
incorporation of religious societies, supports the power of the state 
to grant the corporate privilege for religious purposes. That is, the 
argument can be made in the context of corporation laws, as was 
made in the Walz case338-where the Court relied in substantial part 
on history to sustain state property tax exemptions for property held 
for religious purposes-that the constitutionality of these laws is up-
held by the fact that they have existed for so long. This viewpoint ac-
cords with Justice Holmes' aphorism that a page of history is worth a 
volume of logic.339 
But reliance need not be placed solely or primarily on the histori-
cal argument to support the incorporation of church bodies. In the 
first place, the no-aid proscription has not been taken literally by 
, the Supreme Court. Instead, the Constitution has been interpreted 
to prohibit those forms of assistance that are distinctively in aid of 
religious purposes and are not required in the interest of guarantee-
ing religious liberty.340 A complementary proposition is that the estab-
lishment clause does not prohibit laws or programs that are directed 
to appropriate secular ends, even though such laws or programs result 
in incidental aid to religion.341 
The secular-purpose approach was given definitive approval in 
School District v. Schempp,342 where the Court said that the relevant 
tests in determining whether a given governmental enactment runs 
afoul of the establishment clause are: (1) Does the enactment have a 
secular legislative purpose, and (2) does it have a primary effect that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion?343 Statutes that allow churches 
337. For a sampling of the general views of Jefferson and Madison on the subject, 
see CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 142, at 68-87. 
338. Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
339. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). 
340. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 41 U.S.L.W. 5153 
(U.S., June 25, 1973) (public aid to parochial schools); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 
602 (1971) (public aid to parochial schools); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 
(1963) (Bible reading in public schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prayers 
in public schools); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (religious instruc-
tion in public schools). 
341. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (capital grants to church-related 
colleges); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (free textbooks for parochial 
school students); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday closing laws); 
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947) (bus transportation of children to parochial 
schools). 
342. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
343. 374 U.S. at 222. 
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to incorporate meet this test easily. These statutes are clearly directed 
to secular ends-to facilitate the carrying on of business, entering into 
contracts, and acquiring and disposing of property. Their primary 
effect can also be measured by these secular considerations. The state 
is not prescribing a faith, sanctioning religious acts or programs, or 
giving its support to religious teaching when it authorizes a group 
to form a religious corporation any more than the state is supporting 
a private business when it grants a corporate charter to a commercial 
group. This was clearly recognized in Bradfield v. Roberts,344 one of 
the few early cases arising under the establishment clause. In uphold-
ing the constitutionality of congressional grants to a District of Co-
lumbia hospital that was mvned and operated by a sisterhood of the 
Roman Catholic Church, the Court said that the corporation that 
controlled the hospital was itself nonsectarian and "simply . . . a 
secular corporation being managed by people who hold to the doc-
trines of the Roman Catholic Church, but who nevertheless are 
managing the corporation according to the law under which it 
exists. "345 
The secular-purpose requirement brings to the fore a view fre-
quently voiced by state courts346 in characterizing and dealing with 
religious corporations: An incorporated religious society is viewed 
as a dual entity.347 It is, first and primarily, a religious association 
dedicated to spiritual ends, with its own internal authority concern-
ing religious matters. As a corporation, it is a secular entity, operat-
ing under state auspices and subject to the general laws of the state 
respecting corporate procedure and contractual and proprietary mat-
ters. In short, a religious society is seen as serving both religious and 
secular purposes, and the incorporation privilege is directed to the 
secular aspects of its operation. 
The Supreme Court has also stressed neutrality as a primary con-
sideration in interpreting the establishment clause. 348 Carried to its 
logical conclusion, this means that regulating laws of general appli-
cation must apply equally to churches and religious activities and, 
conversely, that churches may not be denied privileges granted to 
other groups under general laws. Obviously, state laws that grant 
the corporate privilege to all nonprofit corporations meet the neutral-
344. 175 U.S. 291 (1899). 
345. 175 U.S. at 298-99. 
346. See, e.g., Gray v. Good, 44 Ind. App. 476, 89 N.E. 798 (1909); Miller v. Trustees 
of Baptist Church &: Congregation, 16 N.J.L 251 (1837). 
347. See C. ZOLLMAN, supra note 6, at 117-18. 
348. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-27 (1963). 
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ity test so far as their use by religious societies is concerned. Under 
such general laws the religious factor is not a relevant consideration; 
the nonprofit element is the key classification factor. 
The arguments with respect to neutrality lose some of their per-
suasive force when churches do not derive their corporate privilege 
from general incorporation laws embracing all nonprofit organiza-
tions. For instance, the incorporation of churches may take place 
under statutes that are designed peculiarly for ecclesiastical or reli-
gious societies, although they do not single out any one denomination 
for special treatment.349 The classification in such statutes is in terms 
of societies organized for religious purposes. This type of law on its 
face is not neutral. It is fair, however, to assume that any state that 
permits the incorporation of societies organized for religious purposes 
also permits the incorporation of other nonprofit societies. Thus, the 
religious corporation laws may be viewed in th~ context of other state 
laws having to do with nonprofit associations,just as a law granting 
tax exemptions for property held for religious purposes may be a 
part of a general statutory scheme for exempting property used by 
nonprofit organizations.850 
More difficulty is encountered in a state like New York, which has, 
over the years, enacted a series of separate incorporation statutes that 
are tailored to the needs of particular churches.851 These individual 
statutes are, in a sense, special statutes, since they deal with the in-
corporation of churches of a designated denomination. Furthermore, 
they offer the opportunity of granting preferential treatment to some 
churches at the expense of others and thereby of violating the concept 
of neutrality. This way of dealing with the problem is supported by 
historical considerations. It may be viewed as a survival of earlier 
days when the state dealt specially with an established church and 
also as a carryover from the earlier era when the corporate privilege 
349. E.g., CoLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-20-1 to -14 (1963); lDAHo CODE §§ 30-II0I to 
-III0 (1967); ME. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 2861-3161 (1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 315.01-
.50 (1969), as amended, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 351.01-.50 (Supp. 1973). 
350. In Walz, the Court noted that New York had "not singled out one particular 
church or religious group or even churches as such; rather, it [had] granted exemption 
to all houses of religious worship within a broad class of property owned by nonprofit, 
quasi-public corporations which include hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, scientific, 
professional, historical, and patriotic groups." 397 U.S. at 673. 
351. See N.Y. R.ELIG. CORP. I.Aw (McKinney 1952), as amended, N.Y. R.ELIG. CORP, 
I.Aw (Supp. 1972). The following is an example of the kinds of problems that can 
arise: Where a state statute specifies a given voting age for a religious corporation 
and the religious corporation's bylaws allow those of a lesser age to vote, a question is 
raised as to the legal effectiveness of decisions made when the underaged voters par-
ticipate. This problem could become critical when the matter being dealt with concerns 
purely secular matters such as the sale or mortgage of real property. 
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was granted only by special charter. Once a state gets into the prac-
tice of providing a separate corporation law for a particular church 
that is influential enough in the legislature to secure an enactment 
of this kind of law, the legislature probably finds it difficult to escape 
from it. It may be that the historical considerations are in themselves 
adequate to support this legislation. Leaving the historical considera-
tion aside, however, the most important consideration is whether 
the practical effect of these laws is to prefer some churches at the 
expense of others. In New York it appears from an examination of 
the individual statutes that any church body seriously interested in 
securing the corporate privilege has no difficulty in obtaining it. 
Moreover, in New York, general statutes permit the incorporation 
of religious bodies, so that churches not specifically provided for by 
the hand-tailored statutes may nevertheless incorporate under a gen-
eral statute. 302 Indeed, it may be argued that churches organized 
under the general incorporation law stand in a better position than 
those for which special statutes have been enacted because the gen-
eral laws allow churches much more freedom and flexibility in de-
fining their internal procedures and practices.353Since the special 
denominational type of law is designed to provide a corporate scaf-
folding for the particular ecclesiastical structure, it thereby gives a 
legal support to the church's own internal laws. The important ques-
tion this kind of statute raises is not whether it is unduly preferen-
tial or discriminatory, but whether, in its practical operation, it 
unduly restricts the freedom of the churches and therefore violates 
the free exercise clause of the first amendment. More attention will 
be given to this question Iater.354 
Finally, it may be argued that the state may appropriately imple-
ment religious liberty by authorizing the use of legal means that 
enable churches better to achieve their purposes. Entering into con-
tracts and acquiring and holding at least some property, activities 
that are essential to carrying out religious functions, are greatly 
352. N.Y. RELIG, CORP, I.Aw§§ 3-27 {McKinney 1952). 
353. For example, the Maryland statutes governing the Protestant Episcopal Church 
and its dioceses in the state of Maryland extensively regulate various aspects of in-
ternal procedure. For a sample list of those items regulated, see note 373 infra. How-
ever, in a state such as Washington, which utilizes the MNPCA, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. 
§§ 24.03.005-.925 (Supp. 1972), very little internal regulation is set forth. Methods 
are provided for removing officers, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 24.03.130 (Supp. 1972), 
limiting the sale of all or substantially all of the corporate property, WASH. REv. CODE 
ANN.§ 24.03.215 (Supp. 1972), allowing merger or consolidation, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. 
§ 24.03.195 (Supp. 1972), and dissolution, WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. §§ 24.03.235-.302 (Supp. 
1972). 
354. See text accompanying notes 364-74 infra. 
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facilitated by the use of the corporate privilege. The privilege thus 
becomes a means of promoting the exercise of religious liberty b'y 
collective entities and is a phase of what Chief Justice Burger has 
called "benevolent neutrality."355 Indeed, the resemblance and the 
parallels between the arguments in support of the validity of incor-
poration laws and in support of the validity of tax exemption laws 
are striking. 
The discussion up to this point has centered on the question of 
whether the grant of the corporate privilege to a religious society 
violates the establishment clause. Other constitutional considerations 
are suggested under the free exercise clause of the first amendment. 
Since the use of the corporate device as a means of acquiring, holding, 
and disposing of property and doing business is now considered vir-
tually indispensible to the functioning of any kind of organized 
group, it is arguable that the church may claim the privilege of in-
corporation as a matter of constitutional right in the name of religious 
liberty. This claim, if valid, jeopardizes the Virginia856 and West 
Virginia357 constitutional provisions, which prohibit the incorpora-
tion of churches. 
It may seriously be doubted, however, whether the free exercise 
argument, stated in this abstract form, would have much persuasive 
force with the Supreme Court. Considerations of the importance of 
the corporate form may be sufficient to sustain legislative authoriza-
tion of the incorporation of churches, but not compelling enough to 
create a right of incorporation. The idea is now so well established 
in American law that the corporate privilege is a special grant from 
the legislature, made only at its discretion,358 that any claim of a 
constitutional right of incorporation, whether made by religious or 
by secular entities, would hardly receive serious attention. But, again, 
this question is largely academic. Even if religious societies have no 
constitutional right to incorporate, the claim can be made that they 
have a right under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amendment not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of the 
corporate privilege. Perhaps the state is free to withhold the corpo-
rate privilege from all nonprofit societies, but if it grants the privilege 
generally, it should not be free to deny the privilege on religious 
grounds. Such discrimination offends either the equal protection 
355. Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). See quotation from Justice 
Story in note 331 supra. 
356. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 14. 
357. w. VA. CONST. art. 6, § 47. 
358. See H. HENN, LAW OF CORl'ORATIONS § 12, at 18 (1970). 
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clause or the free exercise clause or the two in combination and is 
clearly incompatible with the neutrality concept.359 
While the Virginia and West Virginia prohibitions on religious 
corporations are subject to attack on the ground of discrimination, 
the question may be raised whether the practical effect of the opera-
tion of the laws in these two states is to hamper the churches in a 
substantial way in carrying on their secular enterprises. As previously 
noted, 360 in both these two states, legislation permits the acquisition 
of property for religious purposes in the name of trustees, and the 
benefit of the charitable trust doctrine has been extended by statute 
to trusts for religious purposes. While, therefore, the handling of 
commercial and property transactions in Virginia by churches may 
not be as conveniently done as in other states where the full corpo-
rate privilege is enjoyed, it is not clear that churches in Virginia have 
suffered seriously from this restriction. It is of interest, however, that 
at the time revision of the Virginia constitution was proposed, the 
argument was made that this provision should be deleted from the 
Virginia constitution on the ground of its possible conflict with rights 
secured under the religion clauses of the first amendment.361 
More concrete free exercise questions may be raised by incorpora-
tion laws that restrict rather than enhance the freedom of churches. 
Mention may be made first of state legislation that restricts the total 
amount of real estate that may be mvned by religious corporations.362 
There is no evidence to indicate that these restrictions have imposed 
a substantial burden on churches or have seriously restricted them in 
359. See the opinion of the Michigan Supreme Court in In re Proposal C, 384 
Mich. 390, 432-33, 185 N.W.2d 9, 28-29 (1971), where the court relied on both equal 
protection and free exercise grounds in declaring invalid a Michigan constitutional 
provision that excluded private school children, including those attending parochial 
schools, from receiving shared time instruction or auxiliary services at public schools. 
"Neutrality in its application requires an equal protection mode of analysis •••• 
In any particular case the critical question is whether the circumference of legislation 
encircles a claim so broad that it can be fairly concluded that religious institutions 
could be thought to fall within the natural perimeter." Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 
664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
For development of the thesis that the twin religion clauses of the first amendment 
forbid the use of the religious factor as the basis for a classification for purposes of 
governmental action, see P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW (1962). 
360. See text accompanying notes 139-72 supra. 
361. The 1969 report of the Virginia Commission on Constitutional Revision stated: 
"[The section banning incorporation of churches] singles out the religious bodies for 
exclusion from the benefits of a general law to which other bodies are entitled. By so 
discriminating against churches the present section is probably unconstitutional under 
the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution." CoMMN. ON CoNsrrrUTIONAL REVI-
SION, REPORT ON THE CONsrITUTION OF VIRGINIA 125 (1969). The Commission recom-
mended the deletion of the provision, but the new Virginia constitution, effective 
July 1, 1971, retains the provision. VA. CoNST. art. IV, § 14. 
362. See statutes listed in note 242 supra. 
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the exercise of their religious functions. But whether these restrictive 
provisions are valid is another question. The first inquiry should be 
whether such laws are aimed peculiarly at religious societies. 
If, for instance, a limitation of this nature were part of the gen-
eral laws applicable to all corporations or at least to all nonprofit 
corporations, it may seriously be doubted that the validity of the 
restrictions could be challenged. On the other hand, if the limitation 
is directed peculiarly against corporations organized for religious 
purposes in order to prevent a large accumulation of property by 
churches, it may violate either the free exercise or the equal pro-
tection clauses. However, courts may accept the argument, based on 
historical experience, that some limitations on the holding of real 
property by churches is justified by the tendency of churches to accu-
mulate property and thereby to acquire power that may be deemed 
inimical to the public interests. In terms of a familiar test,363 the 
state may be found to have a compelling interest in imposing these 
restrictions. It is doubtful, however, that a state could persuasively 
document its position that accumulation of property by churches pre-
sents a greater threat to the public interest than accumulation by 
other corporations, both profit and nonprofit. 
Perhaps even more important in considering the free exercise 
clause are the restrictions that specifically tailored incorporation 
laws may place on the internal freedom of churches. These statutes 
may set forth very detailed procedures to be followed in nmning the 
affairs of the church. For instance, the New York statute that provides 
for the incorporation of the Episcopal Church specifically defines the 
powers of the vestry and the board of wardens and the procedure to 
be followed at meetings of the board.364 A celebrated case revolved 
around whether the statute had been duly observed with respect to 
the dismissal of a rector.365 In some states provision is made that only 
persons of legal age shall take part in the corporate meetings.866 
This is proving to be a particularly troublesome provision at present 
in view of the tendency to reduce the legal age, and in some cases 
363. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 
(1963). 
364. N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW §§ 40-49 (McKinney 1952), as amended, N.Y. REuG. 
CORP. LAw §§ 40-49 (McKinney Supp. 1972). 
365. Rector, Church Wardens &: Vestrymen of the Church of the Holy Trinity v. 
Melish, 301 N.Y. 679 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 936 (1951). This case was in and out 
of the New York courts from 1949 to 1958. The rector was dismissed due to alleged 
pro-Communist leanings. His successor was duly appointed by the bishop responsible 
and was required to secure a court order directing the sheriff to expel the dismissed 
rector from the vestry. The dismissed rector's son, however, was granted a stay of 
the order since he had not been a party to the original action. Application of Melish, 
6 App. Div. 2d 819, 176 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1958). The record is silent beyond this point. 
366. See note 269 supra and accompanying text. 
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churches have acted to reduce the voting age from twenty-one to eigh-
teen before the civil law has been modified. If a church in its own 
constitution and bylaws regulating its affairs as a religious society 
provides that eighteen-year-olds have a vote in all matters coming 
before the group, whereas the statute under which the church is in-
corporated permits voting to be done on matters properly coming 
before the corporate group only by persons of at least nventy-one 
years of age, may the church go ahead and do its business by refer-
ence to its own internal law and disregard the limitations imposed 
by the law under which it is incorporated? 
Any discussion of state involvement in a church's internal affairs 
brings up the dual capacities in which church corporations or church 
societies operate. With respect to the handling of business matters 
and the acquisition and disposition of property, church bodies are 
conducting secular affairs and are appropriately subject to the laws 
of the state. But with respect to their own spiritual affairs, such as 
the admission or expulsion of members, the election or dismissal of 
a minister, and questions of doctrine, ecclesiastical organizations 
continue to be viewed as unincorporated associations and are free 
to make their own decisions without interference by the state.367 
Matters distinctively spiritual or ecclesiastical relate to such issues as 
the admission or expulsion of members, the election or dismissal of 
a minister, and matters of doctrine. Obviously, this secular-spiritual 
dichotomy is of importance in connection with the questions we are 
discussing here. If the granting and exercise of the corporate privilege 
and the doing of business with regard to property matters is con-
sidered an aspect of the secular enterprise of the church, then church 
corporations, like other corporations, are subject to the state's usual 
laws respecting contract, property, and association law and must be 
expected to conform to it. It is not supposed that the churches do 
not have to conform with the property laws respecting the registra-
tion of deeds, the signatures required for a valid deed, and restrictions 
on the use of property or that a church is immune to the rules re-
specting contractual liability. Nor is it seriously argued that churches 
are immune to the general laws respecting the principles of agency 
in determining who is authorized to make contracts for a church. If 
this is the case, the question may seriously be raised whether churches 
may claim immunity to provisions of association law that affect the 
churches in carrying on their secular activities. 
Unfortunately, the spiritual-secular distinction, while an accept-
able abstract proposition, does not always admit of easy application. 
367. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian 
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872). 
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A matter that may seem secular to the civil authorities may have im-
portant religious significance to ecclesiastical authorities.368 For in-
stance, a church may well assert that the age at which members may 
participate in its meetings, when and how its meetings are conducted, 
and what procedures are used in calling and dismissing its ministers 
are internal affairs of central concern to its operation as a religious 
enterprise. The state may be intruding too significantly into the 
affairs of a church when it regulates these matters under its corpora-
tion laws.369 
A further consideration relevant to the spiritual-secular dichot-
omy is found in the doctrine of excessive entanglements, recently 
developed by the Supreme Court as a test in the interpretation of the 
establishment clause.370 The Court found that one purpose of the 
establishment clause is to avoid intrusion by civil authorities into 
religious affairs. Government may not engage in programs or enact 
laws that require extensive surveillance by civil authorities of the 
activities of religious institutions, since such surveillance entails the 
risk of entangling the state in matters of religious significance. The 
excessive entanglements idea at least suggests that the state may run 
afoul of the first amendment if it attempts to regulate internal church 
matters that have a significant religious aspect and may properly be 
regarded as falling within the sphere of the church's autonomy. 
While it may be argued that the religious society, having elected 
to avail itself of the corporate privilege, has consented to be governed 
by the conditions and restrictions imposed by the law, this argument 
does not answer questions raised by the excessive entanglements issue. 
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is now too well devel-
368. This situation has been causing some perplexity among courts faced with the 
problem. For example, in Draskovich v. Pasalich, 280 N.E.2d 69 (Ind. App. 1972), 
the court was faced with a property dispute involving a congregation of the Serbian 
Eastern Orthodox Church. The court, in the course of its opinion stated: 
This causes us to consider what is religious doctrine and practice ..•. 
The religious rites, doctrines, polity and practices of a church certainly contain 
as an essential part beliefs and practices in regard to the ownership of property. 
These beliefs are primarily religious and not secular. Frequently these beliefs are 
as strongly held as religious beliefs in regard to baptism or the sacraments. In 
other words, beliefs as to the proper method for a church to own property are 
frequently bound up with and intermingled in the religious rites, doctrines, polity 
and practices of the church. 
280 N.E.2d at 78-79 (emphasis original). 
369. President James Madison, in vetoing the bill to incorporate the Episcopal 
Church for the District of Columbia on the ground that it violated the establishment 
clause, relied primarily on the argument that the statute, by regulating matters in-
ternal to the church, intruded on ecclesiastical matters and gave a legal sanction to 
ecclesiastical law. See note 333 supra. 
370. Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970): "[I]he questions [in deciding 
whether to tax churches or grant exemptions] are whether the involvement is excessive, 
and whether it is a continuing one calling for official and continuing surveillance lead-
ing to an impermissible degree of entanglement." 
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oped to suggest that a state may condition a privilege in any manner 
it sees fit.871 Presumably a religious body may continue to exercise its 
general privileges to carry on business under a statute permitting its 
incorporation even though it challenges the validity of some statutory 
restrictions on the ground of undue interference in internal mat-
ters. a12 
The consent argument may have some validity, however, in the 
case of special incorporation statutes that, like those in New York, are 
tailored to meet the needs of a given denomination. It should be 
emphasized that statutes of this kind, enacted at the request of the 
body, are designed to secure a conformity of the civil law to the 
church's internal law. The state has accommodated its laws to the 
needs of a give:tJ. denomination and, in a very real sense, has used its 
authority to implement the freedom of the churches to fashion their 
own ecclesiastical law. It would seem that the problems most likely to 
arise will result from the failure to amend the statute to conform to 
changes in the church's own internal law.873 If a church is restricted 
by the provisions in a specifically tailored statute, perhaps it should 
seek amendment of the statute rather than attempt to repudiate a 
part of it on constitutional grounds. If the state has a general religious 
corporation law, it may be possible for the church to reincorporate 
under the general law; this could prove beneficial due to the greater 
freedom on internal matters that such laws generally allow.874 
Finally, attention may be directed to problems that may result 
from the intervention by civil organs in the internal affairs of a 
371. The doctrine is that a state may not condition a benefit on the waiver of a 
constitutional right. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970); Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963); Van 
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 
HARV. L REV. 1439 (1968). For earlier discussion, see Hale, Unconstitutional Condi-
tions and Constitutional Rights, 35 Coum:. L. REV. 321 (1935); Merritt, Unconstitu-
tio11al Conditions, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 879 (1929). 
372. See First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles, 357 U.S. 545 (1958), and 
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), where the Court held that churches could 
continue to enjoy statutory tax exemptions despite failure to observe restrictions that 
the Court found to be unconstitutional. 
373. See generally Casad, supra note 49. An excellent example of the type of exten-
sive regulation that this type of statute may impose can be found in Maryland. In 
Maryland, each diocese of the Episcopal Church has its own statute of incorporation-
c.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 274A-97 (Diocese of Maryland), 298-312 (Diocese of 
Eaton), 312A-Q (Diocese of Washington) (1973). These acts vary among the dioceses as 
to matters of internal regulation, but do regulate, among other things, such proce-
dural matters as the age of those eligible to vote for the vestry, MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, 
§§ 275 (Maryland, 18), 299 (Eaton, 21), 312A (Washington, 18) (1973), the number of 
vestr}men and the date of the annual congregational meeting, MD. ANN. CoDE art. 
23, § 301 (1973), powers and duties of the vestry, MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 304 (1973), 
powers, duties and obligations of the rector, MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 305 (1973), and 
powers and duties of the registrar, MD. ANN. CoDE art. 23, § 306 (1973). 
374. See note 353 supra and accompanying text. 
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religious society. Before further discussion, attention should be called 
to the implications of the Supreme Court's decision in Presbyterian 
Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial 
Presbyterian Church.815 The Court held that the Georgia courts had 
violated the religion clauses of the first amendment by upholding 
the freedom of a local Presbyterian congregation to secede from the 
national church body and to take its property with it.376 The Georgia 
courts had used the traditional departure-from-fundamental-doctrine 
rule to settle the dispute. According to this rule, property contributed 
to a religious body by its members was impressed with a trust in favor 
of the fundamental doctrines of that body. If a dispute arose over the 
control of this property, civil courts were allowed to determine which 
faction had been faithful to the trust.377 The Supreme Court held 
that the rule was unconstitutional because it required a state court 
to intrude into distinctively ecclesiastical matters-first, by determin-
ing the fundamental doctrines of the church and, second, by inquiring 
whether there had been a substantial departure from such doc-
trines.378 
The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Brennan, said that 
questions concerning church ownership, use, and control of property 
were appropriate for determination by the civil courts and might 
necessarily involve the application of doctrine if a dispute were due 
to an internal schism over control of church property. The doctrinal 
matter should, however, be left to determination by the authoritative 
organs established by the denomination, subject to possible judicial 
review for collusion or fraud.379 This approach requires a determina-
375. 393 U.S. 440 (1969). 
376. 224 Ga. 61, 159 S.E.2d 690 (1968). 
377. See Note, 75 HAR.v. L. REv. 1142, supra note 49; Note, 74 YALE LJ. 1118, supra 
note 49. 
378. The Court stated: 
The departure-from-doctrine element of the implied trust theory which they (the 
Georgia courts] applied requires the civil judiciary to determine whether actions 
of the general church constitute such a "substantial departure" from the tenets of 
faith and practice existing at the time of the local churches' affiliation that the 
trust in favor of the general church must be declared to have terminated. This 
determination has two parts. The civil court must first decide whether the chal-
lenged actions of the general church depart substantially from prior doctrine. In 
reaching such a decision, the court must of necessity make its own interpretation 
of the meaning of church doctrines. If the court should decide that a substantial 
departure has occurred, it must then go on to determine whether the issue on 
which the general church has departed holds a place of such importance in the 
traditional theology as to require that the trust be terminated. A civil court can 
make this determination only after assessing the relative significance to the religion 
of the tenets from which departure was found. Thus, the departure-from-doctrine 
element of the Georgia implied trust theory requires the civil court to determine 
matters at the very core of a religion-the interpretation of particular church 
doctrines and the importance of these doctrines to the religion. Plainly, the First 
Amendment forbids civil courts from playing such a role. 
393 U.S. at 449-50. 
379. 393 U.S. at 446-47. The Court stated that "civil courts [have] no role in deter-
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tion of the locus of ultimate authority, as fixed by church law. But 
the Court said that the matter could also be properly determined 
by the application of neutral principles.380 Presumably, the Court 
had in mind general principles derived from contract, property, or 
trust law or rules derived from the laws of a state relating to corpora-
tions and nonprofit associations.381 In a separate opinion accompany-
ing a later per curiam decision,382 Mr. Justice Brennan indicated that 
even the resort to church polity to resolve such disputes might also 
be illegal, since the inquiry into polity could itself be deemed to be 
an inquiry into an ecclesiastical matter. 
Admittedly, Presbyterian Church raises a number of difficult ques-
tions, as evidenced by the confusion in subsequent state court deci-
sions.383 No attempt is made in this Article to explore such difficult 
mining ecclesiastical questions in the process of resolving property disputes," but that 
"there might be some circumstances in which marginal civil court review of ecclesiasti-
cal determinations would be appropriate." 393 U.S. at 447 (emphasis original). It then 
quoted from Gonzalez v. Archbishop, 280 U.S. I, 16 (1929), as follows: "In the absence 
of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on 
matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation 
before the secular courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so 
by contract or otherwise." 393 U.S. at 447. This language, said the Court, 393 U.S. at 
447, was converted to a constitutional rule by Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the 
Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94 (1952). 
380. "Civil courts do not inhibit free exercise of religion merely by opening their 
doors to disputes involving church property. And there are neutral principles of law, 
developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied without establishing 
churches to which property is awarded." 393 U.S. at 449. 
381. See Justice Brennan's separate opinion in Maryland &: Va. Eldership of The 
Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368-70 (1970), 
concurring in the majority's per curiam dismissal of the appeal in this case. 
Justice Harlan, in his short concurring opinion in Presbyterian Church v. Mary 
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 451 (1969), indicated 
that nothing in the Court's opinion would preclude a state court's using familiar 
trust principles, including reversion of the property to the donor in case of failure 
to observe the conditions of the grant, in dealing with church property. 
Interestingly, the Georgia court, on remand of the Presbyterian Church case, inter-
preted language in the Court's opinion to mean that Georgia could no longer enforce 
any aspect of its implied trust doctrine with respect to property owned by a Presby-
terian congregation. Accordingly, it held that since title had been taken in the name 
of the congregation, the congregation would prevail. Presbyterian Church in the 
United States v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church, 225 Ga. 259, 167 S.E.2d 658 
(1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1041 (1970). Two other state courts, Wyche v. Alexander, 
15 N.C. App. 130, 189 S.E.2d 608 (1972); Presbytery v. Rohrbauer, 79 Wash. 2d 367, 485 
P.2d 615 (1971), have since interpreted the Court's language differently. 
382. Maryland &: Va. Eldership of The Churches of God v. Church of God at 
Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368-70 (1970). Justice Brennan was joined in his opinion 
by Justices Marshall and Douglas. 
383. The lower courts have used some widely disparate rules in handling church 
property disputes since the Presbyterian Church case. For example, in Nolynn Assn. of 
Separate Baptists in Christ v. Oak Grove Separate Baptist Church, 457 S.W.2d 633 
(Ky. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971), the Kentucky supreme court held that it 
was proper to seek to identify the polity of the church involved in litigation and to 
resolve property disputes accordingly. In Maryland &: Va. Eldership of The Churches 
of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 254 Md. 162, 254 A.2d 162 (1969), appeal 
dismissed, 396 U.S. 367 (1970), the Maryland court ignored polity and simply viewed 
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questions as whether church polity continues to be controlling, or 
even relevant, or whether there is room for continued application 
of an implied trust doctrine guided by conceptions of polity.384 The 
emphasis here is on the significance of the statutory provisions that 
may be invoked as neutral principles in the determination of these 
controversies. The statute under which a congregation is incorporated 
may prove to be decisive in a dispute involving questions of doctrine. 
For instance, in a recent case the Maryland Court of Appeals held 
that the statute under which the local congregation had been incor-
porated385 did not provide for any subjection of the congregation to 
the discipline and authority of a higher church body.386 The statute 
did not explicitly recognize the polity doctrine and on its face gave 
control of the property to the congregational corporation. The Mary-
land court saw the statute as a neutral principle of corporation law.887 
By a combination of what might be called the "formal title" doc-
trine388 and the positive statutory provision, the court decided the 
case without reference to the internal law of the denomination or 
to the implied trust doctrine. 
Whether the Maryland court made the correct choice of the ap-
plicable neutral principle is not the important question for our 
purposes; what is important is that the statµte played the decisive part. 
This suggests that an incorporation statute that explicitly subjects 
congregations that organize under it to the polity and discipline of a 
how title was actually held with respect to the local congregational property in ques-
tion. Accord, Smith v. Church of God, 326 F. Supp. 6 (D. Mo. 1971); Presbyterian 
Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian 
Church, 225 Ga. 259, 167 S.E.2d 658 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 104 (1970); Polen v. 
Cox, 259 Md. 25, 267 A.2d 201 (1970). Other courts view the implied trust doctrine as 
a permissible approach to the resolution of church property disputes, since they find 
it to be a "neutral principal of law." United Methodist Church v. St. Louis Crossing 
Independent Methodist Church, 276 N.E.2d 916 (Ind. App. 1971); Macedono-Bulgarian 
Orthodox Church "St. Clement Ohridski" v. Macedonian Patriotic Organization "Father-
land," 27 Mich. App. 713, 184 N.W.2d 233 (1970). 
384. For commentary on the Presbyterian Church case, see Casad, Church Property 
Litigation: A Comment on the Hull Church Case, 27 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 44 (1970); 
Kauper, Church Autonomy and the First Amendment: The Presbyterian Church Case, 
1969 SUP. Cr. REv. 347; Note, Hull Memorial: A Limited Solution to the Problem of 
Judicial Intervention in Church Property Disputes, 18 KAN. L. REv. 71 (1969); Note, 
Limitations on the Power of Courts in Resolving Church Property Disputes, 36 TENN. 
L. REv. 549 (1969). 
385. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 256-70 (1973). 
386. Maryland &: Va. Eldership of The Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharps-
burg, Inc., 254 Md. 162, 254 A.2d 162 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 367 (1970). 
387. "The Maryland Religious Corporation Law is a general law for all religious 
corporations and has no reference whatever to doctrine. It, therefore, meets the re-
quirement of a 'neutral principle of law.' " Maryland &: Va. Eldership of The Churches 
of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 254 Md. 162, 168, 254 A. 162, 166 (1969), 
appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 367 (1970) (emphasis original). 
388. Under this doctrine the titleholder of the property has the right to determine 
use of the property with neither theology nor administrative church law as relevant 
considerations. See generally Casenote, 54 IOWA L. REv. 899, 907 (1969). 
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denominational body would be recognized as a valid and controlling 
neutral principle that would not require a court to enter into con-
sideration of doctrinal matters. On the other hand, if the statute 
under which a church is incorporated makes no explicit mention of 
subjection of the local church to the discipline or authority of the 
church hierarchy, the resolution of a dispute between a local congre-
gation and a national church organization is not so clearly indicated. 
The statute can be construed to set forth a neutral principle, namely, 
that if the congregation is given authority to acquire, own and dispose 
of property, then, so far as the civil courts are concerned, the dispo-
sition of the property rests in the corporation according to procedures 
defined by its charter or bylaws.389 Thus, property acquired by a cor-
poration serving a local congregation might not be subject to any 
implied trust in accordance with the polity of the church. If, however, 
the congregation's affiliation with a hierarchical structure is recog-
nized in the congregation's constitution or bylaws, neutral principles 
of either contract, trust, or associational law may be invoked to justify 
a civil court's deference to the determination of the issue by the ap-
propriate ecclesiastical agency specified in the law of the church.390 
These considerations suggest that Presbyterian Church, by placing a 
premium on neutral principles-including principles derived from 
corporation statutes-may spark a new interest among national 
church organizations in incorporation statutes that deal specifically 
with given denominations and may thereby counter the general trend 
in favor of general religious corporate statutes such as the MNPCA. 
Quite clearly, a national body runs a risk if its local congregations are 
incorporated under general statutes that take no account of denomi-
national affiliations. 
The foregoing discussion suggests some corresponding questions 
concerning the merger of church bodies,391 particularly in the case 
where a congregation may want to disaffiliate itself from one denomi-
nation and attach itself to another. Obviously, the preceding discus-
sion will apply if the congregation is committed by statute to a given 
389. For an example of the mechanics of such an approach, see Mack v. Huston, 
23 Ohio Misc. 121, 256 N.E.2d 271 (C.P. 1970). 
390. Thus, in the hypothetical case under consideration, it could be concluded that 
the members, by their voluntary adherence to the written documents, had agreed to 
recognize the hierarchical authority and the organs provided for determination of 
disputes within the church. Or it could be concluded that the language in the basic 
documents of the local congregation subjected property acquired by the congregation 
to an implied trust governed by the polity and internal law of the church. 
391. On the issue of merger, see Cadman Memorial Congregational Soc. v. Kenyon, 
306 N.Y. 151 (1953), wherein a local congregation of the Congregational Christian 
Church sued to enjoin the merger of that church with the Evangelical and Reformed 
Church. The court of appeals of New York found that there was no harm to plaintiff 
in that its congregational polity was preserved by the merger and that none of its 
property rights was affected. 
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polity and subject to the discipline of a given church. On the other 
hand, if the statute under which a congregation is incorporated is 
silent on the matter of polity and affiliation and vests the property 
in the hands of the congregation, a neutral principle of corporation 
law would allow the congregation to elect to affiliate with another 
body and carry its property with it. A state court may still be free 
to invoke an implied trust doctrine to prevent the congregation from 
diverting the property from its original use.392 
Finally, questions may be raised respecting congregational dis-
solution, as distinguished from merger or transfer of assets to a re-
lated body. Here again, trust concepts may be involved. The property 
of an unincorporated church body is usually dealt with according to 
the doctrines of trust law.393 If there is a complete failure of the trust, 
the dissolution of the society may result in a reversion to the gran-
tor. 394 On the other hand, there may be an application of the cy pres 
doctrine, whereby the property is turned over to a use for a similar 
purpose.395 Of course, where the congregation was attached to a 
denominational body, it would be quite natural to suppose that the 
cy pres doctrine would be applied so as to require that the property 
be held for the benefit of that body or at least subject to its control. 
Some state statutes expressly provide for such disposition in the case 
of certain types of churches with a congregational polity.806 In any 
event, it would not appear that the property would simply be divided 
among the remaining members of the congregation. If, however, the 
congregation has been incorporated under a statute that simply pro-
vides for a dissolution procedure and for distribution of the property 
among the members, more difficult questions may arise. While the 
statutory procedure may be said to be a neutral principle, authorizing 
a distribution to members of property that, in its most essential as-
pects, can be viewed as held in trust for religious purposes would 
seem to be an extraordinary result. It can, therefore, be expected 
that the statute would be interpreted to mean that upon dissolution 
the property would be held in trust subject to the cy pres doctrine or 
held for the benefit of the denominational body to which the church 
is attached. 
392. See United Methodist Church v. St. Louis Crossing Independent Methodist 
Church, 276 N.E.2d 916 (Ind. App. 1971); Macedono-Bulgarian Orthodox Church "St. 
Clement Ohridski" v. Macedonian Patriotic Organization "Fatherland," 27 Mich. App. 
713, 184 N.W .2d 233 (1970). 
393. See note 49 supra. 
394. See text accompanying note 292 supra. 
395. See note 290 supra and accompanying text. 
396. See note 293 supra. 
